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ABSTRACT
In 1948 the twin policies of "democratisation" and 
"enterprisation" were put forward for application in Chinese 
industrial enterprises in the liberated areas. This essay 
explores the meaning of these two policies in the period of New 
Democracy down to the first year of the first Five Year Plan 
(1949-53) • ’'Democratisation” is examined in terms of the 
establishment of factory management committees and the Democratic 
Reform Movement which sought to remove "feudal elements" from 
factory management. We note that a switch occurred from a 
representative to a participatory definition of democracy. The 
term "enterprisation" is examined in terms of the establishment 
of a unified command structure within industrial enterprises, 
the adoption of a Soviet model of incentive and planning and 
the conclusion of intra-enterprise contractual agreements. 
Finally, an attempt is made to specify the roles of enterprise 
Party and union organisations.
The essay notes that throughout the period there occurred 
a contradiction between policy and resources which was most 
marked with regard to technically and politically competent 
personnel. This lack of necessary resources made elements of 
the Soviet model unrealistic in a Chinese context and sometimes 
resulted in patterns of organisation and incentive which were 
not at all in accordance with the prescriptions of that model.
The adoption of the Soviet model was further complicated 
by the rural tradition of the Chinese Communist Party and 
constant reference is made in this essay both to Yenan in the
1940s and to later periods when older views on organisation and 
incentive reasserted themselves and when it was seen that many 
of the problems that began to occur in this early period 
demanded radical solution.
The focus of this essay is political (concerned with power) 
and sociological (concerned with roles and structures) and 
relies heavily on secondary sources for economic analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Marxian theory stipulated that, following the Socialist 
Revolution, the workers were to be masters of society. The 
Chinese Civil War of 1946-4-9 was not seen as constituting a 
socialist revolution, the preferred term being "liberation” 
(chieh-fang) and the period which followed was seen not as one 
of socialism but of "new democracy" (hsin-min-chu-chu-i).
New democracy was to be a transitional stage between the 
democratic revolution and the building of a socialist state. 
During this period industry designated as "bureaucratic 
capitalist" (kuan-liao tzu-pen ti) and industry owned by the 
imperialist powers was to be taken over by the state, but a 
sizeable private sector was allowed to remain in existence.
The state-owned sector of the economy was to "exercise 
leadership" over the private sector and assist its socialist 
transformation. The recent publication of attacks on Liu 
Shao-ch'i's Tientsin Talks of April-May 194-9 have revealed that 
there was a considerable polemic over the duration of this 
transitional period though, since it is impossible to determine 
to what extent the charges made against Liu were Cultural ,
Revolution rationalisations, we are unable to determine its / 
extent.^
The term "bureaucratic capitalist" implied that it was
virtually impossible to separate industry which was in fact
state owned from the property of those large capitalists who
2
were members of, or who had close ties with, government. To 
all intents and purposes the bulk of industry taken over by 
the state following liberation and which fell into the 
category "bureaucratic capitalist" was state owned before
takeover (chieh-kuan). Such concerns accounted for more than
*
one third of industrial output in 194-9* On the eve of 
liberation, the Kuomintang government Resources Committee 
(Tzu-y&an Wei-yflan-hui) controlled 90% of the country’s iron 
and steel output, 33% of its coal, 67% of its electrical 
power, 43% of its cement and all its petroleum and non-ferrous 
metals. The China Textile Construction Company (Chung-kuo 
Fang-chih Chien-she Kung-ssu) controlled 37*6% of spindles in the 
country and 60% of weaving machines.^ Other forms of 
ownership that were to be included in the state sector were 
foreign concerns, most of which were taken over in the early 
1950s^ and industries temporarily taken over from the 
Manchukuo regime following Japan fs surrender. In this essay we 
are concerned only with that sector and more specifically the 
large industrial concern in that sector.
Although the period of New Democracy was not described as 
a "socialist" period, according to Leninist theory the
n
workers could still be considered as "masters" (chu-,1 en-weng)f 
and the factory democratisation movement which followed 
liberation was held to be an attempt to allow them to exercise
Q
and be conscious of that function. The Sixth All China Labour 
Conference resolved in August 1948 that the two main tasks 
facing industrial concerns were "democratisation" (min-chu-hua) 
and''enterprisation" (chf i-yeh-hua). These corresponded to 
democratic and centralist components in the theory of 
"democratic centralism" (min-chu chi-chung-chih). In the early 
days of liberation it was felt that one had only to juxtapose
12
these two elements for a synthesis to work itself out* though 
by 1957 Mao Tse-tung felt constrained to spell out the
o
potential antagonistic nature of these two components.J
The Chinese conception of democracy can he looked at in
two different ways. Firstly it is contrasted with centralism
and defined in a situation where decision making is extended
further down an organisational hierarchy. Secondly it is
contrasted with "bureaucratism”, and may be defined as
relatively broad participation in the making and execution of 
. . 10decisions. One may further break down this second definition 
into on the one hand a stress oh direct mass participation in 
the making and execution of decisions at the basic level and, 
on the other, a stress on a representative definition of 
democracy. It was the representative definition of democracy 
that held sway during the management democratisation movement 
(Kung-ch'ang Kuan-li Min-chu-hua Yfln-tung) of 1948-51 and this 
representative definition was replaced gradually by a 
participatory one during the democratic reform movement (Min-chu 
Kai-ko YtLn-tung) of 1951* During the process of 
decentralisation of late 1997 ib was to be the first 
(organisational) definition that was stressed.
In the first two chapters we shall discuss these two 
movements. Organisationally, the term "democratisation of 
management” consisted of the formation of factory management 
committees (kung-ch'ang Kuan-li wei-yflan-hui) with worker 
representation and these were to be the supreme policy-making 
organs within factories. The term "democratic reform" was the
process whereby "feudal" and "counter-revolutionary" elements 
were flushed out of management positions in preparation for 
organisational reform. We shall note that these movements took 
place at a much earlier stage in North East China than 
elsewhere, due to the fact that the North East was liberated 
earlier and was faced with a task of industrial rehabilitation 
more rapid than elsewhere.
The bulk of material used in the middle portion of this 
essay relates to North East China for three reasons. Firstly, 
our focus is on large industrial enterprises in the state 
sector, most of which were located in the North East. Secondly, 
the documentation for the North East is better than for 
anywhere else and thirdly, the North East (and more specifically 
the Joint Sino-Soviet concerns in Lushun and Talien) served as 
a model for the rest of the country during this period.
Wherever possible, however, an attempt was made to select 
examples from elsewhere by way of contrast. Secondly, as many 
examples as possible are taken from the iron and steel and the 
construction industries, since the former and more particularly 
the Anshan complex was probably the most advanced industry 
from the point of view of Soviet-type organisation and the 
latter was the one industry where old forms of organisation 
proved the most intractable.
The basic level industrial unit was the "enterprise" (ch1 i- 
yeh). Although this term existed in pre-liberation Chinese 
usage, it was employed in our period of study in its Soviet 
sense. It referred to a unit of one or occasionally several
factories united economically under the "economic accounting 
system" (ching-chi ho-suan-chih). From the standpoint of 
economic administration, it may he defined as that unit of 
industry which maintained its own hank account and which 
exercised a certain degree of autonomy in the use of funds
either allocated by the state or borrowed from the state
/
banking system. From the standpoint of political administration, 
the enterprise was that unit of administration at which "basic 
level" Party and mass organisations (labour union, etc.) were 
established.
The New Democratic period was one in which enterprises were 
being formed and, in using this term, one should constantly be 
aware of the dichotomy between natural and prescribed 
organisational forms. One might suggest that the dichotomy 
between the natural village and the administrative village had 
its urban counterpart, although this parallel should not be 
taken too far, since in terms of personnel the enterprise was 
usually co-terminous with the natural factory except in the 
case of huge vertically-integrated corporations (kung-ssu).
Like the term "commune" the term "enterprise" was used very 
loosely. It could mean an ideal form of organisation, a 
prescribed organisational form which temporarily fell short of 
that ideal or the actual existing industrial unit.
The term "enterprisation" included the establishment of a 
conception of "rationality", a discrete command structure, a 
definite pattern of work motivation and incentive, a unified 
planning and accounting system and a system of contractual
agreements between workers and management. In chapter three we 
shall discuss the efforts made to implement "enterprisation1 
during the Movement to Establish New Records (Ch'uang-tsao Hsin 
Chi-lu Yfln-tung) which began first in the North East in the 
autumn of 1949* The main aim of this movement was to establish 
norms by means of production competitions (sheng-ch'an ching- 
sai). According to these norms a system of planning and 
accounting could be established and a "rational" wage system 
determined. A secondary function served by this movement was to 
give Party branches and labour union branches, then in the 
process of formation, a chance to define their responsibilities. 
In chapters four to seven we shall discuss the political and 
sociological implications of each of the main elements of 
"enterprisation" as laid down during the New Record Movement, 
and how they were implemented in the period down to 1953.
In this analysis the perspective is essentially political 
and sociological. Consequently the discussion of economic 
problems that occurs in this essay does not constitute 
original research and is taken largely from secondary sources. 
Little attempt is made to discuss problems of business 
management or the effect of the total system on optimal 
resource allocation patterns. Little reference too is made to 
legal problems. The enterprise was defined as a "Juridical 
person" that could sue and be sued, but since our focus is on 
internal policy, the only contracts that will be discussed are 
internal labour agreements. What the essay is particularly 
concerned with is to what extent the conception of democracy 
changed during the period 1949-53» the extent and causes of
bureaucratism, changes in the structure of command within the 
industrial enterprise, the ideological effects of changes in 
incentive policy and the functions of the Party and labour 
union within the enterprise.
In the last two chapters we shall discuss the role of the
Party and labour unions in an atmosphere of growing centralism,
in the hope that some light might be shed on the radical reaction
against centralism that took place in 1957-8. Many writers
have attempted to describe the events of the middle 1950s as a
deviation from the Soviet model. In the light of recent
developments, one might wonder whether one should not consider
the imposition of Soviet patterns as deviant. In that this
essay deals with the imposition of those patterns which in Mao's
IXopinion were necessary but dampened creativity, I shall attempt 
to make a contribution to that end.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
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bee for example Chin-tai Ko-ming Li-shi6 — so, Hung-we i-ping 
Chan-tou Kung-ying-chan: (The Fighting Supply Station ot the 
Red Guards' of the Modern Revolutionary History Institute):
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from the Red Guards) Vol 1 Hong Kong: Ta-lu Ch!u-pan-she July 
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Donnithorne, Audrey China’s Economic System London: George 
Allen and Unwin 1967 p 1^5
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Kai-tsao (Socialist Transformation of China!s National Economy) 
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Workers in State-owned and Publically-owned Industrial Enter­
prises”) in Lao-tung Chfu-pan-she Dien-shen-pu: Ch 1i-yeh Kuan-li 
Min-chu-hua (The Democratisation “of Enterprise Management) 
Shanghai: Lao-tung Ch’u-pan-she July 1951 pp 5-10
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Among the People”) 27th February 1957 in Mao Tse-tung Chu-tso 
H^stlan-tu Chia-chung-pen (Selected Readings from Mao Tse-tung’s 
Works) pp V f 8-if99
Schurraann H. Franz Unpublished manuscript on industrial man­
agement in China 1. 16
In the ideal form of Soviet organisation described by Cheng 
Hung-su, the enterprise consisted of more than one factory 
presided over by a director (Chinese translation: ching-li)
whereas each constituent factory was presided over, by a 
Factory General Manager (FGM) (Chinese translation ch1ang- 
chang). In fact, in China, most enterprises were single 
factories and were presided over by an FGM.
See Cheng Hung-su MSu-lien ti Ch'i-yeh Kuan-li shih Tsen- 
yang T'iao-cheng ti” ("How Soviet Enterprise Management was 
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CHAPTER ONE DEMOCRATISATION OP MANAGEMENT' * t ' i
In this chapter it is noted that the pattern of take 
over (ehieh-kuan) in North East China differed somewhat from 
the rest of the country. This was probably due to physical 
reasons rather than policy differences, though there was certainly 
a policy dimension which was highlighted during the Cultural 
Revolution. Prom early 194-9 until 1951 existing factory structures 
were maintained as far as possible and "democratic reform" 
postponed until factory management committees, Party branches 
and labour union organisations were fully operational. This 
chapter will examine the functions of take over organs which were 
sent down by the provisional organs of local government set up 
following the liberation of various areas (military control 
commissions) and will discuss the formal procedure for establishing 
factory management committees and congresses of white and blue 
collar workers. The experiences of the factory management committee 
of the Tientsin Third Textile Mill were held up as a model and are 
narrated at length. In general, factory management committees 
were not very effective even in the North East which was acting 
as a general pacemaker for Chinese industrial organisation. Finally 
in May 1951 & decision was taken to force the pace of democratic 
refdrm and not to wait until management committees were fully 
operational. As a result of this switch, democracy began to be 
defined increasingly in a participatory as opposed to a rep­
resentative sense.
The Tientsin Talks
From the beginning of the final civil war (194-6) through to 
the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic (October 194-9)*
the policy of the Chinese Communist Party towards taking over
industrial units may he characterised by a continuous move from
radicalism to a moderate policy with rank and file cadres tending
to be somewhat more radical than centre• The recent publication
i
of attacks on Liu Shao-ch'i-'s Tientsin Talks of April-May 19^9 
will probably provoke considerable debate on how best to periodise 
these four years. It has been argued recently in the Chinese press 
that the policies announced by Liu in Tientsin ended the previous 
moderately radical policy in favour of a “revisionist*1 policy
2which favoured the national capitalists in the private sector 
and precluded fundamental rearrangement of factory management in 
the public (local government) and state sector^ and, as such, 
was a violation of the policy enunciated by Mao in his report to 
the second session of the Seventh Central Committee (March 5 19^9)5'
This essay will argue that the implementation of reform in 
the spring and summer of 19^9 was much less radical than in the 
earlier period and that the Tientsin Talks occupied an important 
place in the development of policy, but I am not convinced on the 
basis of available evidence that the Tientsin Talks constituted a 
total break with previous policy. The Tientsin Talks were the 
culmination of an increasingly moderate policy that can be traced 
from the end of 19^7 when it became clear that from then on cities 
would be occupied permanently.^ Reporting to the Central Committee 
of the Party at that time, Mao made it clear that excessive 
radicalism was to be curbed. Throughout 194-8 a number of articles 
appeared in the press urging cadres to concentrate on increasing 
production, condemning the importation of “agricultural socialism" 
(nung-veh she-hui-chu-i) into the industrial sector and opposing
>1 7
”guerillaism, 11 left adventurism” and a general leftist orientation'. 
The Talks were hut the culminatiaa of this process.
This is not to say that I reject the charge that Liu's 
Tientsin Talks were opposed by Mao. Some scholars have tended 
to question the Cultural Revolution assertions of disagreement on
Q
the gronhds that Mao said much the same thing as Liu • We have 
seen, however, instances where both Mao and Liu have attacked 
their own deeply held beliefs in conformity to Party policy (for 
example, the attack on the Lo Ming line in 1934 and Liu's defence 
of imbalance in 1958) and this question can only be left open. 
Suffice it to say that it was Liu Shao-ch'i who made the most 
extreme anti-radical speeches in the spring of 1949 and this 
affected the subsequent take-over of factories.
It was not, however, purely policy considerations that 
accounted for the different process of take over in areas liberated 
before and after the spring of 1949*
Different Patterns of Reform in North East China and Elsewhere
Fighting in cities in the North East was considerably more
severe than in cities south of the Great Wall. The result was that
a considerable amount of industry was destroyed in that region
q
and many factories were not operational upon liberation.^ In
addition, the occupying Soviet troops had removed a large amount
of industrial equipment after Japan's surrender, as indeed had
10Chinese Communist Party led troops guilty of left deviation.
Most seniov? management had been transferred south by the Kuomintang 
military authorities before the People's Liberation Army entered
the cities and those that were left were under suspicion as
Kuomintang appointees promoted to replace Japanese managers when
Manchukuo industries were taken over by the state after the war 
11with Japan. The increasingly mild policy reflected in the
'ip
resolutions of the Sixth Labour Conference of August 1948 did
not prevent the North East Bureau of the Party issuing a
directive to the effect that KMT members should not be employed
in senior management positions for the time being,^ though it
would seem that the acute shortage of senior managerial
personnel was due to reasons more physical than political.
14Accounts of the take-over of industries in Shenyang do not
seem to be very different from accounts of the subsequent take-
18over of Shanghai industries. y The main difference would seem to 
be that in Shenyang there were not so many managers that could 
be retained and Shanghai was not faced with such a large scale 
programme of industrial rehabilitation.
The North East People's Government (NEPG) and 
administrations in older liberated areas were required, there­
fore, to appoint new people to many senior management positions.
16Middle level management was largely retained, but senior posts
were often filled by promoted personnel or, more likely, people
17transferred from outside the industrial sector. f There were
consequently a large number of inexperienced people in senior
positions. Press articles time and again bemoaned the fact that
cadres were being despatched at random to serve as managers and 
18accountants. They sometimes brought with them "the line of 
the poor peasant and hired hand" which paid no attention to 
costs and raised wages at will.^ Insufficient attention was 
paid to the training and promotion of middle level cadres and in 
some cases the restoration of production meant that the
proportion of skilled workers to unskilled workers had gone 
down.^0
Tientsin was perhaps one of the last major cities where
take-over proceeded according to the earlier North East pattern.
It was an anomaly in that the actions of lower level cadres seem
to have been much more radical than those in Shenyang which had
21been liberated some months before. Nevertheless the picture 
painted by Liu Shao-ch'i in his (alleged) report to labour 
unions reveals, in an extreme form, the kind of problems faced 
by Communist Party cadres in a situation where senior management 
had fled south. According to Liu, the "bureaucratic capital­
ists" had vanished and the Communist Party cadres transferred
from the countryside to replace them were sometimes less
22literate than the workers. The extant document may well be 
corrupt and should be understood in a context where Liu was 
trying to persuade workers and labour union officials not to 
hold FGMs in awe, nevertheless there is sufficient evidence from 
the North East to show that the experience of newly appointed 
FGMs was often of a very different kind from that required by 
modem industry. I have, however, seen no description of senior 
management in the North East as semi-literate.
The influx of new inexperienced senior management in the 
North East and parts of North China liberated before the spring 
of 1949 had three important consequences which will be examined 
in this essay. Firstly, their inexperience resulted in an 
enormous influence exercised by the joint Sino-Soviet 
enterprises in Lushun and Talien which were under Soviet 
occupation and where, in fact, senior management was largely 
Soviet; this will be discussed in
Chapter Three. Secondly, there was a tendency for some enterprise 
Party branches to take over the functions of technical management 
who were no more experienced than they; this will be discussed 
in Chapter Eight. Thirdly, since the North East and some other 
old liberated areas were starting the task of restoring production 
with large numbers of new personnel, these areas were able to 
combine the two movements which comprised the democratisation 
process - the "democratisation of management1 and "democratic 
reform".
Democratisation of management consisted of the formation of 
factory management committees with worker representation and 
democratic reform was the process whereby "feudal" and "counter­
revolutionary" elements were flushed out of management positions 
and new management structures created. These two movements could 
go hand in hand because there were not many retained personnel 
in senior positions. Further south in places like Shanghai, the 
situation was very different.
Throughout 1948, the policy of restoring production grew more 
and more important and after the moderate line was reiterated 
in the spring of 1949* even greater efforts were made to ensure 
the cooperation of former managers in the state sector. This is 
not to say that no reform was attempted in factories in the south, 
for many accounts were published dealing with the struggles against 
secret agents and saboteurs. "Yellow" (KMT) labour union officials 
were a special target since they were frequently identified with 
the Chun-t'ung (KMT military secret service).^ Nevertheless, 
policy remained extremely mild, which meant that the internal
organisation of factories south of.the Great Wall remained much
04
the same as it was prior to liberation.
The Structure and Function of Take-over Organs
The cities were liberated by military force (for example,
Shenyang), by diplomacy (Peking) or by a combination of the two
(Shanghai), not by popular uprising. In areas where there was a
fairly strong Communist Party organisation, such as Shanghai,
worker picket organisations (kung-ti en chiu-ch* a-tui) were formed
by the Party underground to prevent sabotage by retreating KMT
troops and the removal of equipment and personnel to areas still
25held by the KMT. x In Shanghai, for example, the Party under­
ground set up a People*s Peace Preservation Corps (Jen-min Pao-an-
tui) consisting of some 60,000 people (of whom 60% were 
26workers). This corps maintained discipline whilst the fighting 
was still going on and undertook policing and patrolling duties.^ 
Picket organisations assisted in disarming hostile units, 
confiscated weapons, unearthed hidden material, persuaded KMT 
units to change sides and generally acted as intermediaries 
between the People*s Liberation Army (PLA) and enemy troops 
stationed in factories.^®
This was presumably how their predecessors saw their function
in 1927 and 19^5- On those two occasions worker picket
organisations were formed in haste but soon suppressed by their
erstwhile allies. This time they were to be absorbed into the
Party and union structures which they were instrumental in
creating. Picket organisations were to appear in 195"! during the
2QDemocratic Reform Movement and again during the Cultural
f ■ ■
Revolution where they were said to be employed by power holders 
(tang-ch*flan-p*ai) to neutralise Red Guard criticism.^
The duties of the worker picket organisations were not confined 
to serving a quasi-military function. They also supervised the 
distribution of rations and tried to keep production going^.
Some industrial units such as the Shanghai Power Company boasted 
that its workers remained on duty under enemy gunfire and that the 
supply of electricity was not interrupted for one day^ and others 
resumed operations to the sound of gunfire^. It is impossible to 
assess how much more disruption of Shanghai industry would have 
been caused had there been no worker picket organisations; suffice 
it to say that, in the opinion of Jao Shu-shih, the newly appointed
secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee, their
'54-function was indispensable to the smooth transfer of power^ .
Shanghai was relatively fortunate. There had not been such 
widespread disruption of industry as had occurred in some places in 
the North East and the worker picket organisations had been relatively 
disciplined. In Tientsin the situation had been very different. 
According to Liu Shao-chfi, worker organisations had often dis­
regarded Party policy, taken over factory management themselves and
35set up industrial cooperatives which very soon went bankrupt^ .
The smoothness with which take-over was effected depended very
much upon the efficiency of local Military Control Commissions Cchun-
shih kuan-chih wei-vuan-hui^. The function of these bodies has been
succinctly described by Doak Barnett as similar to receivers in
bankruptcy^. In Peking the Control Commissions were assisted by a
Joint Administrative Office consisting of KMT officials and Communist
Party representatives. The KMT members of this office were required
37to reveal the assets of the former government^f and those of
organisations designated as "bureaucratic capitalist", whereupon 
the Military Control Commission made an inventory and prepared 
to hand over control of these assets to the newly formed local
70
people*s government •
The worker picket organisations did not take over the
management of factories themselves, though they often formed take-
over assistance grpups (pang-chu chieh-kuan hsiao-tsu) which
cooperated with formal take-over groups (chieh-kuan tsu) sent down
40by local Military Control Commissions . Factory based take-over 
assistance groups were required to mobilise the workers to assist
JxA
the formal take-over groups in stock taking (ch*ing-tien) .
Factories formed stock-taking committees (chf ing-tien wei-yuan-hui)
42which contained a number of worker delegates • For example, the
First Woollen Mill (formerly owned by the China Textile Construction
Company) in Shanghai elected one man for every shop of 50 workers
(thirty delegates) and the Sixteenth Mill elected one delegate for
every thirty workers (72 delegates)^. These stock taking committees
were ideally to contain worker activists, white collar workers and
old skilled workers who were all enjoined to solicit and accept
44
the opinions and suggestions of rank and file workers . Once 
formed, the stock taking committees divided out work according to 
technical criteria, making sure that specialists were engaged in 
checking items within their speciality^.
When stock taking was completed, military representatives
(appointed by the original take-over group) and representatives of
the take-over assistance groups were required to jointly affix their
seals to a stock-taking record which was submitted to the local
46Military Control Commission • In Shanghai the Military Control
Commission had designated a financial and economic committee to 
supervise this and other economic items and this sub-committee was 
empowered to send down work teams to factories that required extra 
help .^
In addition to the above duties, the stock-taking committees
also concerned themselves with restoring damaged stock and often
48emergency repair teams were formed . The Woosung Gas Works was
cited as a model of stock taking* The works had been seriously
damaged by retreating Kuomintang troops (evidently this was not
one of the most successful examples of the work of the Peace
Preservation Corps). These troops had burned the motor of the
ammonium sulphate plant, broken the dying chamber and appropriated
several hundred household gas meters. The workers worked night
40
and day for 35 days and restored the damage . It was during this 
emergency repair stage that retained management and newly formed 
worker organisations such as the stock-taking ^emergency repair 
groups had their first experience of cooperation, under the watchful 
eye of a military representative who had been left behind by the 
original take-over group. One is immediately reminded of the 
factory revolutionary committees which were formed during the 
Cultural Revolution following the dissolution of groups very similar 
to the worker picket organisations (and often going Tinder that very 
name)^.
The provision for a military representative in the new
managerial organisation parallelled the organisational framework
at municipal level. At that level Military Control Commissions had
been established as temporary bodies until local level government
51and Party organisations were fully operative*^ • Within the
industrial unit the military representative was the structural
equivalent of a Party secretary and remained as interpreter of
Party policy until a formal Party secretary was appointed. The
post of military representative was primarily a political rather
than an administrative appointment. He was to supervise the
implementation of Party policy rather than take administrative
52decisions himself^ . At a time when horizontal (local) links were
probab^yO stronger than vertical (ministerial) links, his connection
with local military control commissions was of great significance.
In Chapter Eight we shall note that when horizontal links were
strong there was a tendency for basic level Party secretaries to
take over many of the functions of management. In 1950 Teng Tzu-
hui, Deputy Chairman of the Central South Military Administration
Committee, warned against military representatives abusing their
53position in a similar way^ . Listing the duties of the military
representative, Ch*en Po-ta, who at that time was Deputy Chairman
of the Party*s Propaganda Department, made it quite clear that he
was not only seen as a structural equivalent of a Party secretary,
but also as his functional equivalent. The military representative
was not only to supervise the conduct of management but was also to
serve as a policeman and an educator. He was to conduct research
into technical and financial problems, eliminate waste, help
organise labour union branches and consumer cooperatives and was to
promote activists and cadres from among the white and blue collar 
54workers^.
Paced with this rather impressive catalogue of the military 
representative *s duties, it is perhaps strange therefore that the 
few accounts I have seen which describe the activities of military 
representatives do not reveal them as very dynamic and revolutionary
characters, in striking contrast to later literature which is 
lavish in its praise of good Party secretaries. It is even more 
strange that Li Li-san, who in the early 1950s was Minister of 
Labour and first Vice Chairman of the ACFL, was to remark that the 
military representative * s power was simply that of ultimate veto.^ 
One can only conclude that the policy of maintaining the status quo 
south of the Great Wall severely circumscribed the formal power 
given to military representatives. As a quasi Party secretary 
without a Party organisation within the factory, his only power 
derived from his links with local military control commissions who 
were probably unwilling, in this early period, to precipitate 
conflict with retained management. In the North East the situation 
was a little different in that by 19^9 many of the military 
representatives had been replaced by formal Party secretaries and 
the functions of military control commissions were being handed 
over to local government. I offer the above only as a hypothesis 
since no conclusion may be reached until we are in a position to 
evaluate Teng Tzu-hui*s warning that military representatives should 
not take everything on to their own shoulders; one should bear in 
mind, however, that Teng was talking about the Central South 
region which in terms of organisational development was some one or 
two years behind the rest of the country, as our subsequent 
discussion of the Democratic Reform Movement will show.
There are few references to the operation of Party branches 
at factory level during the take-over period. Where underground 
branches did exist they were instrumental in forming picket groups. 
For example, the Party committee of the Men-t*ou-kou Colliery 
outside Peking organised a picket group to take over the Kuomintang 
police station attached to the mine and in April 19^9 less than five
months after liberation it was able to organise a mine labour
union branch and a factory management committee^®. There were
57also many factory Party cells in Shanghai ' before liberation 
but it would seem that factories which had Party cells were 
exceptions and in most cases the function of political leadership 
and control was, at least formally, exercised by a military 
representative and he continued to exercise this function until 
the creation of effective factory Patty organisations.
Formal Structure of the Factory Management Committee 
The period of military control was to be only a temporary one# 
Municipal military control commissions were required to hand over 
authority to municipal people's governments once they had full 
control over enemy assets. Similarly,take-over personnel (such 
as the military representatives) at lower levels were required 
gradually to hand over authority to structures equivalent to the 
people's governments. At factory level these were the factory 
management committees. People's governments were set up soon 
after the military control commissions and coexisted with them for 
some time as authority was transferred^®. Similarly, provision 
was made for the early establishment of factory management 
committees upon which a military representative would sit as an 
ex officio member.
Provision for the establishment of factory management committees 
was made by the Sixth Labour Conference in August 194-8^ and
60detailed regulations appeared in 19^9 governing their formation •
The various regulations and directives 'are summarised below.
In addition to the military representative, the following 
personnel were to be ex officio members, the FGM (or in the case
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of corporations the director (ching-li)), the Chief Engineer 
(or principal engineer), the labour union chairman (once the 
labour union organisation had been formed) and the deputy FGM 
or director (who was often also Chief Engineer) • The remaining 
members (from five to seventeen) would be elected from a meeting 
of all white and blue collar workers (ch'uan-t1 i chih-kung ta- 
hui) or in the case of large enterprises a congress of white and 
blue collar workers (chih-kung tai-piao ta-hui) (hereafter 
Workers and Staff Congress) which would be convened by the labour 
union. The elected members were to submit to reelection once 
every six months^.
The FGM was to be chairman of the factory management committee 
and also of its standing committee which would consist of the 
chairman of the labour union and the military representative (ex 
officio) and one other member elected by the factory management 
committee. In large factories and where there were branch factories, 
management sub-committees might be organised, their method of 
organisation being the same as general committees. The general 
committee was to meet once every two weeks and branch committees
once every week. Standing committee members were required to be
62in constant communication with each other
Formal Duties of the Factory Management Committee
The factory management committee was defined as the 
1 administrative organisation exercising unified leadership within
63the factory or enterprise, under the leadership of higher organs”. . 
Its task was to relate the directives and production plans of 
higher organs to the concrete situation in the particular factory
and to discuss and decide all important questions concerning 
production such as plans, operations, management systems, 
production organisation, appointment and dismissal of personnel, 
salaries and welfare. It was required to carry out periodic 
investigations into how economic plans and its own resolutions were
cj\
being implemented and make summaries of work done.
The standing Committee was to handle day to day work 
concerning all the above matters in the spirit of decisions taken 
by the factory management committee. Branch committees were to 
have no decision making power beyond the application of the 
decisions of the general committee to their particular branches. 
There were, however, required to put forward suggestions on any 
topic.^
The Veto Power of the FGM
The principle of unified leadership demanded that all decisions 
taken by a factory management committee would only become effective 
when they were promulgated as administrative orders by the FGM 
or director. If a decision were taken by a majority of the 
committee which the FGM considered to be against the best interests 
of the factory or not in accordance with higher directives, then 
he had the right of veto but was required to report the reasons 
for his veto to a higher level for ratification. Similarly, if a 
majority of the factory management committee considered that the 
FGM had acted wrongly in applying his veto or if they disagreed 
with the report which he was required to submit to each of its 
meetings, they likewise could submit their views to a higher 
level. Pending a directive from the higher level, committee 
members were required to abide by the decision of the FGM. If 
a matter of urgency arose which the FGM did not have
time to submit before the factory management committee , he
might act without reference to the committee provided that he
66subsequently inform that body for its approval . Such a form­
ulation gave the FGM considerable leeway to disregard democratic 
procedure. His arbitrary actions would be checked so long as the 
higher level valued the principle of democratic decision making, 
so long as there was adequate contact between basic and higher 
levels in a ministerial chain of command and so long as there were 
effective political control personnel within the factory who were 
willing and able to supervise the FGM*s conduct. As one might 
expect, concern was expressed about the potentially undemocratic 
nature of the FGMfs veto and handbooks for labour union workers 
went to great pains to assure the sceptical that there was really 
no danger^7. Democracy was to be "democracy under centralised 
leadership” for only this way could will and action be unified. The 
FGM was the highest responsible person in the factory and since 
"the higher levels understand the whole picture better and represent
the views of the majority, this power of centralism is built upon
68a democratic foundation" • The veto was Justified on the grounds 
that it would prevent confusion arising when the FGM and management 
committee were at odds. If the FGM*s decision were wrong, one 
could expect the higher level to rectify it^. It was soon to be 
discovered that such a faith in bureaucracy was a irrifle naive.
Formal Structure of the Workers and Staff Congress
The regulations of early 19^ *9 stipulated that in addition 
to a factory management committee, there was also to be organised 
a Factory Workers and Staff Congress in factories employing over 
200 people. This body was to be convened by the Chairman of the 
labour union and was to meet once or twice per *i>onth, preferably 
on a public holiday or in the workers* spare time, each session
not lasting more than half a day. Delegates to the congress 
were to he elected from each basic unit (production teams, shifts 
etc.) and each delegate was to be directly responsible to the unit 
he represented. Elections were to be held annually unless a 
delegate was recalled by his constituents. Ihrparticularly large 
factories, the congress might divide into two levels, delegates 
to the higher level being elected from the lower level^.
"Self Examination1
The congress was not authorised to make authoritative 
decisions and its resolutions had to be ratified by the factory 
management committee and promulgated by the FGM before they took 
effect^. Its main function was to expose the FGM to a fairly 
large representative body which would listen to his report and 
offer criticisms and suggestions concerning his management of the 
factory. FGMs were frequently required to make a public "self- 
examination" (chien-t1ao), the importance of which should not be 
under-estimated. Managers were considered as "intellectuals" (chih- 
shih fen-tzu). preoccupied with questions of "face" and the 
management-worker gap was, to a far greater extent than in the West, 
reinforced by class and cultural distinctions. In the past workers 
and management were often very carefully insulated from contact 
by the gang-boss system (pa-t1 ou chih) (which will be discussed in 
the next chapter). Managers were not used to direct contact with 
the workers and many of them felt, therefore, that a system which 
demanded the FGM report to a factory congress would harm their
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prestige, especially if they were required to make "self-examinations" 
The official view considered questions of "face" a characteristic 
of a petty-bourgeois outlook and that the process of "self-exam­
ination" would enhance the prestige of the FGM for the workers
would treat a sincere self-examination with respect and "regard 
the FGM as a member of the same family".*^ One cannot but 
observe that workers and FGMs often came from very different 
kinds of family and the official view confused petty-bourgeois 
"liberalism" (in Mao’s sense of the word) and the legacy of a 
traditional shame culture.
One may argue that China is eaperiencing a process of
transition from shame culture to guilt culture. In the former
the fear of public humiliation acts as an incentive to ' . s
prescribed conduct. In the latter there is an active desire to
confess one’s faults in public in order to lighten the burden
of guilt unshared. In this early period "intellectuals" such as
factory managers were greatly afraid Of public humiliation and
for this reason attempts were made to expose such managers to
the criticism of workers. So long as this criticism is
constructive, the fear of humiliation may be lessened and one
can proceed to develop inner-directed patterns of motivation
74-more conducive to economic development.(
The function of self confession was not only to lay the
foundation for psycho-cultural change, but was also the first
step in a process which sought to transform "organisation",
which is characterised by a network of interconnected roles and
structures, into "community", which is characterised by a
75network of interconnected human relat ion s.T he closure of 
the elite-mass gap lies at the core of Mao’s view of
76community, and if one wishes to effectively close this gap there 
must he a free flow of information throughout an organisation.
Prior to liberation, management was not concerned with
explaining policy to workers and later, as a result of the obsession
with secrecy that characterised the period of China fs First Five
Year Plan, many crucial policy decisions were not communicated to
them. In the early New Democratic period, however, any attempt
to hide economic secrets from factory workers was strongly opposed.
Fears were expressed by management that once workers knew about
the current state of enterprise profits they might ask for higher
wages and some managers advocated concealing certain information
from factory management committees for reasons of security. At this
77stage any such advocacy was denouncedf'.
The Congress and the Labour Union
The communication function of the congress would probably 
be better served if the congress were not tied to any formal 
organisation since formal organisational ties tend to produce 
formalised procedure. In the Soviet Union, for example, the 
establishment of formal ties between workers* councils and labour 
unions resulted in the latter swallowing up the former, only to be 
devoured themselves by the State^®.
In China the regulations of early 19^9 governing the establish­
ment of management committees and congresses indicate that a very 
close connection between the labour union and the congpess was 
envisaged. The labour union committee was to organise the congress 
and was obliged to carry out all its resolutions (unlike the
management committee which was only required to listen to its
advice) and the labour union committee was not empowered to alter
the resolutions of the congress without the permission of a higher
79level labour pnion organ .
Reading the resolutions of early 19^9* one might have 
supposed that the worker and staff congress was a part of the 
labour union structure and its relationship to the union committee 
was much the same as a Party Congress to its Central Committee.
This, however, was not the case. In reply to a query as to whether 
the congress had the right to elect the union committee and to 
amend the factory labour union constitution, a handbook for labour 
union cadres entitled One Hundred Questions on the Workers Movement
declared that the congress should not have that right which properly
80belonged to a Labour Union Member Conference • The congress was
to be organised by the labour union but remain outside the union
structure. This distinction was probably stressed because when
the regulations governing worker and staff congresses were drawn
up in early 194-9 most of the country had no basic level labour
union organisations and, indeed, much of the country had not been
liberated. It was probably in recognition of this fact that the
One Hundred Questions (published in December 194-9) stated that
congresses should be organised jointly by the PGM and labour union 
8*1Chairman rather than the labour union Chairman alone as was laid 
down in the regulations of May 194-9* Furthermore, congress 
delegates were frequently not union members which irked labour 
union committees who were required to carry out congress resolutions, 
In reply to a question on this point, the One Hundred Questions 
could only reply that if some congress delegates were not union
members, they ought to be, since the very fact that they had been 
elected showed that they had the confidence of the masses and were
gO
ideal labour union material • Within a few years of liberation,
83however, over ninety per cent, of people eligible for union membership y 
had joined and this could no longer have been a source of tension.
By that time, however, the congress system was all but defunct.
The Process of Democratisation: a Case Study - the Tientsin Third 
Textile Hill
The above description of the formal institutional structure of 
the Mdemocratisation” process tells us very little about how 
"democratisation” worked in practice. The following account deals 
with one textile mill in Tientsin from liberation (January 19^ -9) 
through to early 1950 and, although the situation in Tientsin as a 
whole wajs hardly typical, the process of "democratisation” in the 
Third Mill was fairly smooth and its experiences were propagated for 
other factories to study.
On the 15th January 19^9 the PLA. occupied Tientsin and a take­
over group was immediately assigned to the mill, which had formerly 
been owned by the Chinese Textile Construction Company and was therefore 
subject to confiscation. No details are given as to who comprised this 
group though it may be assumed that it was sent by the local Military 
Control Commission. It proceeded to impose controls over the top 
management and consolidate control from the top down; the impression 
one gets from the account is that top management remained unchanged 
though it became subject to military supervision. The take over group 
formed a work team (kung-tso-tsu) whose task was to mobilise workers to 
elect delegates who would assist the take over group in stock taking
which was completed in two days®'*.
Production recommenced on the third day hut due to a 
shortage of raw materials the machinery could only run from three 
to four days per week and it was not until April that all the 
machines could he operated for a full week. The atmosphere in 
Tientsin during the first three months after liberation was quite 
revolutionary. No attempts were made at the Third Mill, however, 
to effect any radical reorganisation, and no changes were made in 
jobs or wages. Nevertheless, the revolutionary atmosphere in 
Tientsin did have some effect upon the workers. They expressed 
dissatisfaction with their jobs and wages and wished to engage in 
struggle with the white collar workers. The white collar workers, 
for their part, (presumably fearful of what was going on elsewhere 
in the city) considered that the question of wages and jobs was 
just being used as a means for fomenting strife between white and 
blue collar workers to secure their replacement by former blue
collar workers. Needless to say, tension and bad labour discipline
86affected production and caused waste
In April 19^9» I*iu Shao-ch*i visited Tientsin and delivered 
his Tientsin Talks. With regard to policy in the public sector, 
his major theme was the need for unity between white and blue 
collar workers. Whatever truth there was in the charges that Liu 
sought a "capitalist restoration",-after his speeches there was 
less stress on instant democracy within Tientsin factories and 
tension between white and blue collar workers at the Third Mill 
lessened. As a result of Liu*s speeches, the Tientsin General 
Labour Union put forward a mild policy for the democratisation of
factory management within the city and the only elements that
continued to he prosecuted were former "yellow” labour union
officials. It became clear that management was to be subjected to
"democratic control" through a factory management committee which
was formally set up on 25th April^. This was not long after Liu's
arrival in Tientsin. It was before his authoritative speech to
88labour union cadres and I have only found reference to one w'r;;:r;h 
of Liu's Tientsin speeches which antedates the establishment of 
the factory management committee (that of 24th April) I suspect 
that the account gives too much credit to Liu Shao-ch'i, especially 
since it states that changes in personnel organs were effected, a 
worker and staff congress set up and a labour union preparatory 
committee organised after Liu's speech and before the establishment 
of the factory management committee^.
The account is very vague about how the management committee
was elected. Elections were supervised by the take-over group
whose work had finished in the middle of January and since it is
difficult to imagine that this group was still in the mill, I can
only assume that the members of the management committee were the
very people who had been elected to help out the take-over group
in the three days after liberation, especially. since the account
tells us that at the time of election some workers had not much
idea as to what a factory management committee was even after three
91days* propaganda^ .
The take-over group had very little idea about the nature of
factory management, how to conduct elections or how to conduct
92preparatory work prior to the electionsJ • Furthermore, the formation
of the management committee was undertaken before the detailed 
regulations on the formation of factory management committees in 
North China were promulgated7 . I assume that all the take-over 
group had to go on were the vague formulations of the Sixth 
Labour Conference and perhaps some concrete examples from the North 
East where factory management committees were already in operation*
The inexperience of the take-over group, together with a 
distrust of white collar workers on the part of blue collar workers 
resulted in the majority ol elected members? I consisting of unskilled 
workers with no technical knowledge. Some members were clearly 
unsuitable bn political grounds; for example, the delegate of the 
cloth mill, Liu Tso-hsiang, proved his unsuit ability when discussing 
wages by proposing to increase his own bonus. Other members did 
not say anything at all fearing, on the one hand, to say anything 
which the leadership might find "incorrect" and, on the other hand, 
to say anything which would incur the anger of their constituents. 
Still others concerned themselves with petty trifling questions^*.
The picture, presented here, reveals a combination of fear and 
indecision remarkably similar to the early stages of land reform 
in the rural sector.
Because of its manifest incompetence, the FGM did not treat 
the committee very seriously. He either failed to carry out 
conscientiously the committee*s resolutions or exercised his veto.
The military representative, for his part, tended to side with the 
FGM. The FGM vetoed a majority proposal for the establishment 
of a cooperative store. He refused to entertain a proposal calling 
for the abolition of the system whereby workers were searched when 
leaving the factory, even though such a system had long been attacked
in Communist Party propaganda and refused to authorise the release 
of labour to the labour union for the construction of an air 
raid shelter at a time when North Chinese cities were being 
bombed77.
Then something happened to change the FGM*s mind, though the 
text does not make it very clear exactly what this was. His 
changed attitude was ascribed to the persistence of the Party, 
the military representative and the labour union. I am not clear 
exactly what was meant by the Party in this context since no 
reference is made to the appointment of a Party secretary; the 
subsequent account, however, does indicate that there were some 
Party members in the mill so presumably some cell organisation 
existed. The management committee now felt sufficiently confident 
to make proposals concerning the training of workers for part­
icipation in management and the promotion of skilled workers to 
supervisory posts. Acting on a committee proposal, Party members 
and the labour union preparatory committee organised an eight 
term training class in which six hundred and forty-five workers 
enrolled. The curriculum stressed the fostering of a new labour 
attitude and the role of the workers in management and the graduates 
of this class were to form the backbone (ku-karQ for a subsequent 
movement to increase production. The first skilled worker to be 
promoted was a certain Yu Shih-hui who had "dealt a blow to a 
management that had no confidence in the masses" by carrying out 
improvements on twenty-three machines. He had formerly been 
underpaid and discriminated against. Now, as a shift leader, he 
secured for his department the first "red flag commendation" in 
the factory and became one of Tientsin1 s first thirteen model
workers^.
The management committee once again accepted a proposal 
that the search system he abolished and this time there was no 
veto* It delegated this task to the labour union which organised 
over two hundred "search exempt workers groups" comprising two 
thousand four hundred and ninety-nine workers. Those who were 
cleared as trustworthy displayed exemption certificates (or 
badges) (mien-chien-cheng), but by February 1950 there were still 
some workers who were subject to search and the article demanded 
that this situation be rectified. Following the organisation of 
these groups, four or five surprise searches were carried out and 
no stolen property was discovered^.
In addition to the exposure of the FGM to the workers at 
the periodic meetings of the Workers and Staff Congress, the 
committee endeavoured to establish a regular system of "self 
examination" at lower levels in the factory. Workshop self 
examination meetings were organised at which technicians and other 
personnel guilty of alienating themselves from the workers were 
criticised. The first such meeting dealt with the case of a 
certain technician by the name of Liu Hui-t*ang who was charged 
with beating ordinary workers before liberation and of not having 
reformed in the period since. The workers wished to expel him 
from the factory but it was decided that he should be given a 
chance to confess and undergo criticism. Following his "self 
examination" his relations with ordinary workers underwent a change 
for the better^®.
The mildness of the treatment given to Liu cannot be contrasted
too strongly with the methods of land reform in the rural sector 
which, although milder than before, were much more severe than 
in the factories. At the Third Mill it was "responsible people" 
who launched the criticism and there was no attempt at total 
condemnation from all levels. One may also contrast this period 
with a later period (1951) when corrupt cadres were given short 
shrift in the Three Anti Movement which will be discussed in 
chapter eight. Even during this mild period, however, some 
dissident elements were expelled from the mill; for example,
Chao Chen-chiang, a former KMT "thug" (ta-shou) who took opium 
and had continued to attack workers after liberation^. One might 
suspect that the difference between the above two cases stemmed 
from the fact that Liu was a technician and valuable to the mill 
whereas Chao was an ordinary worker, for Liu Shao-ch*i had demanded 
that every effort should be made to avoid struggles against 
technicians. We have insufficient evidence to confirm or deny 
this suspicion.
The management committee was required to conduct propaganda
among white collar workers with the aim of developing their
reliance on the masses.* Propaganda was later seen as mainly a
Party and union function. At this stage, however, resolutions on
propaganda were taken by the management committee which authorised
reading lists for white collar workers. In addition, practice
workshop self examination meetings were organised so that white
collar workers would learn how to carry out criticism and self
criticism before being exposed to the real thing. The reason for
this kind of exercise (yen-hsi) was that white collar workers were
100still unsure of their position and feared to speak out .
We are told that the case of Chao Chen-chiang prompted
the workers spontaneously to organise mutual aid groups to
investigate problems concerning production and technology and,
at the same time, the electrical supply plant and repair shop
101set up technical research groups . W e  are not told, however, 
how exactly the dismissal of a rowdy worker was able to bring about 
a demand for technological improvements, nor is it at all clear 
why something that occurred spontaneously should be listed as one 
of the great achievements of the factory management committee.
In the opinion of the military representative these mutual aid groups 
were to serve as a form of cell organisation (hsi-pao tsu-chih) 
for receiving mass opinions on the democratisation of management
•until labour union teams (the lowest level of labour union organ-
102isation) could be formed . If the activities of these groups 
were confined to matters concerning production and technology, 
one might suspect that the military representative had a rather 
restricted view of what democratisation meant, and indeed what the 
function of labour union teams was to be once they were formed.
Despite the above achievements, at the end of August 19^9* 
the mill leadership (undefined) were still concerned about the 
predominance of unskilled Workers on the factory management 
committee and demanded that some skilled workers and personnel 
with managerial skill be elected. The text does not make it clear 
whether a new management committee was elected or whether extra 
members were elected to serve on the old committee. In any case, 
the first management committee of the mill had served some two 
months longer than the period stipulated by the regulations 
governing factory management committees which had been promulgated
10^ 5whilst it was in office . The second management committee 
contained three new members, the newly promoted shift leader Xu 
Shih-hui, Ho Feng-kao, a skilled fitter,and Chang Ching-yu, an 
old maintenance worker of thirty years standing. White and blue 
collar workers throughout, the mill were reported to be happy with 
this choice which had been made after a lengthy period of 
propaganda and fermentation (yun-niang), unlike the election of
'loa­
the first committee •
From the convening of the first meeting of the second 
committee (9th September 194-9) to the time the account was written 
(probably Februaiy 1950), twelve meetings were held, which was 
about the frequency stipulated by the official regulations. The 
most important task of these meetings was to collect and assemble 
the one hundred and thirty "rationalisation proposals" that were 
put forward. Ninety nine proposals were submitted to the nine 
meetings that were held between September and December and of 
these ninety five were adopted. They may be classified as follows:
Proposals concerning production planning 5
technical matters 9
management 54-
personnel 12
welfare 15
other matters 6
The fact that over 80% of these proposals concerned management 
and technology as against 13% concerning welfare is taken by the 
author of the article to demonstrate how much the workers cared 
for production, though he subsequently criticised the committee for 
paying insufficient attention to welfare. The FGM did not exercise
his veto at all. Once these proposals had been accepted by the
Management Committee they were submitted to the engineering
105personnel for testing and implementation
The management committee was now strong enough not only to
avoid the FGM's veto, but also to censure the FGM for what they
considered high handed action. For example, at the twelfth
meeting of the factory management committee, the FGM was censured
for taking on extra labour without consulting the management
committee or its standing committee. The employment of this
labour was only put on the agenda of the committee after tha
action was taken. According to the formal regulations, the FGM
might well have been within his rights if this could be defined
as ’’emergency action”. Nevertheless, he apologised to the committee
and promised that such a situation would not occur again. Another
worker complained that the FGM had employed a large number of
trainees (shih-hsi-yuan) who, after their period of training,
became white collar workers. This lessened the promotion chances
of blue collar workers. The committee submitted this complaint
to the military representative in his role as interpreter of
Party policy and, after an investigation, he declared that the
promotion rate for blue collar workers to staff status was not 
106high enough . This example is of particular interest in that 
during the middle 1950s personnel matters were considered the 
prerogative of the Party, whereas in the early 1950s where the 
Soviet model was implemented, management tended to take the 
initiative in personnel matters. This appeal to the military 
representative, as substitute Party secretary, shows how matters 
of promotion were viewed prior to the adoption of the Soviet model.
50.
Meetings of the Factory Management Committee were held every 
other Friday. On the Wednesday before each meeting, every member 
would hand his proposals to the secretary of the committee (it is 
not clear from the text who the secretary was) who would sort them 
out, tabulate them and hand a list to each member and to the 
chairman of each branch committee (chih-hui chu-,jen). After 
receiving the list it was the duty of each committee member to go 
out among the workers and seek their opinions. On the Thursday 
evening the labour union chairman would convene a preparatory 
meeting which each elected delegate (though not the other ex officio 
members) would attend in order that everybody should have a clear 
idea of the implications of the proposals and thus prevent 
discussion at the main meeting becoming too trivial. The 
preparatory meeting could also be used to bring forward new 
p r o p o s a l s . I t  does not take too great a stretch of the imagina­
tion to see how the preparatory meeting might be used to throw out 
proposals of too contentious a nature in order that more time at 
the main meeting could be spent getting through other proposals 
that stood a better chance of success and how a FGM could persuade 
the labour union chairman who convened the meeting to exercise what 
was to all intents and purposes a veto. To guage how democratic 
the whole procedure was, we need to know not only what happened to 
proposals made to the main meeting, but also to proposals submitted 
to the preparatory meeting and no account of this is given. It 
would seem that a preparatory meeting would serve the interests of 
rank and file workers so long as labour union chairmen were 
prepared to take a stand against management. As far as we know, 
they were rarely prepared to do this in 19^9* In chapter nine we 
shall consider the situation in 195  ^when union chairmen were 
prepared to manifest a greater degree of independence.
The management committee’s standing committee met for one hour 
every afternoon in what was referred to as a "head knocking 
session" (p1 eng-t * ou-hui); a session where Party, management and 
union representatives put their heads together. It concerned 
itself mainly with solving problems handed to it by similar 
workshop level "head knocking sessions" where the detailed imple­
mentation of committee resolutions was worked out. In addition 
to these workshop meetings (che-chien hui-i) which were particularly 
useful in acquainting white collar workers with shop floor con­
ditions, shop level "self examination" meetings continued to be 
held and a system of shop production conferences (sheng-ch'an
/IAQ
hui-i) concerned with technical problems was instituted.
A meeting of the workers* and staff congress was held every 
month and its principal content were reports by the PGM and labour 
union chairman on production work and labour organisation. When 
first set up, some discussion was allowed at this meeting though 
later there was no time for this as meetings only lasted one hour. 
Self examination was now carried on at shop level meetings (which 
probably exempted the PGM) and detailed topics raised by the 
congress were discussed by labour union teams^^ (which had been 
formed by February 1950). This would seem to be the first stage 
in the fusion of the congress with the labour union organisation 
and the reinsulation of the PGM which became a feature of factory 
organisation during the First Five Year Plan period.
The great increase in production during the latter part of 
194-9 was attributed to this process of democrat is at ion and the 
experiences of the Third Mill were considered relatively
successful. By February 1950, however, there were still considered
to be a number df serious shortcomings. The management committee
had paid insufficient attention to the problem of mobilising
women workers to take part in management and no woman had been
elected to the committee (though one was subsequently co-opted)«
The committee had not gone far enough in soliciting the suggestions
of rank and file workers and had been dilatory in its transmission
of resolutions (for example, the resolutions of the 11th session
were passed on at the preparatory meeting for the 12th session).
The FGM was still slow in carrying out committee resolutions and
some workers still felt him not to be conscientious. Not enough
cadres had been promoted to managerial posts (only two workers had
been promoted to the position of foreman kung-t'ou ). There was
still some mutual antagonism between white and blue collar workers
110and welfare matters were not given sufficient weight.
The Failure to Implement the Democratisation of Management
The fact that the Third Mill’s modest catalogue of
achievements should have been held up as a model suggests that the
democratisation movement was not particularly successful and the
suggestion is confirmed by the publication of a number of
articles in early 1950 describing this lack of success and calling
111for an end to the policy of maintaining the status quo*
Although articles went to great pains to point out that such a 
policy had been correct, the time had come to reform the "disparate, 
irrational, anarchistic, disorganised and confused" structures
which were not only a legacy of the past but also the result of
i12 •piecemeal reforms since liberation. In some cases organisational
systems were less unified than they were prior to liberation.
Vithin the textile industry different systems of organisation 
existed within the same city and in the coal mines the old gang 
boss system remained. In many factories retained management who 
had achieved their positions through personal influence and
113bribery continued to maintain their position by these means .
The time had come to step up the tempo of "democratic reform". 
At this stage, however, it was still hoped that representative 
bodies such as the factory management committees would be able to 
take the initiative in carrying through the necessary reforms 
and we conclude this chapter with a discussion of the operation 
of these committees throughout 1950 and early 1951*
The root cause of the lack of success of management committees
noted in early 1950 lay in the fact that the principles of
114democratising management had been poorly propagated • This
115was partly the function of management committees themselves ,
but was more properly the function of Party and labour Union 
116organisations . We shall note in chapter eight that there was 
a tendency for Party committees to be complacent which led to a 
major Party rectification movement in the spring of 1950. The 
responsibilities of labour unions were far greater. As"trans- 
mission belts" between Party and masses, they were to solicit the 
opinions and suggestions of rank and file workers as to unpopular 
systems of management and to educate these workers on their role 
in m a n a g e m e n t ^ M a n y  union branches, however, "lacked demo­
cratic spirit" and "were not able resolutely and correctly to 
represent the interests of the workers nor conscientiously to
organise and lead activists among the white and blue collar 
workers to take part in democratisation and struggle against
A A p.
bureaucratism” • Such a situation is not surprising at a 
time when union branches were in the process of formation and 
were not as yet clear about what their functions ought to be. 
This will be discussed in detail in chapter nine.
In the absence of effective propaganda and a spirit of
participation, "democratic” structures were just seen as rather
tiresome committees that wasted everyone *s time"*^. Not enough
notice was given before meetings of management committees and
inadequate preparatory work done. Having failed to solicit mass
opinions and suggestions, delegates tended to represent no one
but themselves and in such a situation, neither management nor
120workers took them very seriously . Not wishing to waste time
listening to the comments of unrepresentative and uneducated
delegates, the FGM and labour union chairman tended to devpte
more and more time at meetings to their own reports, often to the
121point of precluding any discussion at all • In many cases
sessions of the management committee became merely "meetings where
122responsible management passed on job assignments” or "audiences
for management” (t*ing t*ing hui)^^. Many worker delegates,
tired of just raising their hands and ratifying decisions taken
124previously by management, stopped attending meetings • Delegates, 
upon transfer to other departments or units frequently left 
vacant their seat on the committee and in on© case, that of the 
power plant of the Peking Shih-ching-shan Iron and Steel Works, 
this process led to the management committee just consisting of 
one man - its head"1^ .  #
Management usually complained that although they warmly
supported the policy of democratisation, they were too "busy to
waste time on discussions that were either too abstract or too 
126
trivial . In the North East where the political vocabulary of 
senior management had reached a level higher than their political 
consciousness, some very interesting political rationalisations 
were made. For example, some managers justified their bureau­
cratic attitude by saying that the workers were political^backward 
for they were guilty of viewpoints which were, on the one hand,
1 economist” (ching-chi chu-i ti) (i.e. they stressed only self 
interest) and, on the other "ultra-democratic” (chi-tuan min-chu 
ti) (i.e. they were undisciplined). Others claimed that as the 
representatives of the state they were the representatives of the 
working class and, as such, commanded the “unquestioned obedience 
of the workers. One manager made play upon the word "democracy” 
which consists of two characters, min (people) and chu (ruler),
127by saying: "What is min chu. You are the min. We are the chu.” '
Some of these allegations were remarkably similar to those made 
during the Cultural Revolution some seventeen years later.
The attitude of management toward the workers and staff
congress was, if anything, worse than their attitude towards
the management committee. The management committee could, after
all, serve the useful function of training managerial talent. All
the congress did was embarrass management. In many cases congresses
128were convened at irregular intervals and sometimes not at all.
be
In Peking four month intervals between congresses seemed to/the
129rule rather than the exception . Congresses were frequently
convened to pass on work assignments for a particular movement
(such as the Movement to Establish New Records) and then did not 
130meet again,  ^ The congress was supposed to be a Hbridge between the 
factory management committee and the masses” organised by the 
labour union. Presumably labour unions felt that one "transmission 
belt” was enough.
The above complaints about the attitude of management in the
North East shows that even in this area, where the process of
"democratisation” had commenced somewhat earlier than the rest
of the country, factory management committees were not faring very
well. According to statistics of the North East General Labour
Union for January 195^* only 683 (39*3%) of the 1647 factories
and mines under its Jurisdiction had set up management committees
and the majority of those that had been set up suffered from 
131"formalism”.  ^ Reporting on an investigation of over twenty 
committees in Shenyang, Chang Li-k*o, the chairman of the Shenyang 
General Labour Union, reported that the majority were organisation­
ally defective. Some contained only half the required number of 
elected members. Standing committees and congresses were not 
performing their function and there was a general lack of democratic
spirit. Chang attributed this failure to incorrect leadership on
132the pafct of the Party and a general lack, of experience. And 
this was the first area to implement the democratisation policy 
and the one with the most experienced urfcan Party organisation.
In chapter eight it is noted that in the North East in the 
period immediately following liberation, some Party branches
usurped the functions of management. Where this occurred, (the
Wu Erh Factory for example) the functions of a factory management
committee were in fact served hy an enlarged Party committee^^
in defiance of an instruction by Kao Kang, Secretary of the North
1-54-East Bureau of the Party ^ . In other cases, the standing dommittee
of the management committee usurped the functions of the full
committee on the grounds that the knowledge (and even the literacy)
135of members of management committees was of a very low level ^ .
Condemning this attitude, the Industrial Department of the North
East People*s Government stated that the general management level
of cadres in industrial enterprises was also very low, and for
that reason such cadres were to listen to the informed comments
136of worker members of management committees  ^ . Should one conclude 
from this that once the managerial skill of cadres was higher there 
would be no more need for factory management committees? Similarly, 
if factory;.management committees were schools for training managers, 
what would be their fate once the need for managerial talent was 
less acute.
Herein lies a crucial problem which is also relevant to that 
other organisational form that was described as a * school for 
management” - the labour unions. Was the factory management 
committee to train workers to become managers or to train workers 
with managerial skill to participate in management as workers. 
Ideally, it was both but in practice, as the case of Tu Shih-hui 
of the Third Mill shows, the former was a more probably outcome.
The short life of the experiment with management committees, 
however, does not permit us to come to any definitive conclusion
on this point. One year after the regulations governing the
establishment of factory management committees in North China
were promulgated, the ACFL noted in its annual report that "no
remarkable record” had been achieved^**7. Various femedial
measures were advocated during 1950, such as setting up tripartite
(Party, management and union) inspection systems to check up on
the implementation of committee resolutions, provision for
meetings of committees where no reports were made so as to allow
138for greater discussion, fixed meeting schedules etc., ^ but 
without much success. The radical atmosphere of the spring of 
1950 resulted in a partial democratic reform movement in North 
China and a union rectification movement throughout the country, 
but these movements, which will be discussed in later chapters, 
were not very successful since they involved only modest mass 
mobilisation. The policy in industry throughout these movements 
was to create representative structures within the factories which 
would decide on what measures should be taken for the reform of
139management structures; the various emulation movements of 1950 y 
together with the restoration of production would ensure that 
such reforms would be carried out in an atmosphere of expanding 
production.
The success of the newly formed representative structures 
depended to a very large extent upon the effectiveness of Party 
and union leaderships of and propaganda concerning the democratis­
ation process. On this score Party and union structures proved
themselves ineffective and this led first to the Party and labour 
union reforms of 1950 and later to the major reforms of 1951*
Hay 1951 saw a general radicalisation of the atmosphere in
Chinese industry and the unfolding of a series of movements
designed to force the pace of feform. The initiative in these
new movements came not from the management committees but from
140the Party organisation . When a large scale mass movement was
launched in South China in May 1951 to carry out once and for all
the movement for democratic reform, formal leadership was assigned
to the factory management committees and labour unions except
where the FGM was a retained person and the union was felt to be
"impure”. In such cases democratic reform committees were to be 
141set up • These committees were usually under Party leadership 
and were the major form of organisation for the democratic reform 
movement of 1951* There were many retained managers in South 
China (and elsewhere) and many instances of union branches 
dominated by former gang bosses, as the democratic reform move­
ment disclosed. In such circumstances the factory management 
committee was brushed aside. In the radical political movements 
of 1951-52 workers participated as individuals in effecting change 
rather than relying on elected deputies to carry out changes on 
their behalf. Management committees were not revitalised in the 
1951 Democratic Reform Movement and very few survived the Three 
Anti Movement, for democracy was by then seen in a participatory 
as opposed to a representative sense.
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CHAPTER TWO DEMOCRATIC REFORM
In this chapter, the concept "democratic reform" is examined. 
The main aim of "democratic reform" was to get rid of "feudal
A
remnants" such as gang bosses (pa-t1 ou) who exercised a consider­
able degree of power throughout the industrial sector (but 
particularly in the construction industry and the mines). Attempts 
had been made in the North East under the Japanese to curb the 
power of gang bosses, though in areas such as Shansi the gang boss 
system existed in much the same form as it had for decades. The 
situation in the Yang Ch'uan mines is narrated at length, not 
because it was typical but because it demonstrates just how 
possible it was to disregard post-liberation policy. Many former 
gang bosses managed to preserve part of their former influence by 
obtaining positions as team leaders, labour union cadres or even 
model workers. In the North East, the process of democratic reform 
accompanied the movement to establish management committees and 
worker and staff emigresses. In North China, the movement began 
in earnest in the spring of 1950 but over much of the countiy , it 
was not until May 1951 that the pace was forced and a full scale 
movement launched. In 1951* three stages were laid down for the
\\ ft l} vV
movement, democratic struggle, democratic unity and democratic 
construction.* In the course of the first two stages, enterprise 
Party and union leadership often revealed themselves ineffective 
or corrupt with the result that the movement rarely got as far as 
the third stage. Replacing the third stage, the Three Anti Movement 
sought to revitalise the Party and labour unions and this will be 
discussed in Chapters eight and nine. By the time of the Three 
Anti Movement, democracy had been defined almost exclusively in a 
participatory sense.
The Gang Boss System
The pre-liberation gang boss system was essentially a system
of contract labour where various levels of contractor controlled
bodies of workers which they placed at the disposal of management.
Such a system was referred to as "feudal" in Chinese accounts
because it was primarily an exploitative system that depended on
a network of human relations where the ties between gang boss
2and worker were personal rather than contractual . In China these
personal ties often stemmed from indebtedness, not necessarily of
the worker himself but frequently of his parents who tied their
children to a gang boss to settle, a particular debt. Gang bosses,
for their part, went to great pains to see that such debts were
never paid and that the worker remained a bond-man for life. Such
was the root of the appalling labour conditions in textile mills
and the co&l mines of Shansi where in the 1930s miners worked for
3
some twelve hours a day for a wage of ten cents .
£he gang boss system has every appearance of a rural form of 
organisation transferred to the industrial sector. In fact, the 
gang boss system sometimes developed spontaneously in an industrial 
concern without any rural influence whatever. Writing in the 1930s 
the Nankai University economist, H.D. Fong, noted that male 
operatives in a variety of industries developed a sense of temporary 
ownership of their job which entitled them to bring in assistants 
of their own choosing and this became the main form of recruiting 
labour in Chinese industry. Many of those that were in a position 
to bring in assistants became gang bosses who emancipated them­
selves from work and made a living on commissions which their
h.
assistants paid them for giving them a job • Such a system 
developed considerably during the 1930s since it depended upon 
two conditions which were prevalent at that time; the existence 
of a large pool of unemployed and an atmosphere of expanding 
production* (Phis second condition was essential since lowered 
production frequently forced the gang boss back on to the shop 
floor, whereas an ever growing need for labour increased his 
personal income5.
Various estimates were made during the 1930s as to what the 
income of gang bosses was. Official figures for China in 1930 show 
that gang bosses appropriated some 20% of the wages of mining 
workers, though some commentators, such as Lamson (193*0 , put 
the overall figure somewhere between 40% and 60%^. It is doubtful 
whether we shall ever be able to quantify gang boss exploitation or 
even agree as to what constituted a gang boss, for clearly the 
woman who brought her daughter into the mill to help her out was 
very different from a local despot who controlled several hundred 
men.
As they built up the huge heavy industrial complex in 
Manchukuo, the Japanese had no course but to perpetuate the gang 
boss system since they found ’''little in common with the racial
Q
habits, customs and habits of the coolies”. Such pat’ou were felt 
to be necessary to ”keep strict vigilance over morals and discipline' 
The Japanese were, however, contemptuous of a ’feudal system” over 
which they did not have full control and sought to limit the power 
of gang bosses. In the Fushun mines, for example, pay scales for
gang bosses were worked out and a fixed allowance made according 
to the number of workers they controlled; further "squeeze” was 
prohibited. Pat’ou who supervised regular day-rate miners were 
granted allowances of 11.5% of the total wage paid to these miners 
and pat’ou supervising other contract labourers were paid 8%..
In addition, managerial departments were required to appoint the 
greater and lesser pat’ou to their position rather than accept 
self-styled gang bosses as de facto contractors.^
Such control was possible in the North East because there was 
an efficient and sufficiently ruthless administration. In other 
areas, such as the Shansi mines, no pre-liberation government was 
able to effect much control even if they wanted to.
Democratic Reform in the North East
In the North East the policies of "democratic reform” and
the "democratisation of management” tended to be implemented
*
simultaneously. This was probably partly due to the fact that the 
gang boss system had already been restricted under the Japanese 
but was mainly because there were fewer retained managers in this 
area and many factories which had been temporarily abandoned had 
to build up new managerial systems from scratch. The political 
atmosphere at the time of the ldb eration of the North East was 
somewhat more radical than the atmosphere after the spring of 
1949 and this meant that a struggle against gang bosses and other 
reactionary elements could be launched immediately. An example 
of the early democratic reform movement in the North East was that 
of the Wu San Factory in Shenyang. In this essay considerable
attention will be devoted to this factory both in order to give 
some degree of continuity and because the Wu San Factory was 
subsequently chosen as a national model for labour union work and, 
as such, reflects very clearly Party policy towards the reform of 
industrial enterprises. The Wu San Factory was taken over in 
November 1948 and immediately a campaign was launched to educate 
the masses as to their new rights and duties. A "speak bitterness” 
movement (su-k1 u vun-tung) was organised with much the same kind 
of objective as its counterpart in the rural sphere. This was 
accompanied by a campaign of criticism and self criticism in which 
both white and blue collar workers took part. At the same time as 
workers were registered for labour insurance, a register of members 
of reactionary organisations was compiled and. feudal elements, 
enemy military policemen and counter-revolutionaries flushed out. 
Upon this basis, steps were taken to "rationalise" the management 
and wages structures, restore production and take in new Party 
members. By October 1949* the factory was able to put the "economic 
accounting system" into operation which indicated that such reforms 
were considered to have been completed satisfactorily in the Wu 
San Factory/^
Maintaining the Status Quo
The model experiences of the Wu San Factory were rarely 
repeated south of the Great Wall. The situation was especially 
bad in the mines. At a congress of mining unions meeting in 
January-February 1950, it was reported that, apart from a few mines 
in the North East and North China, the policy of maintaining the 
status quo (yuan-feng pu-tung) was still being maintained^*. In
some mines management committees had not been convened or were 
"formalistic” and had incurred the hostility of the workers rather 
than their support. At the Ling Shan Coal Mine in Chahar, for 
example, the workers had dubbed the mine management committee , 
(kuan-li wei-yuan-hui") the "bureaucratic committee” (kuan-liao 
wei-vuan-hui  ^ and many cases were reported where gang bosses had
-it
just changed the names of their gangs to shifts or teams . In
the Tsao Chuang Mine, twenty two former gang bosses had been
appointed team leaders and supervisors and were still engaged in
their former practices^. In the Hung Shan Mine sixteen former
gang bosses had been appointed team leaders or pit supervisors and
many of these had adopted the philosophy that it did not matter
who was currently in power, they would always get along (after all,
they had experienced several changes of government). ^ In the
building industry, almost no change had been effected and here the
problem was particularly difficult since it was virtually impossible
at this stage not to depend upon contract labour. In some sections
of the industry in Tatung in early 1950, there were as many as
seven levels of gang-contractor who between them creamed off from
50% to 70% of the money paid to them, leaving the workers only
*\L
30-50% as wages. ^
The Yang Chfaian Case
In the spring of 1950, Chinafs leadership became more and 
more concerned about the effects of a policy which left old abuses 
unremedied and which pe?pmitted ”feudal remnants” to believe that 
they would ”get along” under the new government. A number of 
articles began to appear in the press which described the persistenc
of old exploitative forms of organisation and demanded that 
the process of democratisation and reform be speeded up. One 
such account dealt with the Yang Ch*uan State Coal Mines in 
Shansi which was. traditionally the area where some of the worst 
excesses of gang boss exploitation had occurred, and which in 
1937 H.D. Fong had considered a nliving hell"^. Although it 
was an extreme case, it is narrated here as an example of what a 
moderate reform policy could lead to.
When a reporter went down to the Yang Ch'uan Mines to invest­
igate the failure to complete current production tasks, he was 
told that the gang boss system had been abolished long ago. 
Nevertheless, bearing in mind thejfact that the North China General 
Mining Bureau had issued several warnings to the mine about the 
persistence of the gang boss system and that there were rumours 
currently circulating in Peking that these warnings had been 
unheeded, he pressed the matter further, only to be told that the 
gang boss system was being maintained but that it was no longer
*|5>
exploitative.
After some further investigation the reporter discovered 
that after liberation all that had happened was that the various 
levels of gang boss had changed their titles and continued as 
■before. In the whole mine, out of a total of 38 senior level 
cadres at division (ku) level, 20 were some species of gang boss 
who now rejoiced in the title of division chief (ku-chang), deputy 
division chief (fu-ku-chang) or unit leader (tui-chang). Under 
them came 55 group leaders (ta-t su-chang), 90% of whom were former
gang bosses who did not work at all. Under each team leader were 
three team leaders (hsiao-tsu-chang) and a secretary. The 
secretary did no manual work and was responsible for wage payment 
and the team leaders worked, at the most, half time. The reporter 
calculated that out of the 3*556 white and blue collar workers in 
the mine, 2,4-98 were exploited by these 55 group leaders.
A group leader who did little or no work could earn 3,000- 
3,100 work points a month, as opposed to an ordinary worker*s 
1,320 points for a 22 day month, which in itself was not less than 
the former legal wage of a gang boss. In addition, the group 
leader took his cut of the workers* wages, since grain payments 
were still paid in time honoured way to ;the team leaders rather 
than directly to the workers. This sometimes amounted to 5 out of 
every 20 chin of grain which was paid twice monthly. The group 
leader could also obtain illicit income by other means such as 
claiming bogus expenses or accepting payment for non-existent 
workers. As well as making automatic deductions from workers* 
wages, the group leaders received extra payment according to the 
amount of coal mined. There is little wonder, therefore, that the 
workers considered the democratic discussion of wage determination
iq
as something of a Bham. 7
The acting manager felt that if he did not co-operate with 
the former gang bosses, he would not be able to complete his 
production plan. It is ironical therefore that it was precisely 
the failure to complete the production plan that brought the 
situation to the attention of the reporter. According to him
Party and management personnel within the mine had not realised
that the gang bosses were in fact ”feudal remnants11. On the
contrary, they were considered as "skilled workers’1 and the
main force that could he relied upon to develop production.
Management was only concerned with receiving the coal once mined
and was prepared to dismiss workers who objected to the system
on the grounds that this attitude impaired productivity. The
only way workers could protest was to write comments on the coal
trucks criticising the stupidity of the acting manager for relying
upon the group leaders. The reporter described such a situation
as a ’commercial relationship” (mai-mai kuan-hsi) in which the
only concern of management was the return they got for money
10paid to/the group leaders .
The backwardness of Party personnel was explained by the 
fact that 13 out of 55 group ledders had been accepted as Party 
members and some of them were members of the Party committee.
One such member of the Party committee managed to secureethe 
demotion of a group leader who was not a former gang boss and 
was concurrently a lower level Party secretary because he had 
failed to donate to the wedding festivities of the committee 
member’s son; as a Party committee member the former gang boss 
was able to disregard the subsequent protests of the mine 
manager.
Party membership had expanded rapidly to a strength of 370 
(10% of the total work force) and the group leaders had carefully 
controlled the acceptance of new members. As supervisors of
education throughout the mine, the Party committee did its best 
to see that the gang boss system was not criticised. When the 
reporter attended meetings of the Party committee which were 
discussing documents attacking the gang boss system, he noted 
that they considered the mine a "special case”, and when the 
committee analysed the reasons why the mine was not fulfilling 
its production tasks, it could only conclude that insufficient 
reliance had been placed on the "skilled workers” who were, in 
fact, the gang bosses. The former gang bosses had also formed 
the nucleus of the labour union organisation and many group 
leaders were concurrently leaders of union teams. Resenting this, 
the workers referred to union dues (hui-fei) as union tax (hui- 
shui).'t3~
It was in the interests of the former gang bosses to see 
that planning did not work smoothly. The reporter noticed that 
no-one seemed to know exactly what the size of the work'force 
was. In this way they could continue to accept payment for non­
working personnel. When management insisted that workers should 
be signed on and off work by a staff member, the union cadres 
declared that this was a "bourgeois viewpoint" which placed no 
reliance on the working class. The workers were thus allowed 
to sign themselves in, which allowed group leaders to falsify 
records and maintain their own illicit income. Management was 
unable to exercise any discipline at all over the group leaders 
or their supporters. An attempt to discipline a union committee 
member who was absent longer than the period of leave granted him.™ 
resulted in a protest by the labour union chairman and the quarrel 
which ensued caused a total breakdown of discipline
The maintenance of the gang boss system in the mine resulted 
in considerable tension between the mine authorities and local 
government. In order to investigate the gang bosses* control 
over the labour union, local Party and labour union organisations 
sent down an investigation team (tiao-ch* a-tui) which was 
frustrated by a parallel work team (kung-tso-tui) organised, 
ostensibly to help with the investigation,within the mine itself. 
When the investigation team called meetings, only minor cadres 
attended as observers and the team was unable to operate effectively 
There was, furthermore, a lack of unity between Party management 
and unions within the mine and this lack of unity was carefully 
fostered by group leaders who held posts in more than one body; 
every effort was made to prevent the formation of any group that 
could effectively oppose the gang boss network.^*
The revelations of the situation at Yang Ch*uan led the 
North China General Mining Bureau to issue an order for the 
situation to be investigated and this order was published in the 
same newspaper as the above report. One would suspect that either 
the reporter or his editor had submitted his findings to the 
bureau before publication or that the reporter had gone down to 
the mine with explicit instructions from the Mining Bureau. In 
its order the Mining Bureau pointed out that the mine had already 
received two warnings (September 194-9 and January 1950) and had 
done nothing about them, which clearly demonstrate the leisurely 
approach to democratic reform at that time. In its work plan for 
April 1950 the mine had put forward the abolition of the gang boss 
system as its main task but was unwilling to call for "self
examination" meetings for fear that this would provoke the anger 
of the group leaders and thus harm production. Consequently 
the General Mining Bureau ordered the Yang Ch*uan mine to convene 
a conference of all cadres and with the participation of "good" 
workers, conduct a movement of criticism and self criticism. The 
results of the self examinations were to be submitted to the 
General Mining Bureau together with a description of what measures 
were being taken to abolish the gang boss system.
Such were the consequences of a policy which sought to 
subordinate political problems to the task of getting production 
moving again. The order of the Mining Bureau criticised an 
excessive concern for problems of production and its tone was more 
radical than any similar order that I have seen since the mild 
policy was confirmed in the spring of 194-9* It was infinitely less 
radical, however, than what was to follow in the summer of 1951*
Control from Above or Mobilisation
Policy during the mild period after the spring of 194-9 saw 
"democratisation" and "enterprisation" going hand in hand and the 
reform of old structures proceeding at a fairly leisurely pate.
It was hoped that the newly created Party and union structures would 
carry out a gradual "democratic reform". What was probably not 
forseen was a situation where "feudal remnants" sought to take over 
the newly created Party and labour union organisations. During the 
spring and summer of 1950, following the publication of articles 
calling for a speed up in "democratic Reform", a series of 
administrative orders were promulgated formally abolishing the gang
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boss system in various sectors of industry. ^  When lower level
Party and union organs failed to respond adequately to this speed
oc.
up, a rectification movement was launched.
In this essay, two types of political movement will be 
discussed; those that involve widespread mass mobilisation and 
those that do not. In the period under review, the "democratic 
reform" movement of 1951 a^ cL the Three Anti Movement^ were
political movements of the former type, whereas the rectification
28movement of 1950 and the various movements of 1953 were movements
of the latter type. In 1950 the stress was on control from above.
The campaign for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries of
late 1950 and early 1951 was described as a mass movement; and it
required workers to denounce counter-revolutionaries within
factories, but it did not involve anything approaching the degree
of mass mobilisation of the movements of mid and late 1951. For
this reason the campaign against counter-revolutionaries which
exercised control from the top down was mainly concerned with the
activities of active "counter-revolutionaries" rather than "feudal
remnants" such as gang bosses. Some people argued, however, that
OQ
it should have broadened its scope to include "feudal remnants". 7
The preoccupation with control from above is demonstrated by 
the considerable attention that was given to the establishment of 
a formal control (inspection) apparatus. Attempts were made to
*0
build up such an apparatus as soon as cities had been liberated. -
The regulations of May 19^9 governing the establishment of factory
management committees demanded that such committees institute a
*1
regular inspection procedure within factories. In January 1950
an emergency inspection was ordered for all public ally run
enterprises in Peking, Tientsin, Shansi and Hopei, whereupon each
factory and mine organised a control (inspection) committee (chien-
ch1 a wei-yuan-hui) consisting of representatives of Party*
3%management, unions and Youth League • Such control committees
could not be very effective, however, so long as there was a
danger that they might themselves be controlled by corrupt elements.
Some eighteen months later the 88th meeting of the Government
Affairs Council called upon municipal level People*s Control
52Committees to extend their network down into the factories , thus 
implying that despite the great attention given to control work, 
municipal level control organisations had not yet penetrated the 
factories.
A new approach to the problem of democratic reform was 
needed and the Party*s experiences in the rural sector seemed to 
offer an answer. In May 1951* there commenced a series of mass 
movements that were to last a whole year. The Democratic Reform 
Movement of 1951 sought to get rid of "feudal remnants” and 
counter-revolutionaries that had escaped the formal suppression 
campaign. The failure uf many Party, union and managerial cadres 
to give an effective lead in this movement led in turn to the Three 
Anti Movement which, at the end of 195% was extended into the 
private sector in the form of the Five Anti Movement. By mid 1952 
the political structure of Chinese factories had undergone 
considerable change.
The Situation in the spring of 1951
The democratic reform movement of 1951 was described as a
’’supplementary lesson” (uu-k’o) in that since liberation a
certain amount of reform had been effected and the function of
the 195  ^movement was to make up for the deficiencies of these
earlier attempts. Reform had been most thorough in the North
East and least thorough in the Central South which boie the brunt
34of the 1951 movement. In this latter area, former gang bosses 
had found their way into the Party, the Youth League and the 
labour unions from which position they engineered strikes and
go-slow resistance.^ Some had achieved prominent positions in
3 3*7
management and others had even been elected model workers. (
They were accused of having dealings with secret agents, of con­
ducting sabotage and of taking their customary ’cut1 of wages
38due to workers. Although most accounts dealt with the activities 
of gang bosses on the docks, in the construction industry and in 
the mines, their activities were not confined to these areas, 
where for reasons of organisational diffuseness control was
particularly difficult, but were also found in other industries
39such as textiles. J
Other Targets of the Democratic Reform Movement
Although the main targets of the movement were the gang 
bosses, there were also other targets. The 195^ movement was to 
follow directly on the ’high tide” of the campaign to suppress
counter-revolutionaries and was to finish the work of that
40earlier movement. The main target of the suppression movement
had been secret agents Ct’e-wu fen-tzu) who worked for such
organisations as the KMT Military Secret Service (Chun-t’ung) or
41the Nationalist Youth Corps (San Min T ’uan). Numerous accounts 
of their sabotage of industrial plant had appeared in the press
42since liberation; now a mass movement was to disclose those
who had escaped the net. Another target of the democratic reform
movement was the secret societies through which many of the gang
bosses had operated.  ^ A number of these societies were said
to be still in operation, such as the I Kuan Tao, the Chiu Kung
Tao, the Kan Chu Erh Hua Tao. the Green Gang (Ch1 ing-pang) and
44the Red Gang (Hung-pang). In addition to the large secret
societies were secret of semi secret mutual help organisations
(pang-hui) which were sometimes little better than protection 
45rackets. Such organisations exercised influence not so much 
over the formal organisational network of factories (except where 
gang bosses with secret society connections held formal managerial 
petitions) but over the informal netowrk. Control over the 
informal network, which was to be one of the main functions of the 
Party organisation, will be discussed in chapter eight.
Alternative Strategies for Democratic Reform
It took a long time to persuade the Party that there was a
need for a mass movement to implement the pblicy of democratic
reform. Even in 1951 various non-radical alternative policies were
put forward for consideration. One school of thought felt that
the problem of flushing out feudal remnants and counter-revolutionary
elements could best be undertaken gradually and indirectly by means
46of production competitions. Presumably it was felt that once 
these elements took part in emulation contests they would either 
come to realise that they gained more prestige from this than their 
former activities or, if they failed to respond to such contests, 
reveal themselves as indolent parasites which could be dealt with
easily. This view was held to be wrong. Some depraved elements 
had indeed become model workers but their activities had not 
changed. A Chlang-chiang Jih-pao editorial stated emphatically 
that not only were production competitions not useful for dealing 
with feudal remnants but that the democratic reform movement was 
the sine qua non for holding production competitions in the 
future.^
Another school of thought felt that the democratic reform
work could best be carried out through the introduction of labour 
48insurance. Only people who could claim to be "working class"
were eligible (this included white collar workers and was not
linked to family origin). People whodderived a large part of their
income from sources other than their own labour were not classified
as working class and the sources of their income were subject to
investigation. In this way it was hoped that undercover gang
bosses would be disclosed. During the process of democratic reform,
however, false returns were submitted for every concealed gang
boss could claim that his income derived from an official salary.
Ch1 ang-chiang Jih-pao declared that the registration of people for
labour insurance could only be really effective after the democratic
4q
reform movement had been concluded. J
A third school of thought saw no reason why the techniques
of the campaign for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries
(which did not involve very much mass mobilisation) should not be 
50continued. The official reply was that the fervour engendered 
by the suppression campaign would be useful in the subsequent
mobilisation of the masses. The proper progress of any 
movement should be from the outside inwards and from surface 
to the depths, but in proceeding inwards and penetrating the 
depths, mobilisation was essential.
Action was to be swift. After the campaign for the 
suppression of counter-revolutionaries, it was felt that there 
was a need to strike whilst the iron was hot. In the period 
before Kay 1951* leading personnel considered that feudal forces 
within the factories had shown some sign that they were afraid 
and that their ranks were disintegrating. Now the workers' 
political consciousness had reached a level sufficiently high for
them to be mobilised and leadership within factories had by now
52a fairly good idea as to who the targets were to be. Such was 
the mood in Kay 1951* The iron, however, was not always hot and 
exponents of guerilla warfare should not have confused disintegration 
with strategic dispersal. Kany of the masses took quite a long 
while to be mobilised and some of the leadership did not realise 
that by the end of the series of movements of which this was the 
first, they themselves would in fact be the targets.
Leadership of the Kovement
The literature is vague about how exactly the movement was
to be led. The factory management committee was usually too weak
to lead the movement and since retained management were suspect,
management committees containing a retained FGK were, at least in
53one region,explicitly forbidden to assume a leading role. In 
some cases union committees assumed leadership but they were frequent!
found to be "impure" and to have connections with feudal 
remnants.^ In general the Party committee leduthd movement 
according to the formula "leadership by Party committee, call 
from management and response by the labour-unions
The Party committee usually exercised this leading role
through a specially created body such as a "Committee for Studying
56Current Affairs"^ or more probably a Democratic Reform Committee 
which consisted of Party and Youth League members, some management 
and labour union activists (ideally chosen from among the victims 
of a particular feudal remnant or group of feudal remnants^.
Such committees were ideally sponsored by the factory union 
committee or, if that body were corrupt, a higher level union 
committee.^® The factory level democratic reform committees were 
linked to municipal level Democratic Reform Committees which were 
united front bodies, led by the municipal Party committee but 
also containing representatives of the municipal People's 
Government, representatives of the democratic parties, (non Party)
5o
democratic personages and worker (union) delegates. 7 Within
the area under the Jurisdiction of the South China Bureau of
the Party Central Committee, democratic reform committees (or
their equivalent) at enterprise level were required to report to
the municipal level Democratic Reform committees once every two
weeks and municipal level committees were required to report to
60the Provincial level Party committee once a month. Such a form
of organisatinn was the prototype for the subsequent Three Anti
Movement where Increase Production and Practise Economy Committees
61
took over the function of the old Democratic Reform committees.
The First Stage of the Movement
Three official stages were laid down for the movement -
"democratic struggle", "democratic unity" and "democratic
62construction". The first stage, "democratic struggle", was
launched at a number of mass meetings. At first, attacks were
required to be of a very general nature (for example, against
imperialism and the Chiang Kai-shek regime) and these general
attacks would provide the starting point for "initiation reports"
(ch*i-fa pao-kao) which were usually made by cadres from outside
the factory.  ^ The attack would then move nearer to the day to day
concerns of the workers whose participation in the earlier meetings
would have given them greater confidence to accuse people with
whom they were in daily contact. Groups of activists would be
formed within the shops whose task was to relate the discussion at
factory level to their own particular circumstances and then
submit their conclusions back to meetings at factory level. Then
the whole process would be repeated, the content of the
denunciations getting a little more specific every time. The
leadership (democratic reform committee) would utilise the material
so collected to make a number of "key point denunciations" for
their propaganda effect and then the movement would be thrown wide
open for denunciations to be carried on within small groups. After
that, all the fragmented evidence would be collected together and
64"speak bitterness" meetings (k"ung-su-hui) held. At these 
meetings, the land reform experience was explicitjfcy drawn upon.^ 
Both land reform and the democratic reform movement were aimed at 
"feudal elements" rather than capitalists but in the latter, there 
was an element of caution far greater than in the case of land 
reform, even though 1951 was a mild period in the rural sector.
Though I have seen accounts of gang bosses being dragged through 
the streets, I have seen no suggestion of any summary executions 
and the regulations governing punishment seem to have been adhered 
to. These regulations stipulated that the factory could only 
determine the nature of punishment if it fell within the category 
of demotion, reduction of salary, transfer of work, public 
surveillance or suspension of labour union membership. More
67
serious cases were to be submitted to the Peoples Courts. '
In both movements mass reaction tended to be similar. Workers
were reluctant to denounce the accused through fear of
68retaliation and the leadership was frequently accused of giving
6©
insufficient support to the accusers. 7 Once the process of
accusation was under way, however, a psychological climate was
created where accused people wished to put a speedy end to the
70agony and readily confessed.( Attempts were made to narrow down 
the number of targets and every effort made to avoid the 
persecution of technical personnel unless they were themselves
. 71active counter-revolutionaries or had links with secret societies.'
Instructions on how to conduct this "struggle" stage of the
movement stressed that the first battle must be fought with
72caution since it was vital to win it.r This caution was, however,
not to be too excessive and, after the first battle, the
leadership of the movement was not to be fettered by demands to go
73slow for fear of harming production.^ The press was eager to 
note examples where production actually went up in the course of 
the movement,^ though in some cases up to 20% of the working
hours for a whole month had been taken up by the movement and the 
effect on production must have been considerable.*^
Progress was slow. Reporting to the Chengchow Party 
committee on an investigation into the progress of the movement 
in Honan in July 1951* the municipal Party secretary, Chang Hsi, 
noted that of the twenty six publically run enterprises in Honan, 
fifteen had been taken over from bureaucratic capitalists upon 
liberation and eleven had been set up since. In both of these 
categories former gang bosses could be found and some of them had 
usurped leading positions. Factories where any appreciable success 
had been recorded only constituted 10-20% of the total. Over 
half of the enterprises had carried out the initial mobilisation 
but impure elements remained in leading positions. The remainder 
(20-30%) had not responded at all to cadres who had been sent down 
to make "initiation reports" and labour unions and other 
organisations were firmly in the hands of "reactionary elements".^ 
The above type of analysis was the set form for summing up the 
progress of any movement in its initial stages*^ and was employed 
right down to the Cultural Revolution with much the same kind of 
percentage breakdown. This is not to say the figures were 
necessarily inaccurate, only that when initial reports of a 
movement1 s progress are published it tends to be at a point which 
shows a similar statistical breakdown. The crucial statistic here 
is that the report was delivered 2-J- months after the commencement 
of the movement.
\89.
The struggle stage of the movement was in some cases to 
last right down to December 1951* by which time the Three Anti 
Movement was in full swing. It certainly set the stage for that 
movement. A whole series of problems were uncovered such as weak 
labour unions, bureaucratism in the Party branches and tension
between white and blue collar workers. Directives instructed
4 78those carrying out the movement not to cover these upr for they
were to be the basis upon which the subsequent movements would be
built.
The Second Stage of the Movement
The second official stage of the movement was that of
"democratic unity”. Following the dismissal of the major targets
minor offenders,such as workers who had previously been forced to
join "reactionary parties" the KMT military and police forces,
the nationalist Youth Corps orI various secret societies, were to
confess their former activities and submit to criticism. In this
stage, "struggle" was to be avoided as the aim was to correct
misunderstandings between white and blue collar workers, between
labour union cadres and workers and between groups of workers in
79different departments and localities.
It is very difficult to assess just how successful this stage 
of the movement was. Summing up progress in the movement in 
September 1951* Liu Tzu-chiu, who held a number of very important 
posts in the ACFL, reported that many workers had come forward to 
confess their past errors and in some factories more than half the
total number of workers had corrected the false information they had
/
given when registering for labour insurance. He noted that the
I*
attitude of workers towards the Party and labour unions had
changed. Union cadres were no longer eager to give up union work;
it was no longer necessary to hold film shows in order to attract
union members to a branch meeting and when Party and union cadres
were sent down from higher levels, they were no longer treated
80with indifference by the workers. All this may well have been 
true, but there were reasons other than democratic reform that 
made workers more interested in the activities of labour unions.
This was the period in which labour unions were accused of "economism’ 
(where workers were mobilised to seek their own material benefit 
at the expense of wider goals). Would it be too cynical to suggest
81
that this was at least a contributory factor to their new prestige?
September 1951 was to see the beginning of the Three Anti 
Movement which was to reveal considerable bureaucratism (kuan-liao 
chu-i) within industrial enterprises. Clearly the democratic reform 
movement had not gone far enough in closing the gap between workers 
and management. In view of this, one is tempted to be somewhat 
sceptical about Liu Tzu-chiu*s optimistic report.
The Third Stage of the Movement
The third officially prescribed stage was that of "democratic 
*
construction". During this stage, systems of responsibility and 
production control were to be established, internal labour agreements 
signed, labour insurance re-registration carried out and a system 
instituted whereby there was provision for the regular re-election
Op
of labour union committees. The extremely radical campaign 
against bureaucracy that took place at the end of 1951 meant that
this stage was postponed until the second half of 1952, by which 
time every effort was being made to implement the Soviet model 
within Chinese factories - a model which had long since given up 
the idea of collegial leadership of industrial enterprises.
Democratisation and Democratic Reform in Cultural Revolution 
Retrospect
The policy switch of May 1951 led to a different definition 
of democracy. During the earlier period, "democracy" within 
Chinese enterprises was defined according to a criterion of 
controlled representation. After May 1951* the meaning of the word 
"democratic" in the term "democratic reform" was seen in a part­
icipatory s'ense. Workers themselves were to participate in the 
overthrow of gang bosses and other undesirable elements rather than 
rely upon their representatives to do it for them. This is not to 
say that after 1951 the representative definition of democracy was 
given up for the 1954- constitution was based upon such a definition 
and a similar definition was propounded in the 1960s.
In the period since 1964-, we have seen a remarkable parallel
to the events of 194-9-51 • First, a few attempts were made in 1964-
to elect management committees but elections were vetted by Party
85and management and such committees had little power. ^ Then attempts
were made to reform management, to reduce the number of levels of
administration and correct the bureaucratic behaviour* of management,
84-though not as part of a mass movement. When this process was seen 
not to be particularly successful, a mass movement was launched 
(part of the Cultural Revolution) which took as its first target
the removal of Mirrational" management systems. At this stage,
the movement was led hy enterprise Party committees who acted
through the labour unions. The labour unions, however, soon came
85under attack from top to bottom for economism. y Leading the 
movement, the Party formed its own body of activists (for example
o rr
the Shanghai Ch* ih-wei-tui ), though finally Party committees 
themselves came under attack from revolutionary groups with support 
from a b o v e . T h e  attempt to democratise management in a rep­
resentative sense that was made in 1964-65 was i-n many ways similar 
to the attempt of 1949-51* The failure to make much headway led 
to the proposition of a participatory definition of democracy both 
in May 1951 and 1966. In both the early stages of the Cultural 
Revolution and the Democratic Reform Movement, leadership within 
enterprises revealed themselves as somewhat conservative and this 
led to a movement of a far more radical nature (the January 
Revolution of 1967 and the Three Anti Movement). In both cases 
the unions came under attack for "economism". At this point, 
however, the parallel breaks down. In the aftermath of the Three 
Anti and Five Anti Movements factory management committees withered 
away, whereas at the time of writing the supreme policy making 
structure within Chinese industrial enterprises is the revolutionary 
committee.
These post cultural revolution committees may well have been 
the kind of organisation that the democratisation movement of 1949- 
1951 attempted to set up. Like those committees of the early period 
they are organised according to a triple alliance formula and contain 
a military component. At the present time we are seeing the growth 
of a new Party structure, but it is too early to say whether the 
military component in enterprises will be replaced in the same 
manner as in 1950-51*
The Democratic Reform Movement sought to smash the 
traditional informal network within the factories. Gang bosses 
were able to isolate management from workers. Such a system 
prevented not only the development of an efficient organisation 
where communication between top and bottom is not impeded, but 
also the development of any new patterns of community where the 
commitment of the individual is to a group other than the 
traditional gang.
The pulverisation of the traditional informal structure 
could lead to one of two possibilities; a "totalitarian" 
solution where efforts were directed to achieving as much 
congruence as possible between the formal and informal networks 
of organisation and the eventual atomisation of the work force 
or the development of new patterns of group solidarity which did 
not necessarily correspond to the formal organisational structure. 
I shall argue in chapter eight that the Soviet model of the 
early 1950s tended to produce the former possibility, but there 
existed also a tradition which sought to politicise informal 
structure rather than pulverise it.
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FART TWO ENTERPRISATION
In this section I shall attempt to describe the Soviet 
model of organisation and incentive that was applied to China in 
the period following liberation* We shall examine five aspects 
of "enterprisation", commencing the discussion with the Movement 
to Establish New Records that began in 19^9- The overall theme 
of this section will be the contradiction between policy and 
resources which was determined in part by the low level of 
education on the part of junior line management, a lack of 
competent technical personnel and a generally low level of 
political consciousness*
We shall see that in the period prior to 1953 the Soviet 
model of organisation and incentive was only partially 
implemented and it was to be a long time before any of the 
ambitious schemes put forward during the New Record Movement of 
194-9 were in any real sense realised. In fact, many elements of 
the Soviet model were only implemented just in time for them to 
be subjected to intense criticism during the increasingly 
radical period after 1955-
In the meantime, we shall note that some elements of the 
Soviet model were mutually contradictory in a Chinese context 
and this contradiction resulted in forms of organisation 
antithetical to the Soviet model. Some of the forms of 
organisation that existed during this period were to appear 
again in the middle 1950s and middle 1960s, at a time when 
the numbers of skilled and politically conscious personnel had 
increased and China*s leaders were in a position to discuss to 
what extent elements of the Soviet model militated against the 
hierarchy of goals against which a total view of rationality 
might be measured.
CHAPTER THREE - THE MOVEMENT TO ESTABLISH NEW RECORDS - LAYING 
THE BASIS FOR ENTERPRISATION
The Sixth Labour Conference of 19^8 put forward the two 
policies of "democratisation" and "enterprisation". The two 
components of the "democratisation" process, the establishment 
of representative bodies and the movement to flush out "feudal 
elements", depended to some extent upon the establishment of 
agencies external to the factory (military control commissions, 
local People's governments, Party committees, union structures, 
municipal democratic reform committees etc*) but the process of 
"democratisation" was not so totally dependant upon the formation 
of external agencies as the parallel process of "enterprisation".
The term "enterprisation" was used explicitly to describe 
a process of transition from a territorially defined factory (kung-
A
ch1ang) or a commercially defined company (kung-ssu) into a unit 
that was defined in terms of the external network of economic 
administration. The term "enterprise" was first and foremost an 
administrative one and in the state sector, it indicated the lowest 
level of an administrative network that enjoyed a certain degree 
of autonomy in the use of funds allocated by the state or borrowed 
from the state banking system.
This chapter will describe briefly the rudimentary system of 
economic administration that was established in North East China 
following liberation and then examine the various components of the 
concept "enterprisation" as they were applied to industrial
enterprises in that region during the Movement to Establish New 
Records which commenced in mid 19^9* We shall deal mainly, 
though not exclusively, with North East China since this was the 
area which was acting as a prototype for industrial organisation 
in the New Democratic Period and the area in which the New Record 
Movement was most fully developed.
The concept "enterprisation" may be broken down into five
components - the establishment of a conception of rationality, 
a discrete command structure, a unified pattern of motivation and
incentive, a planning and accounting system and a system of 
contractual agreements. An attempt will be made to determine what 
exactly was meant by rationality within Chinese industry in 19^9 
and then the second, third, fourth and fifth of the above com­
ponents will be examined in connection with the New Record 
Movement. In this way it is hoped that a basis will be established 
for the following four chapters in which each of these components 
will be dealt with in more detail.
The Basic Economic Accounting Unit
The "enterprise" was conceived of in its Soviet sense and 
the Soviet model of organisation which is referred to in this 
essay is that of the late 1 9 -^Os, at which time enterprises con­
sisting of one or several factories were considered to be basic
2links in the system of economic administration. Chinese industrial 
literature at the time of liberation was, however, not very clear 
about exactly which Soviet model was to be implemented. Labour 
union cadres were explicitly instructed to read material dealing
5
with the Soviet Union's New Economic Policy-^ since the relationship
between the public and private sectors of industry in China 
during the period of New Democracy was felt to be similar. It 
was not always clear which Soviet organisational forms were to be 
adopted; those of the late 1 9 -^Os or those of the early 1920s?
As in the case of "democratisation", a distinction must be 
drawn between the North East and the rest of China. In the North 
East, it was clear that the Soviet organisational model to be 
emulated was that of the late 19^*0s. In December 19^8, the basic 
system of economic administration that was adopted in that region 
placed state run industry under the control of an industrial 
department fkung-veh-ru') which was divided into nine administrative 
bureaux (kuan-li-chu); coal mining (with nine sub-bureaux), 
machinery, non-ferrous metals, forestry, textiles, chemicals,metal 
mining (with four provincial sub-bureaux), military engineering and 
a bureau for other enterprises (including paper, cement, rubber, 
porcelain etc.). In addition, two corporations (kung-ssu) directly 
administered by the Industrial Department were established; the
Zl
Anshan and Penhsi Iron and Steel Works. The various administrative 
bureaux were the counterparts of Soviet organisational forms (glavks) 
as were the corporations (combines). The administrative bureaux 
controlled a number of lower level corporations as did the Anshan 
and Penhsi complexes. Such corporations differed from the bureaux 
and sub-bureaux in that they wen "economic accounting" organs 
(profit making organisations) as opposed to "budgetary" organs.
With the exception of corporations, the basic economic accounting 
unit was to be the enterprise which seemed usually to be only one 
factory.
The North East adaptation of the Soviet administrative model
was later to he extended to the whole country, with ministries
taking the place of administrative bureaux and new administrative
bureaux taking the place of sub-bureaux. South of the Great Wall
in the period immediately following liberation, however, a certain
amount of confusion existed as to what form of organisation ought to
be prescribed for the lower levels of administration. Some people
appeared to take the New Economic Policy (NEP) parallel sufficiently
seriously to advocate the establishment of basic level organisations
remarkably similar to the NEP trust which, in the Soviet Union, had
c;
ceased to be the main basic level accounting unit in the 1 9 2 0s.
In the spring of 19^9 Liu Shao-ch'i advocated the establishment of
ten horizontally integrated corporations in Tientsin and the
incorporation of sundry factories that did not fall into clearly
defined production criteria into joint enterprises (lien-ho ch'i-
yeh)." Liu stated that private organisations could enter these
organisations though it is difficult to imagine how this would have
worked out in practice, and as far as I know no details have been
published on the operation of such corporations or joint enterprises
in this early period. Similar organisations were to appear in the
7middle 1950s and 1960sr and for these some documentation exists.
It was not however for this kind of "trust” that Liu Shao-ch'i was 
subsequently attacked but for his proposal to turn over part of 
industry to organisations similar to British public corporations,
Q
and thus dilute the power of the Party.
Although this essay will not examine the structure of supra- 
enterprise organisation, it is useful to have some idea about the
formal industrial network and the significance of the role of 
the individual enterprise in it, for the very term "enterprise" 
was defined according to that prescribed network.
Rationality^
The North East embarked early upon the implementation of a 
Soviet organisational model. A considerable amount of literature 
was translated from Russian and a number of articles appeared 
describing the "rationality" of this model. In China the process 
of democratic reform was to pave the way for "rational" admin­
istration. One is bound, therefore, to ask what is meant by 
"rationality".
The loosest definition of rationality is the "selection of
q
the appropriate means to achieve some end". For such a definition
to have any operational significance, one must establish a definite
hierarchy of ends and be in a position to predict the probable
10outcome of the means used to attain them. Since the determination
of ends must of necessity be in accordance with a hierarchy of 
11Values, a conception of rationality is only operational when a 
convention as to desired values is established. It is impossible 
therefore to divorce rationality from ideology.
Within every society there is always a maze of contradictions
between hierarchies of social and economic values, between human
and technological values, between community and organisational 
12values etc. Social scientists of a non-totalist persuasion who 
are concerned with assessing the "rationality" of a particular
action tend to abstract a single hierarchy of values and ends 
against which to measure that action, in the hope that other 
social scientists might abstract a different hierarchy of values 
and ends to measure the same action. The conclusion so produced 
is that the action in question is "rational” in terms of A but 
not in terms of B. Social scientists of a totalist persuasion, on 
the other hand, seek to measure action against a total integrated 
developmental process where individual ends are not abstracted.
An action is therefore rational or irrational only according to 
that process.
The first approach to "rationality" all too easily leads to 
a situation where the process of abstraction becomes unconscious 
and the partial nature of ends becomes "given"; what was 
hitherto a useful heuristic device becomes a reductionist ideology 
whose practitioners find it difficult to engage in inter­
disciplinary comparison. The second approach to rationality all 
too easily leads to a failure to achieve a totally integrated 
hierarchy of values and ends and the employment of imported models 
rather than carefully worked out developmental strategies. One 
might well argue that those economists who bring to the study of 
China a view of rationality defined only in terms of "optimum 
resource allocation patterns" may be guilty of the former, whereas 
those latter day Weberian sociologists who bring to China a view
ALL
of development in terms of stable behavioural models may be 
guilty of the latter. In North East China in 19^9$ the term 
"rational" tended to be equated with a prescribed stable Soviet 
model in much the same way as some of the heirs to Weber's
"legal rationality" measured rationality against a prescribed set
15of pattern variables that were rooted somewhere in a stable
'16"mid-Atlantic culture"• In this essay we shall note that the 
Soviet models of organisation and incentive were not introduced 
all at once but the New Record Movement of 1949-50 contained all 
the necessary ingredients of those models and the success of that 
movement was attributed to "reliance upon the cooperation of 
allies and friends" (the Soviet Union) rather than the "rationalism" 
(sic) of some Chinese equivalent of Frederick Taylor."1'7
Genesis of the Movement to Establish New Records
The New Record Movement was the third of a trinity of 
movements carried out simultaneously within North East industry 
in 194-9* the other two being the democratisation of management and 
democratic reform. It was to have a significance far wider than 
just beating pre-war records and ray impression is that it was 
considered to be of a far greater importance than the other 
movements. Li Fu-ch'un, Vice Chairman of the North East People’s 
Government, described its political importance as no less than 
"the consolidation of the material foundation of the People's 
Democratic Dictatorship and its economic and administrative sig­
nificance as no less than "laying the foundation for enterprisation" 
by raising the level of output, improving quality, determining
norms, practising "economic accounting" and improving systems of
18production management.
The movement originated in the joint Sino-Soviet enterprises 
in Lushun and Talien where Soviet experts were at hand long before
1 Qthe conclusion of the Sino Soviet Treaty. y In the North East 
as a whole, the movement dates from June 194-9 when the North East 
Industrial Department conducted an investigation into the work of
factories in each of the administrative bureaux that had been set
20up some six months before. The investigation discovered that
waste was very serious and this was attributed to the inexperience
21
of management. Quite naturally the Industrial Department turned 
to the one region where management was not inexperienced (Lushun 
and Talien) for guidance as to how to overcome this problem. The
answer given by the Soviet experts was that the economic accounting
22system (khozraschet) should be implemented as soon as possible 
and in July 194-9 the Industrial Department decided that the economic
accounting system would be introduced or strengthened in all
23factories under its jurisdiction. ' From July-September 194-9 
considerable discussion was held as to how such a system could be 
implemented and again Soviet advice was sought. The Soviet ex­
perience had shown that the implementation of the economic accounting 
system could only be effectively undertaken once an efficient system
of norm determination had been worked out within enterprises and
24the best way to do this was to emulate the Stakhanovite system. 
Consequently, in September 194-9* the ^ew Record Movement began 
formally, with the primary aim of establishing norms through labour
emulation competitions.Upon these norms a system of planning and
25accounting could be built. ^
In October a number of directives were published by the North
East Bureau of the Party Central Committee and the Industrial
26Department establishing the scope of the movement and linking it
27with the policy of implementing the economic accounting system. (
In addition, each bureau chief, corporation director and FGM 
under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Department attended a 
mobilisation conference so that the movement could proceed in 
a uniform manner
As a result of the introduction of the New Record Movement,
it was claimed that in the three months from October-December
194-9 the labour productivity rate in enterprises under the
jurisdiction of the North East Industrial Department went up by
13% on the September rate. In the first five months of the
movement (October 194-9-March 1950) over 30,000 workers in two thirds
of the 170 principal factories in the Industrial Department's
network were involved in creating new records either individually
or collectively and this amounted to 19*940 items. Of these,116
factories, 36 had already arrived at a new set of norms by March
2Q
1950 and 16 had partially done so. J In the North East as a 
whole, output of enterprises under the Industrial Department 
doubled in the second half of 194-9^ though this is also attributable 
to many other factors, not the least among them the repairing of 
war damage.
Rationalisation Proposals
The establishment of new records was closely associated 
with the fostering of "rationalisation proposals" which would 
serve to raise the level of quality control and technical standards 
upon which norms could be established. A rationalisation proposal 
may be defined as anything which improved the labour productivity 
rate and lowered costs - in fact, anything which contributed to
the determination of higher hut realistic norms. Such proposals
might deal with cutting down on useless operations, eliminating
waste, reducing losses, aiding inter-departmental co-ordination,
improving the working environment, new designs for equipment,
measures to save time etc. All such proposals could, in theory,
he accorded a cash value. Rationalisation proposals were divided
officially into three categories; inventions, technical improvements
and other rationalisation proposals, and the cash value of each
proposal was an estimate of the annual amount of money saved by its
adoption. Bonuses were awarded in direct proportion to the cash
31value according to a set scale (see figure 2).
The drive to foster rationalisation proposals began in the
Lushun Talien area long before the remainder of the North East.
Within Talien enterprises in 194-8, 1426 proposals were made, of
which 449 were considered to have definite technological value.
The estimated value of these proposals was ¥ 61,000 (Kuan-tung
currency) equal to 15% of the overall value of production in Talien.^
In the country as a whole during the years 1949-52 almost 400,000
rationalisation proposals were recorded, of which over 241,000 were 
33a d o p t e d . I  have, however, seen no nation-wide bonus scales for
34rationalisation proposals promulgated before May 1954.
We shall note later that sometimes technical personnel did
not give sufficient weight to rationalisation proposals that were
35put forward by ordinary workers." As early as October 194-9* there 
was a tendency for FGMs to disregard rationalisation proposals that
FIGURE 2.
NORTH EAST PEOPLES GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL DEPARTMENT TEMPORARY 
BONUS SCALE FOR RATIONALISATION PROPOSALS 5th April 1950 
In units of JMP(NE) ¥ 10,000
Value (annual 
savings)
Inventions Technical
Improvements
Other
Rationalisation
Proposals
under 100 20-25% 15-20% 5-10%
100-500 15%+10 12%+ 8
!
■+* 
I
\o 
' 
KD
II
500-1000 12%+25 00 + PO 00 4%+ 14
1000-3000 10%+4-5 5%+ 58 2.5%+ 29
3000-6000 8%+105 £ + 03 CO 2%+ 44
6000-10000 6%+22 5 3%+ 148 1.5%+ 74
10000-30000 5%+325 2.5%+ 198 1.25%+ 99
30000-60000 4-%+62 5 2%+ 348 1%+ 174
60000-100000 3%+1225 1.5%+ 648 0.75%+324
100000-300000 2%+2225 1%+1148 0.5%+ 574
300000 + 1%+5225 0.5%+2648 0.25%+1324
not to not to not to
exceed exceed exceed
15,000 8,000 4,000
Source
Tung Pei Jen-min Cheng-fu Kung-yeh-ou:
1
Kuan-yii Ch'uang-tsao Sheng-ch’an Hsin Chi-lu Chiang-li Chan-hsing 
T'iao-li7 (Temporary Bonus Regulations for Establishing New
Records^
Tung Pei Kung-yeh No. 20, 16th April 1950, pp 50-53•
did not offer spectacular results, and this prompted official 
instructions that FGMs think of "benefits of the order of only 5-10% 
and discuss all proposals at the regular production conferences that 
had been instituted as part of the Soviet system.^ FGMs were 
required to work out concrete procedures for dealing with such 
proposals and their submission to higher levels for approval.
Norm Determination
Norms were to be determined on the basis of new records and
technical standards. At first there was a tendency to decide norms
arbitrarily, upon the basis of abstract theory or according to
international standards. International standards tended to be higher
than Chinese standards at that time and this resulted in the setting
of norms which were too high and which dampened the workers' ardour.
For example, the Antung (now Tantung) Paper Works began to establish
norms in August 194-9 upon the basis of international standards and
the current production of the factory. A monthly target of 12 tons
of a particular type of paper was fixed for the whole factory, but
by October the highest monthly target reached was 9 tons. In
November the FGM was forced to lower the target to 11 tons. In that
month the New Record Movement was implemented in the factory and
this resulted in a record output of 12.652 tons. The target (an
aggregate of lower level output norms) was raised accordingly to 12
tons. In December an output of 15*92 tons was recorded which brought
the average monthly output up to 12.67 tons and in January the target
57was raised to a point just above the average, (13 tons). ' This 
clearly demonstrates a policy which sought to keep targets (and 
lower level norms) closely tied to average production over a period
of time and to actual increase in production rather than purely 
technical or normative criteria.
Output norms were not the only kind of norm. Originally 
there were three others (quality, time and labour) which were 
collectively known as the four fixed (ssu-ting) ^  but as the 
movement was developed ten norms were prescribed. First a quality 
norm was determined and after that nine other norms were determined 
in the following order; norm for the utilisation of raw materials, 
labour norm, time norm, output norm, equipment norm, expenses norm, 
cost norm, capital construction norm and technical norms; the first
eight of these were said to form a system since the last two
7>q
categories were to a greater extent independent variables. y
After the masses had been mobilised to create new records, 
technical cadres went down into the shops to fix quality and 
technical standards against which to measure the above norms. On 
the basis of these standards and records which had already been 
achieved, discussion was organised at all levels.
Individual norms were fixed according to an individual worker*s 
achievements. Once he had established a tentative record, workers 
engaged in the same job would discuss his achievements and if they 
felt that they could realistically achieve the same themselves, 
would propose the formal adoption of this record as a norm. If 
they felt that they could not achieve the record, a different 
worker did the same job of work and a new discussion was started.
The initial norm could only he set once there was no more 
disagreement
Once initial norms had heen determined, they were submitted 
to the factory management committee for adoption and then to the
41appropriate administrative bureau or corporation for ratification*
Once such ratification had been obtained, the nouns could not be
altered for a period of six months during which time new records
would be set which would provide the basis for new norms for the
42second six month period* During this process of norm determination
FGMs were warned not to concentrate solely on output and technical
43norms at the expense of others* ^
The Appearance of Labour Models
From the very start of the movement, the process of setting
new records was associated with the appearance of labour models*
In its formal decision to launch the New Record Movement, the
North East Industrial Department singled out a number of labour
models in the Machinery Bureau’s network who had established new
44records upon which norms could be determined* Considerable
43publicity was given to their exploits and soon other factories 
began to publicise the achievements of workers who had successfully 
emulated them. In the space of one month seventy workers were 
designated ’advanced producers” within factories under the Machinery
4 CL
Bureau. All these workers received large bonuses but there was 
also a significant element of non-material incentive in the pro­
pagation of their achievements. The selection of model workers
was defined as an anti-conservative measure and this "conservatism" 
could be defined in three very different ways. Some people thought 
that the former Manchukuo standards could not be improved upon. 
Others feared that machinery might be broken in the movement and 
others disliked the development of a belief in "individual heroism".
Wages and Incentives
. .A major feature of the New Record Movement was an attempt
to tie a wage and bonus system to the system of norms formulated
in the course of the movement. In Chapter Five we shall discuss
how the Soviet system that was adopted and which was the result
48
of "thirty years struggle against egalitarianism" conflicted with 
the egalitarian ethos of the Communist Party, or at least the rural 
section of it. In the meantime we note the main features of the 
prescribed Soviet system which were first implemented in Lushun 
and Talien at the beginning of the Soviet occupation.
The prescribed system for enterprises in Lushun and Talien 
was a seven grade system for blue collar workers with a progressive 
differential between grades. For example, if one takes grade one 
as 100, grade two would be 120, grade three 145, grade four 175» 
grade five 215* grade six 260 and grade seven 320, thus giving *1 
differentials of 20, 25, 30, 40, 45 and 60 between successive grades 
.The lowest grade was initially calculated as Just enough for a 
single worker to live on according to the 1946 cost of living index 
in Talien which amounted to a wage of ¥ 2,400 (Kuan-tung currency).2*’ 
In 6ther areas where inflation was rapid, wages were tied not only
to a cost of living index, "but also to the price of foodstuffs
SOaccording to a wage point system. In 194-8 the Sixth Labour
Conference decided that the lowest basic wage should be calculated
51as the lowest possible wage for two people to live on^ and as
the Lushun-Talien model was implemented in North East China as
a whole, the prescribed seven grade system tended to be replaced
by an eight grade system. Throughout this period, workers in
"heavy” industry enjoyed a higher wage scale than workers in light
industry which was the exact opposite to the situation that had
52pertained in pre-liberation Shanghai.
White collar workers and managers in Lushun and Talien were
not paid according to the seven or eight grade system but ideally
according to a separate 15 grade system (see figure 3)> This was
not a progressive system since it was felt that workers directly
55engaged in production needed a greater incentive. ^
The best method of payment was considered to be piecework
which was Justified according to the socialist principle of
"from each according to his labour to each according to his work".
In its most rudimentary form this meant no more than a progressive
bonus system for overfulfilling norms. For example, if a worker
fulfilled his output norm by 5% be would get a 10% bonus, whereas
if he fulfilled it by 75% be would get not a 1S0% bonus but a 200%
bonus, the principle being the more the norm is overfulfilled the
54-greater the bonus.^ This was hardly a piecework system.
A more sophisticated version was the simple piecework system
FIGURE 3.
FIFTEEN GRADE SALARY SCALE (MONTHLY) FOR WHITE COLLAR WORKERS 
IN LUSHUN AND TALIEN - early 1950 
(Kuan-tung Currency)
GRADE GRADE ONE ENTERPRISE 
(HEAVY)
GRADE TWO ENTERPRISE 
(LIGHT)
1. 5500 3200
2. 4500 4000
5. 5500 5000
4. 6500 5800
5. 7500 5600
6. 8500 7700
7. 9000 8200
8. 10,000 9000
9. 11,000 10,000
10. 12,000 11,000
11. 13,000 12,000
12. 14,000 12,500
15. 15,000 15,500
14. 16,000 14,500
15. 17,000 15,000
Note: I cannot understand why a grade five white collar worker
in a grade two enterprise should earn less than a grade four 
white collar worker. I would have considered this a misprint if 
I had not seen the same pattern elsewhere (in the collective 
contract for the Glass Factory of the Lushun-Talien Electronics 
Bureau (see chapter seven)).
Source. Chu P ’u: *Wei-ta ti Ch'uang Hsin Chi-lu Ytin-tung^
(The Great Movement to Establish New Records)
Chung-Kuo Kung-yeh Vol. 1, No. 12, 24th April 1950, pp 3-^6.
which by 1949 was the main system in force in Lushun and Talien 
(and was said to be enjoyed by 80% of Soviet workers at that time). 
According to this system the basic wage was fixed at the 
stipulations of the seven grade scale plus 10%. If, for example, a 
glass cutter was required to meet a norm of 280 square metres per 
day and his normal working day were eight hours, his time norm for 
every metre would be 1.7 minutes. Thus for every metre he cut he 
received payment for 1.7 minutes according to his particular grade 
scale plus 10%; Thus, if he cut 2 metres in 1.7 minutes, his wage 
doubled.^
The ideal system was a progressive piecework system which 
was the same as the above except that when norms were exceeded 
the extra payment was on a progressive scale. Thus if the above 
worker cut 2 metres in 1.7 minutes he would get more than double 
his pay and if he cut three metres he would get considerably than 
treble his pay.^ According to the progressive system, the bonus 
graph is curved rather than a straight line, though the degree of 
curve may vary.
According to the Lushun Talien system, white collar workers 
were to get bonuses in proportion to the progressive bonus system 
of workers on the 7 grade system if a particular factory over­
fulfilled its target by under 40%. If the factory overfulfilled
its target by over 40%, white collar workers were to get a bonus
57of 70% but this was the ceiling. '
We shall note in Chapter Five that although the seven grade
system was fully operative in Lushun and Talien by the autumn of
19^9 and that by the spring of 1950 78% of all workers in this
area were in receipt of payment according to the piecework or
58progressive piecework systems, the model spread very slowly to 
other areas. Outside Lushun and Talien in 1950 piecework systems 
were found mainly in light industry (especially in textiles) where 
they had survived from the pre-liberation period.'' In heavy 
industry the progressive bonus system for overfulfilling norms
60remained more common than piecework systems at least until 1954-*
Though strenuous efforts were made to introduce the seven and eight 
grade systems during the New Record Movement, once norms were 
formulated, very little success was recorded even in the North East 
in establishing unified differentials.^ The Lushun Talien 
experiences are valuable only as a model.
A System of Internal Contracts
Another feature of the New Record Movement was the establishment 
of a system of internal contracts within the enterprise. These 
were collective contracts which were anything from labour agreements 
to productivity deals, joint contracts which stipulated the 
relationships between various structures within the enterprise, and 
master apprentice contracts.62 Korean War another
type of contract was introduced: the patriotic com£actt These compacts 
began as donation agreements to support the front in the last days 
of the Civil War and continued as such into the Korean War where 
they were transformed into r lower level guarantees of labour
discipline and plan fulfillment.^ Such a system of internal 
contracts was seen as particularly important during the New Record 
Movement since they established a link between labour regulations, 
wage standards and norm fulfillment. In drawing up these contracts 
a worker had the chance to discuss his terms of service and the 
norms he was expected to achieve. Once drawn up, the worker knew 
exactly what his norms were and what he stood to gain if he 
fulfilled or over fulfilled them. These different types of contract 
will be considered in detail in chapter seven.
The Responsibility System and Planning Network.
The final major feature of the movement was the introduction
of a responsibility system. Some managers felt that the New
Record Movement could become too "democratic” in the sense that
labour activism might lead to confusion and the shelving of
64-responsibility in the drive to achieve new records. What was 
feared was "democracy" in its participatory sense, in much the same 
way as a policy of mobilisation was feared in the democratisation 
movements.
In the first five months of the movement, not a great deal 
of attention was paid to discipline, for the movement was felt to
65be like water which, in the end, would flow along defined channels. 
Presumably, if one dug the channel too soon the water might dry up.
By the end of February 1950, however, attempts were made to implement 
a system of responsibility and following an authoritative decisioho
66from the North East Industrial Department a number of articles 
appeared in the press specifying exactly what the establishment 
of such a system would entail.^ The requirements of the Industrial 
Department revealed a conception of control far tighter than 
anything that was to appear subsequently.
The head of every bureau and corporation was required to 
report daily to the Industrial Department on how far the current 
plan had been fulfilled in enterprises under his jurisdiction, 
whether machines had been stopped and on the state of equipment, 
supply of materials and distribution of products. The Industrial 
Department was required to analyse the opinions and suggestions of 
the bureau chiefs and corporation directors and to make periodic
/o
summaries® To this end the department published a journal Tung Pei 
Kung-yeh which was the forerunner of the many ministerial journals 
that were to appear in the years that followed.
Every week bureau chiefs and corporation directors were 
required to collect summaries from the heads of each sub-department 
and each FGM and Mine: General Manager within their network. These 
summaries were to be based upon the rpports made by FGMs ordsub- 
bureau chiefs to work conferences or production conferences within 
their own units; they were to deal with work over the past week, 
showing how the resolutions of previous meetings had been implemented
The head of the planning department of each administrative 
bureau was required to hand down a ten day plan to each FGM in the
first two days of each ten day period, giving details of the
day and night operation of equipment within each factory, and on
the basis of these ten day plans, the FGM was to hand down daily
plans to the shops giving concrete instructions for each worker
70and each piece of equipment.'
Before beginning work every day, meetings of technicians,
shift leaders,foremen and team leaders were to be held in the
shops to determine work posts for the day (or shift) and after
every shift a fifteen minute meeting was to be held in every shop
to analyse difficulties encountered in the shift and shortcomings
71m  the work done.
One person was to be assigned responsibility for each piece
of equipment and responsibility for shift change, supply, safety
and the resolution of different' kinds of technical problems located
A regular inspection procedure for every item of equipment was to
be instituted and, in the case of stoppages due to equipment
malfunction, the bureau or corporation concerned was to call a
meeting to determine who exactly was responsible; these meetings
72were to submit peports to the head of the Industrial Department.r
The instructions on responsibility were supplemented by a 
73directive on safety'^ following which each bureau cnnducted an
74-mvestigation of safety measures throughout its network.' The 
Industrial Department organised four inspection teams to carry out 
spot checks. In addition, each factory was required to set up its
122,
own safety inspection system, the provisions of which were to "be 
ratified by the appropriate factory management committee
Such a system of responsibility was highly ambitious and 
took a long while to put into operation. In 1953 a widespread 
lack of responsibility was noted even in the North East which 
indicated a lack of success in implementing this responsibility 
system. A mammoth campaign was instituted at that time to solve 
the problem once and for all and we shall return to this campaign 
in the next chapter.
Spontaneity and Discipline
The above seven major features of the New Eecord Movement 
were all inter-related. Records were to be set and rationalisation 
proposals submitted in order to furmulate norms. Model workers 
were to be designated and wage and bonus systems determined to act 
as incentives to set new records. Internal contracts were to be 
concluded linking labour regulations, wage systems and planned 
targets in order that the worker know exactly where he stood and 
what he could gain by setting new records. Finally, a responsibility 
system was to be introduced to stop the whole process getting out 
of hand.
In the North East the New Record Movement accompanied the 
process of democratic reform and the mobilisation carried out for 
these two movements was the same. By December 19^9* that region, 
both movements had reached a stage that required consolidation and
stability. In the previous three months, although very many
new records had been set, overall production targets were sometimes
not being fulfilled due to faulty management systems.7^  The New
\
Record Movement had been designed primarily as the first step in
introducing the economic accounting system which was above all
aimed at minimising waste. In the course of the movement, however,
77waste had sometimes increased'r due to a stress on quantity at the 
expense of quality, a preoccupation with finishing work in record 
time, insufficient attention paid to inspection procedures and the 1 
large scale testing of rationalisation proposals that often went 
w r o n g . T h e  enthusiasm of the workers had led to their participation 
in extra shifts and night shift workers frequently worked through 
the following day shift, thus endangering their health.*^ The 
time had come to give greater stress to the disciplinary elements 
in the movement and the establishment of a responsibility system 
was given priority,
A number of articles appeared in the press highlighting the 
lack of a sense of responsibility. It was noted that in some 
factories there were no technical regulations at all and in others 
some people came and went at will without any regard to the work
QQ
post to which they were assigned. Demands were made therefore 
that the Party, management and labour unions carry out all measures 
necessary to enforce labour discipline even to the point of
gxi
compulsion. In the summer of 1950, the new order of priorities 
was reflected in press accounts of the New Record Movement which 
were sometimes included under the heading "Establish a Responsibility
op
System". This was a far cry from an earlier policy which demanded
that the “water” he allowed to find its own channel
The original policy for the New Record Movement had been 
one of discipline on the basis of creativity. In early 1950 this 
changed to one of creativity on the basis of discipline and it 
was at this stage that the movement spread to the rest of the 
country. Democratic Reform was not very thorough south of the 
Great Wall in the period 1950-51* nor was the development of labour 
emulation competitions, for they too depended upon a policy of 
mobilisation which was not to appear in any significant way until 
1951.
In that year, the New Record Movement was given a new
lease of life and it subsequently developed into a Movement
to Increase Production and Practise Economy as mass mobilisation
became more thorough.®^ In July 1951 Li Li-san warned against
precipitately imposing disciplinary measures upon workers engaged
in production competitions even though such competitions might
harm their health and so affect production. Li felt that the
intense vigour engendered by such competitions could not last for
very long and only when movements began to lose their vigour was
one to lead them "from their temporary shock nature into becoming
84-regular campaigns". Li's remark was an echo of the "water" 
analogy that had been applied to the North East at the height of 
its New Record Movement.
Commenting on emulation campaigns at the Seventh Labour
85Conference in 1953* Lai Jo-yd, the secretary general of the ACFL, ^
noted that it had been impossible to routinise production 
competitions until after democratic reform had been carried out.®® 
Thus the stress on labour discipline and the creation of Soviet 
type structures which in the North East took place in the spring 
of 1950 did not take place with anything like the same degree of 
thoroughness in the rest of the country until after the conclusion 
of the Three and Five Anti campaigns of 195^-52.
Individual and Group
In the New Record Movement there developed not only a 
contradiction between spontaneity and discipline, but also a contra­
diction between individual and group orientation. The Soviet 
model, as interpreted during the New Record Movement in North 
East China, fostered the individual model worker who was rewarded 
both materially and non materially as an individual and kept in 
check by a system of individual responsibility. Bonuses were to 
be awarded to individuals wherever possible and if it was impossible 
to avoid giving a collective bonus, the recipients were required 
to divide out the proceeds according to which individuals made the 
greater contribution; at all costs "egalitarianism" was to be 
avoided.®*'7
Surveying the twenty years* history of the Chinese People’s 
Republic, one may discern two views of work motivation and incentive. 
The first praises the hard working individual and criticises the 
lazy. Such a stick and carrot policy pays according to piecework 
and is founded upon the befief that status and material benefit are
DO
the prime determinants of work motivation. The second view
praises the individual not so much for his hard work as for 
his "activism". Such "activism" is infectious,®^ hard work 
per se is not. Activism may he defined not just as enthusiasm 
for work but infectious enthusiasm for work and the collectivity. 
This second view does not rule out status and material benefit 
as important factors in work motivation but attempts to reduce 
them to collective dimensions. Deriving from that collective 
orientation, an additional ingredient is added - guilt. Under 
such a system the lazy individual is not only apprehensive of 
criticism but feels also a sense of guilt at having let down the 
collectivity.
There is a considerable amount of literature upon guilt 
as a determinant of work motivation in Western (particularly 
Protestant) society. It has been said that capitalism depended 
for its development upon a system of stable expectations which 
derived from the inner worldly asceticism of the Puritans who 
by depersonalising family and neighbours achieved inter-personal 
reliability at the expense of emotional involvement.^® Emotional 
involvement was displaced on to a symbol which in the period of 
the Protestant Reformation was God,^ though later such a symbol 
was replaced by a more secularised version of ideal-self projection 
(duty etc.). Guilt stemmed from the inadequacy of the residual 
self when confronted by the symbolised projection of the ideal- 
self.^ In Mao*s view the community is a God-symbol.^ Guilt 
therefore stems from a similar confrontation.
The activist-guilt pattern of motivation became quite 
manifest during the Great Leap Forward which was characterised not 
so much by the replacement of material incentive by moral incentive, 
but by the switching of the loci of both types of incentive.
During that period, collective material bonuses were stressed^ 
and patterns of innferrdirection fostered.^
We h,hve noted that during the New Record Movement a stick
and carrot policy was adopted which might conflict with a more
widely defined policy of fostering "activism". There was also a
stress upon the individual which might conflict with the ethos
of a Communist Party that had emerged from a tradition of group
orientation. The individual hero had been a feature of Yenan
days but however much individual responsibility was a feature of
policy, it would not mean much in a situation which demanded that
qg
cadres assume a number of ever;*changing roles.
Such a stress upon the individual might lead also to 
division amongst the workers.^ In 195^ Li Li-san called for the 
"promotion of collective heroism" instead of individual merit.
He saw the primary function of group contracts as shifting the 
focus away from the individual.^® This might have been a plea for 
a shift to an activist community orientation or, in view of Li's 
current "economist" line,^ the reflection of a trade unionist*s 
conservative distrust for the individual shock worker. An 
affirmation of gemeinschaft may be either radical or 
conservative.
C o n c lu s io n
The New R ecord Movement e s ta b lis h e d , in  N o rth  E a s t C hina  
th e  d im ensions o f  th e  S o v ie t  m odel t h a t  was to  be em u la te d . 
R a t io n a l i t y  was d e f in e d  a c c o rd in g  to  t h a t  m o d e l, f o r  th e  
"advanced methods we must pursue a l l  come from  th e  S o v ie t  
U n i o n " . R a t i o n a l  in c e n t iv e  was a p ro cess  w hich  r e la t e d  th e  
s iz e  o f  th e  c a r r o t  (o r  s t ic k )  to  c u r r e n t  p ro d u c tio n  and
b e h a v io u r  was r a t i o n a l  in  so f a r  as i t  was s ta b le  and
101p r e d ic t a b le .  Thus began a p ro cess  w hich  was to  end w ith  th e
G re a t Leap Fo rw ard  when Mao c a l le d  a t t e n t io n  to  th e  tem p o ra ry
102n a tu re  o f  s t a b i l i t y  and th e  permanence o f  im b a lan ce  and
105a f f ir m e d  t h a t  C h in a  was no lo n g e r  to  " e a t  re a d y  made fo o d " .
One is  l e f t  w ith  th e  prob lem  o f  w h e th e r a n o th e r  s t r a te g y
c o u ld  have been d e v is e d  in  th e  e a r ly  1 9 5 0 s . Mao c e r t a in ly  d id
104n o t th in k  so . In  th e  c h a p te rs  w h ich  f o l lo w ,  th e  v a r io u s
in g r e d ie n ts  o f  th e  S o v ie t  m odel w i l l  be t r e a te d  more f u l l y  and 
we w i l l  n o te  t h a t  th e  p r e s c r ip t io n s  o f  th e  S o v ie t  model t h a t  
were l a i d  down in  th e  N o rth  E a s t in  19^-9-50 were no g u ara n te e  
o f  i t s  f u l l  im p le m e n ta tio n .
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CHAPTER FOUR UNITY OF COMMAND
The prescription of a Soviet-type responsibility system for 
North East China at the beginning of 1950 marked the beginning of 
a process that was to culminate in 1953 with a large scale move­
ment to extend the Soviet-type organisation throughout Chinese 
industry. Until that time there was a significant gap between the 
implementation of policy north and south of the Great Wall, for 
organisational reform depended on the completion of democratic 
reform. Just as it had been possible to prescribe "trust"-like 
organisations as basic economic accounting units in Tientsin in the 
spring of 1949* so it was possible for at least one management 
theorist in Shanghai to advocate functional patterns of organisa­
tion at the time of liberation even .though these were anathema to 
the post-war Soviet conception of organisation. We shall examine 
the prescriptions of this advocate to show that at least in 
Shanghai, Chinese management was familiar with alternative forms of 
organisation. The Soviet staff-line conception of organisational 
command will be elaborated on and this conception contrasted with 
existing patterns of organisation within Chinese industrial 
enterprises. The Soviet model demanded a downward transfer of 
staff functions which led to a growth of "bureaucratic structures” 
at middle levels of organisation. This pattern of organisational 
change will be examined from the perspective of the chief 
engineer, the shop supervisor and the foreman and then contrasted 
with‘the reverse process that began in 1964 where staff functions 
were transferred upwards and functional patterns becaie stronger. 
Before commencing the discussion, however, let us determine what 
exactly is meant by functional patterns of organisation.
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frinciolcs of Organisation
Vithin an industrial organisation, there are threo 
possible principles of formal organisation; the single line 
principle, the staff-line principle and the functional 
principle.
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In single-line organisation, specialised staff functions 
(personnel management, engineering, accountancy, etc.) are 
performed by line management v;ho issue instructions directly to 
ohc shop floor. Such a principle is only suitable for the 
snail concern since it is based upon the assumption that line 
management has sufficient tine and expertise to perform the 
necessary staff functions. In staff-line organisation, 
specialised staff have merely an advisory role. Their function 
is to assist line management in making decisions but they may 
not issue instructions directly to the shop floor. Such a 
system assumes that line managers are sufficiently competent to 
integrate the advice of staff members and process such advice 
into operational instructions. In functional organisation, 
specialised staff are required to issue orders directly to the
shop floor within limits very clearly defined by their 
expertise. In an ideal functional system, division of labour 
would be worked out to such a degree of precision that there 
would be no need for any line managers to perform an integrative 
function.
When the idea of "functional supervision" was first 
propounded at the beginning of the Twentieth century it was 
closely associated with the school of "scientific management" 
of which Frederick W. Taylor was the most notable exponent. 
Taylor believed that functional systems would be possible to 
actualise in a situation where each worker was turned into an
unthinking cog in a machine who responded automatically to the
2specialist commands of each of eight functional foremen.
Workers were by nature lazy and given to "soldiering" and 
all attempts were to be made therefore to cancel out the human 
factor. Subsequent works on industrial management, however, 
considered it not only undesirable but also impossible to 
consider workers in such a mechanistic way.
Functional Integration
There is, however, no necessary connection between a 
functional system and a technological conception of organisa­
tion (i.e. between roles and structures rather than between 
individual human beings) as the Taylor system presupposed. In 
a staff-line system, the function of the line manager is to 
integrate the advice of staff members with the predetermined 
policy goals of the organisation and so formulate operational 
instructions. The Taylor model assumed the disappearance of 
this function as staff members become receptive to an
integrated organisational policy specifying the exact scope 
within which they might issue instructions to the shop floor. 
Such policy integration was effected at foreman level and above
and the atomised workers were required to do nothing but abide
3by written regulations. It is possible however to construct a 
functional model where the integration of conflicting stimuli is 
effected on the shop floor according to an effective and 
detailed set of organisational values. In such a model, staff 
officers would be located at a level higher than that of the 
foreman since their direction would be confined to matters of 
importance; ideologically motivated and highly skilled workers 
would be expected to handle routine matters. The growth of an 
elite-mass gap which might follow from such an upward transfer 
of staff functions might be countered by a requirement that 
management spend a certain amount of time on the shop floor.
Such a model would require effective mechanisms of supervision 
and inspection that could pinpoint areas where integration was 
not being achieved and operations might be facilitated by 
locating committees at various strategic points where co­
ordination was crucial. Such an ideologically integrated 
functional model is offered here only as an ideal type by way of 
contrast to Taylor's technologically integrated functional 
model, which in the absence of any perfect division of labour 
and any possibility of cancelling out the human factor is 
similarly merely an ideal type.
The Dimensions of Stratification
In addition to the above two principles of organisation 
(staff-line and functional) and integration (ideological and 
technological), this chapter will be concerned also with the
dimensions of stratification. Staff-line organisation is by 
definition stratified since staff advisors are attached to 
various levels of line management. The prime variable is the 
number of levels of organisation and the number of staff 
personnel located on them. The number of organisational levels 
and the location of staff personnel depends directly upon the 
way responsibility is determined. In a functional system, the 
nature of work undertaken at the basic level determines the 
responsibilities of those who have to supervise it. In a staff- 
line system it is not only the nature of work that determines 
the responsibilities of supervisory personnel, but also the 
nature of the network of command and communication. In such a 
system a communication network might become relatively 
autonomous and increasingly less responsive to both orders from 
above and messages from below. As a consequence channels of 
command might tend to elongate, the number of levels of 
organisation increase and the personnel engaged exclusively in 
communication proliferate. In China this pattern has occurred 
several times in the past twenty years and has always resulted 
in anti-bureaucratic campaigns which seek to shorten channels of 
command and abolish middle levels of organisation. I shall call 
such recurrent patterns bureaucratic cycles, noting that in the 
period under review a major cycle began after the conclusion of 
the Three and Five Anti Movements and ended in 1957* Though our 
period of study covers only the beginning of this cycle, it will 
be demonstrated that the process of bureaucratisation was well 
under way by 1 9 5 3«
An ideal functional system need not be stratified at all. 
One could imagine a system where there were only two levels, the 
functional staff managers and the workers. In practice however, 
whatever the degree of technological or ideological integration, 
the number of people that any group of functional agents may 
supervise is limited by purely physical factors. In the Taylor 
system, functional supervision stemmed from a relatively low 
level (that of the foremen). In a system that was integrated 
more ideologically than technologically one might suppose that 
a relatively high degree of unity of purpose on the shop floor 
might allow for a somewhat larger number of workers to be 
placed xrnder a group of functional supervisors and control 
therefore could proceed from a higher level; some stratifica­
tion, however, is inevitable in conditions short of perfection.
In Chapter two it was noted that Chinese pre-liberation 
systems of organisation tended to be stratified to a very high 
degree and the gang boss system was frequently divided into a 
number of levels. Such stratified systems were heavily re­
inforced by a cultural gap between management and workers. The 
practice of chien-t1ao was designed partially as a measure to 
close that gap but in the early 1950s, as our discussion of the 
cavalier treatment accorded to factory management committees 
has demonstrated, nothing short of very drastic measures would 
be very effective. This chapter will attempt to demonstrate 
that after the Three Anti Movement, not only were these 
measures not forthcoming but the development of the first stage
of a bureaucratic cycle further insulated management from 
workers and perpetuated a gap that was eventually to be 
tackled by very extreme measures during the Great Leap Forward.
Functional "Overlay” Patterns
We have talked so far about ideal types between which the 
direction of organisational change in the Chinese industrial 
enterprises may be charted. In practice, lack of technical 
skill on the part of Whrkers, lack of technical supervisory 
staff and lack of well developed mechanisms for achieving 
ideological integration would have made the provision of 
technologically or ideologically integrated functional systems 
impossible even if this had been prescribed policy.
Functional systems have always been extremely rare in
Zl
industrial organisation because of the extremely high demands 
they place upon workers and management. In the China of 1950 
where management was relatively inexperienced, they seem to 
have been non-existent. This does not mean to say that the 
construction of functional models is a futile exercise for it 
is axiomatic that in any system of staff-line organisation, a 
pattern of functional relationships will overlay the formal 
structure.^ No industrial organisation exists in which all 
technical decisions have to originate from a particular level 
of line manager, for such a system would be incapable of coping 
with any emergency situation where technical expertise must be 
brought to bear upon an immediate problem. Such functional 
relationships may be formalised but since it is extremely 
difficult to foresee all the possible technical problems that
might occur, a significant portion of the network of functional 
contacts is usually informal* This chapter will consider only 
the network of technical functional contacts. Chapter eight, 
however, will consider a different type of functional contact 
stemming from responsible Party personnel for such personnel 
were themselves functional agents under a staff-line system.
An Advocacy of the Functional Principle
It is quite clear that the alternative organisational 
models enumerated above ^ were considered by Chinese management, 
in Shanghai at least, at the time of liberation. In the first 
two issues of the unofficial industrial journal Chung-kuo 
Kung-yeh which appeared either side of the liberation of 
Shanghai, an extensive discussion of organisational models by 
a certain Yin Ku \*as published.^ I have seen no reference to 
what effect his advocacy of functional patterns of organisation 
had, but the fact that his articles were published in a journal
o
that supported the liberation of Shanghai meant that some 
retained managers must have considered the possibility that 
liberation would not mean the automatic adoption of the Soviet 
model in all its detail. At the same time the official journal 
of the North East Industrial Department, Tung Pei Kung-yeh, 
contained many articles advocating the current Soviet;?rsystem 
of organisation but that was in a situation where the Lushun 
Talien experience was being explicitly drawn upon for the
instruction of inexperienced management cadres. It is not 
inconceivable that more experienced retained management south 
of the Great Wall considered that their options were far wider.
Tracing the history of various types of factory organisa­
tion from the military or line type (chiln-tui-shih-ti huo 
hsien-ti tsu-chih) (single line type) through the staff-line 
type (hsien-ti chien ts1 an-tsan-shih ti tsu-chih) to the 
functional type (chuan-chih-hua tsu-chih), Yin Ku conluded that 
the functional t^ rpe was the most advanced. Such a type of 
organisation could be implemented in China since by the 1950s 
China had reached a stage of development comparable to the 
United States at the turn of the century when Frederick Taylor 
had first put forward the idea of functional supervision. Yin 
Ku felt (erroneously) that China need not fear confusion 
arising from workers receiving orders from different sources, 
since this had not been a great problem in the West. One could 
help the process of integration by the provision of a strong 
committee system (wei-yflan-hui-chih) and specify the degree of 
stratification by locating functional supervisors at two levels, 
in a production control department (sheng-ch1 an k 'ung-chih-pu) 
at factory level and in similar departments at a lower level.
The committee system would ensure not only lateral integration 
on the shop floor, but also vertical integration between 
functional supervisors at these two levels. As such his 
prescribed system was really a mixture of staff line and 
functional systems (hun-ho hsien-ti chien ts1an-tsan-shih-ti 
chi chuan-chih-hua ti tsu-chih) with real functional leadership
being operative at the lower levels.^
Yin Ku acknowledged that there would be a tendency for
specialist workers not to understand the comments of members
of other departments and to show a lack of interest in
committees. He felt however that frequent meetings of the
appropriate committees would help to overcome this problem. He
realised that in the case of divergence of opinions,
specialisation might militate against a successful conclusion,
but this was a fault of the men not of the system. Yin Ku
also called for appropriate supervisory organs to be
established to pinpoint difficulties, and advocated the
establishment of a separate system of personnel management to
10pay attention to the human factor Cjen-ti yin-su).
The particular stress given by Yin Ku to the problem of
men as well as system may be interpreted as a call for
ideological integration and certainly a separate system of
personnel management which paid attention to the human factor
could be seen as the mechanism by which such ideological
integration might be effected. Yin Kufs prescriptions were in
many ways similar to the ideologically-integrated functional
model which we have constructed. Such a system is similar too
11to the kind of pattern that was elaborated in Yenan in 19^3 
and put forward again during the Great Leap Forward, which may 
be characterised by unified policy which could best be 
achieved through a staff line system at the highest level and
12"divided operations" (fen-san ching-ying) at the basic level.
This was a system in which functional agents might intervene 
at any level except the very top and where the Party was 
responsible for ideological integration. It differed from the 
Great Leap Pattern, however, in its stress on specialisation at 
lower levels rather than reliance on the "jack of all trades" 
(to-mien-shou)
The History of the Soviet Organisational Hodel
One may see why the functional principle of organisation 
might appeal to revolutionary socialists. A technologically 
integrated functional model offers on the one hand a system 
which seeks to cut through bureaucratic hierarchies and on the 
other a glimpse of Engels' eventual "administration by things" 
rather than "administration by people". However attractive it 
might seem from this point of view, its dehumanising effects 
outweigh its advantages. In human terms an ideologically 
integrated functional model would be much more attractive if 
only it can be made to work.
Shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution, it was the 
technologically integrated Taylor model that came to the 
attention of Lenin, who whilst damning its dehumanising effects 
spoke of adopting its better aspects. It is very difficult 
to determine what aspects of the Taylor system Lenin wished to 
save. If he really wished to advocate functional patterns of 
organisation, it is very difficult to understand why in the 
same report in which he offered faint praise to Taylor, he made 
the statement from which the subsequent advocates of "one-man
management” (an extreme form of staff-line organisation) derive
15their inspiration:- ^
".... it must he said that large-scale machine industry - 
which is precisely the material source, the productive source, 
the foundation of socialism - calls for absolute and strict 
unity of will, which directs the joint labours of hundreds, 
thousands and tens of thousands of people. The technical, 
economic and historical necessity of this is obvious, and all 
those who have thought about socialism have always regarded it 
as one of the conditions of socialism. But how can strict unity 
of will be ensured? By thousands subordinating their will to 
the will of one.
Given ideal class consciousness and discipline on the part 
of those participating in the common work? this subordination 
would be something like the mild leadership of a conductor of an 
orchestra. It may assume the sharp forms of a dictatorship if 
ideal discipline and class consciousness are lacking. But, be 
that as it may, unquestioning subordinatibn to a single will is 
absolutely necessary for the success of processes organised on 
the pattern of large-scale machine industry.
Whatever Lenin may have felt, literature on Soviet
management attests to the prevalence of functional patterns of
organisation in Soviet industry for the first ten years after
the Bolshevik Revolution.^ In the early days after that
revolution attempts were made to administer enterprises
bureaucratically and industrial concerns were no more than
18extensions of a central bureaucracy. Balancing what would 
appear to be an excessively centralised system were the workers 
councils which had been set up in 19^7* though the power of 
these gradually diminished as they came under labour union 
leadership.^ As a result of the breakdown of the War 
Communism model and a switch to the New Economic Policy, a high 
degree of factory autonomy was enjoyed. Stalin’s answer to 
this lack of unity was to curtail what was left of the power of 
the workers representative bodies at factory level and to vest
20supreme power in an enterprise director* In a wider 
context the "economic accounting system" established the 
responsibilities of the enterprise director, whereas in the 
context of the enterprise itself "one-man management" 
established his power* The "economic accounting system" gave 
the enterprise director a degree of autonomy which was not very 
clear, since he was at the mercy of a number of external 
control agencies which might exercise different degrees of 
control at different times* This uncertain degree of autonomy 
could at best serve to keep the enterprise director on his toes 
or at worst create an atmosphere in which managerial initiative 
suffered.^
As "one-man management" and the Stalinist version of the 
economic accounting system were promoted, the so-called 
"parliamentary system" of factory management declined and 
worker participation was confined to attending production 
conferences at various levels and worker and staff congresses 
at enterprise level, which like their later Chinese counter­
parts were under union leadership and were of a "mass nature"
rather than of an executive nature and had no decision making 
23power*  ^ Although something of the representative definition
of democracy remained, the "democratic base" on which one-man
management was to rest became defined increasingly in terms of
"making the will of the one man actualised in the voluntary
24actions of the workers".
The functional principle was formally abolished in the
Soviet Union at the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) in at which Kaganovitch defined one-
man management as a process whereby each of the line managers
in the four tiered conception of enterprise was made an
25absolute leader* ^
One-man management was an extreme form of staff-line 
system and lay , at the core of the Soviet model that was 
imported into China* In an article in Chung-kuo Kung-yeh one 
year after Yin Ku had put forward his defence of functional 
systemsf Cheng Hung-suf an exponent of the Soviet model, 
reflected very clearly how the three possible organisational 
principles were now viewed* His translation of the single 
line, staff line and functional principles are contrasted with 
those of Yin Ku as follows
YIN KU CHENG HUNG-SU
Single line Military or line System of hierarchical
system organisation leadership
chfin-tui-shih-ti huo chu-chi ling-tao-chih
hsien-ti Hsu^chh
Staff-line Line and staff One-man management
system organisation tan-i ling-tao-chih^
hsien-ti chien ts1an 
-tsan-shih ti tsu- 
chih
Functional Functional (special- Functional (divided job)
system ist job) organisation system
chuan-chih-hua tsu- chih-wu fen-kung-chih
chih^o
As far as organisational theorists in China were concerned, 
a staff line system was now synonomous with one-man management 
and descriptions of functional management described not the way 
it employed expertise but the way it divided work* Needless to 
say, Cheng Hung-su was most contemptuous of this functional 
system*
One-Man Management
One-man management lay at the core of the Soviet 
organisational model* During the early period in which the 
Soviet model was propagated in China, many works were translated 
from Russian explaining in some detail what was meant by this 
term and its application in the Soviet Union, ^  Though the term 
was applied to descriptions of Chinese organisation, there 
seemed to be a reluctance to use it* In fact the Soviet term 
edinonachalie (one-man management) was translated in a number of 
different ways (i-chang-chih* tan-i ling-tao-chih) and 
frequently not used at all but subsumed under the general term 
managerial responsibility system (hsing-cheng tse-,1 en-chih) * ^
Perhaps the main reason why the principle of one-man 
management was not given great prominence in the early New 
Democratic Period was that its implementation was to be 
combined with the establishment of factory management committees 
which were not very different from the parliamentary system” 
(Chinese translation: i-hui-chih), which in the Soviet Union
one-man management had been designed to replace. Again we
return to the problem of exactly which Soviet model was to be 
implemented. If it were really the Soviet model of the late 
19 -^Os, as official pronouncements indicated, there could be no 
place for "parliamentary forms"• If, however, It was the Soviet 
model of the early 1920s there was a place for management 
committees and some precedent for recognising a contradiction 
between such committees and the principle of unity of command,
A further contradiction lay between one-man management and 
Party and union leadership. Commenting on the relative lack of 
success in implementing one-man management in the Soviet Union 
prior to 1940, Cheng Hung-su attributed the cause directly to 
the interference of the Soviet Communist Party, the labour 
unions and local government,^ implying that such a situation 
ought to be avoided in a Chinese context, Ve shall note in 
chapter eight that Kao Kang was most insistent in his demands 
that Party committees confine their "leadership" to the sphere 
of ideology^ and such a situation could only lead to a 
diminuation of the power of the Party and its relegation to a 
position of being little more than just another functional agent 
in a staff-line system.
The full implementation of one-man management could not be 
effected so long as factory management committees still 
exercised some power and horizontal links with Party and local 
government were still strong. It would also be unwise to 
attempt to implement such a system so long as potential
candidates for positions as line managers were ex gang bosses.
It was possible therefore to attempt to introduce the system into 
North East industry in 1950, but hardly possible in regions 
further South until after the Three Anti Movement although that 
movement, .^.Lch being Party-led, strengthened horizontal links 
at the expense of vertical ones. ^ It was not until 1953 that a 
campaign was launched to implement the system over the whole 
country^ and not long after this campaign accounts appeared in 
the press covertly attacking the system on the grounds that it 
was being interpreted wrongly. ^  It was formally abolished at 
the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 when Li Hsfleh-feng, the head 
of the Party*s Industrial Work Department, praised those Party 
comrades who had persisted in the tradition of the Communist
36Party and refused to implement the one-man management system.^
It is my impression that the rigid staff-line system 
involved in the one-man management system was only incompletely 
implemented even in the North East. In the absence of 
statistical information one cannot document this adequately, but 
I shall attempt to show that what was described as one-man 
management was only a very incomplete version of a rigid staff- 
line system even at the Anshan Iron and Steel Works, the largest 
and most advanced industrial complex in the country*
Cultural Revolution material is most vitriolic in its 
condemnation of one-man management. Such a system was described 
as "revisionist” and the consequence of policies adopted by Liu 
Shao-ch*i and his "henchmen" who had embarked upon the
"capitalist road".^ According to such material, one-man
management systems were usually introduced around 1956^® or in
7q hr\
the early 1960s^J and dismantled during the Great leap Forward
41or Cultural Revolution * 1956 is a most unlikely date for
their introduction, since that was the year in which the
culmination of attacks on one-man management resulted in its
' \
formal abandonment by the Eighth Party Congress* The choice of
this date is probably linked to the fact that 1956 was the date
that marked the formal commencement of the Bino-Soviet split
(Khruschev's speech to the Twentieth CPSTJ Congress) and the
formal demotion of Kao Tse-Tung's thought in the Party 
42constitution , rather than the date that the introduction 
actually occurred* Furthermore, anyone who remembered the early 
1950s would be quite sure that one-man management was primarily 
a Stalinist system. The attacks on one-man management as 
"revisionist" is an example of a process common in the Cultural 
Revolution where the substance of Stalinism was attacked 
although the label of Stalin was retained as a weapon with which 
to attack revisionism*
Cultural Revolution material focuses on the revival of one-
43
man management in some instances during the 1960s J and it is
from this period that some of the most lurid descriptions of its 
44abuse derive* The heyday of the system was however the period
from 1952 to 1954, and it is possible to find in the literature
of that time similar evidence of the exercise of dictatorial
powers by FGHs, often to the point of forbidding workers to have
43
any dealing with the enterprise Party secretary. ' fly
overwhelming impression is, however, that prescribed systems, 
although of a stratified line type, were not excessively rigid 
and showed a marked degree of functional supervision.
The moderation with which one-man management systems were 
introduced stemmed from the fact that they were coupled with the 
factory management committee system, a slow policy of 
democratic reform (in the South), the retention of pre-liberation 
managers, the existence of fairly strong horizontal links (until 
after the Three Anti Movement), a fear that Party leadership 
would be diluted and above all a conception of democracy which 
differed in many ways from the Soviet Union.
In categorising democracy in a participatory sense, one is 
bound to pose the question as to what exactly workers were to 
participate in. By no stretch of the imagination can mere 
participation in work be defined as democracy and the partici­
pation in the making of all decisions is only possible in a very 
small unit. According to Leninist theory such participation 
should only be possible when workers* political consciousness is 
sufficiently high, and the difference in the Chinese and Soviet 
conception of democracy stems from a definition of the term 
"sufficient11. The mass line which was developed in Yenan days 
specifies the mechanics of reconciling impulses emanating from 
the top and bottom of an organisation but cannot make any a 
priori assertion of the degree of participation in what 
decisions at what levels. Nevertheless it is my subjective 
impression that Chinese organisational prescriptions are more
concerned with reconciling such conflicting impulses than Soviet
organisational prescriptions which give greater weight to unity
of will. In the'period in question, Soviet writing on
organisation appeared to he more elitist than similar Chinese
writing and, in a Chinese context, the above quote from Lenin
46was always qualified. I assume therefore that the Chinese 
view of organisation during the New Democratic Period was 
intrinsically less elitist than the Soviet view. Such an 
assumption may be contradicted by those who believe than an 
appeal to democracy in the early period of a revolutionary 
society is only instrumental in achieving the mobilisation 
necessary for future controls. Neither of these two axioms is 
amenable to empirical test.
The Superimposition of the Soviet Command System
The Soviet principle of organisational command demanded
that staff-line patterns of organisation replace existing
patterns and that the insulation of senior management from the
shop floor resulting from the gang boss system be ended. Until
democratic reform was fully effected gang bosses were frequently
sufficiently resilient to place themselves in line management
posts and perpetuate the highly stratified form of pre-
47liberation organisation. 1 In such a situation the adoption of 
a single line command system only would strengthen the power of 
the gang bosses.
Following democratic reform, the Soviet model could be 
best implemented by the replacement of all former line managers,
for only this way could one he certain of breaking down existing 
patterns of solidarity. Such a policy was impossible, however, 
in a situation where managerial talent was scarce. The most 
practicable policy for implementing the Soviet model was there­
fore one of superimposition.
Chapter two noted that in pre-liberation China there were
two ways in which an individual could become a gang boss. He
could utilise connections with organisations outside his place of
work, as in the case of people who made use of the Green Gang
48network in Shanghai to become gang bosses ; or he could place
himself in a position to control the number of assistants taken
49on to help him, as in the situation described by H.D. Fong. '
In view of the terms of reference of the Democratic Reform
Movement, one would imagine that gang bosses of the former type
were more easily dealt with than those of the latter type. This
latter type of gang boss depended upon technical skill to be in
a position to take on assistants in the first place, and for
this reason it is understandable that some Party and management
personnel had great difficulty in differentiating gang bosses
80from skilled workers.
The Democratic Reform Movement defined gang bosses in terms 
of their actions rather than their function; consequently there 
is every reason to suppose that minor gang bosses who had not 
completely "emancipated themselves from labour" remained as 
foreman after democratic reform was completed, in much the same 
way as rich peasants remained in the rural sector. In chapter
eight we shall discuss the political implications of this 
process of industrial kulakisation^  and in this chapter confine 
ourselves to the organisational implications.
Multi-Headed Leadership in the Construction Industry
We shall consider two sectors of industry - the construction
industry, which might be expected to retain old forms of
organisation for a longer period than other industries because
of the necessity of maintaining a system of contract labour,
and the iron and steel industry, which was given priority in
this early period and might be expected therefore to show the
greatest degree of change. In the construction industry,
retained foremen tended to have a very low level of literacy,
which meant that they were not very receptive to technical
52commands coming down the line. Blockages in line communica­
tion could be overcome by replacing such foremen by more 
literate workers, but these were in very short supply. The only 
way therefore to make certain that technical specifications 
were being met at the basic level was to superimpose a command 
system over the existing pattern of organisation, thus giving 
rise to very strong patterns of functional supervision. At 
gang (section) level, section (gang) leaders were required to 
respond to the functional supervision of work supervisors 
(shih-kung-yttan). ^  Such work supervisors were linked to the 
site manager (kung-ti chu-Jen) by a parellel command structure 
which exercised functional leadership over all levels of line 
management.^ Thus the process of strengthening the pattern of
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command which the Soviet model demanded resulted not in the
development of ono-nan management systems but in the growth o:
'new patterns of functional supervision. Such functional 
*
patterns v;cro not a carry-over from the pact but a now 
organisational form, as is demonstrated in the following
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Guch a system caused considorablo staff-line tension v/hich 
was oz-raccrbatod by the fact that section ([sang) loaders v;oro 
shilled but not very literate, whereas wort supervisors were 
literate but not very shilled. ^
Che quasi-functional leadership e::ercisod by work 
supervisors was the-complete opposite of that proscribed by the 
Taylor system. The Taylor system demanded that functional 
agents be not only responsive to the demands of a central 
planning department, 'but also have an intimate knowledge of
basic work processes. For exampl/e, a certain skilled bricklayer 
who was appointed work supervisor in'-195  ^noted that he had 
under his functional jurisdiction scaffolders, concrete workers, 
metal workers, bricklayers, carpenters, etc. and the nature of 
his particular skill was such that he could give useful guidance 
only to b r i c k l a y e r s . ^  If he had been a line foreman in a staff 
line system he could have called upon, staff experts to help him 
supervise these other jobs. As it was, he was required to give 
guidance to line foremen who knew more about their own jobs than 
he did. The cardinal point of any functional system is that 
work processes at the basic level determine the scope of 
functional supervision. Once the scope of functional super­
vision is determined by a work supervisors relationship to a 
planning department, confusion will ensue.
The lack of knowledge of basic work processes on the part
of work supervisors led either to a situation whereby they
moved work sections around from one job to another, which made
the responsibilities of individual workers very diffuse, or
where they were too cowed to do anything in the face of line
foremen who were more skilled than they and submitted all
57questions great or small to an overworked site manager.v
Under the shih-kung system a work section might receive 
instructions from a lower or higher level work supervisor or 
directly from the site manager himself. These orders frequently 
conflicted and there was no mechanism to achieve integration.
The result was that frequently workers became alienated from 
all management and held the work supervisors in contempt. Such 
a situation was referred to in the Chinese press as multi-headed 
leadership (to-t'ou ling-tao) ^  rather than ’'functional 
leadership” (chuan-chih-hua ling-tao) for clearly a work 
supervisor who was required to intervene in the line in areas 
beyond his expertise was not exercising functional leadership as 
understood by Taylor and his successors.
The growth of patterns of functional leadership in the
construction industry resulted from the superimposition of the
shih-kung system over the single line organisation of the work
site. We have so far considered the system only from the point
of view of the construction corporation undertaking the work.
There were, however, other networks of command which might issue
instructions to the site. In the case of an external
corporation undertaking construction work there was frequently
a problem of conflicting orders emanating from the enterprise
for which the work was being done and the construction
corporation doing the work. In mid-1952 a number of directives
were issued by the North East Industrial Department which
specified that when construction work was being undertaken for* a
particular enterprise by organisations external to that
enterprise, the primary channel of command should be that of the
50
enterprise for which the work was being done.  ^ Despite these 
directives, confusion remained even to the point of one cadre 
writing to the very journal in which the directives had appeared
asking for advice on how to deal with the problem of multiple
60channels of command.
The cadre had to deal with four channels of command 
(excluding the Party network). First there was the factory for 
which the work was being done, which maintained a representative 
on the work site. Secondly there was the construction 
corporation undertaking the work, which was represented by the 
site manager and an inspector (chien-kung-ytian). Thirdly there 
were technical inspectors from an industrial design (she-chi) 
corporation, and fourthly there was the labour union organisation 
affiliated to the local general labour union apparatus. The 
construction corporation was responsible for the quality of the 
work; the factory for which the work was being done was 
responsible for examining and approving the work done; the labour 
union was responsible for training workers and the design 
corporation was responsible for technical direction. The 
perplexed cadre had no idea how this process might be unified.
In practice the party which assumed the major responsibility was 
the construction corporation, since it had signed a contract and 
was responsible for the quality of the work, but the cadre felt 
that the primary initiative should have been taken by the 
factory for which the work was being done. He suggested that 
liaison meetings should be held, though he was not clear which 
party should be responsible for convening them nor who should be 
responsible for conducting political education. The editorial 
comment castigated the cadre for not reading the relevant
directives which had laid down that all forms of "parliamentary 
system" were wrong since they only led to responsibility being 
passed on. The initiative should clearly have been taken by the 
factory for which the work was being done, which would lay down 
the specifications of the work and not be subject to any inter- 
corporation haggling.61
A number of points emerge from the above account. Firstly 
the cadre had clearly not read the relevant documents of the 
Industrial Department, which makes one wonder just how effective 
the mass of detailed instructions emanating from that source 
was. Secondly, it would appear that the Party organisation had 
been completely eclipsed in a situation where the cadre in 
question was not sure who should take the initiative in liaison 
and who should be responsible for political work. Thirdly, the 
attack on the very idea of a liaison committee indicated an 
attitude of considerable rigidity, which might have been 
permissable within units under the jurisdiction of the North 
East Industrial Department but in other areas which were 
required to emulate the North East and where vertical 
communications were much weaker could have been highly counter­
productive.
Ilulti-Headed Leadership in the Iron and Steel Industry
It was not only in the construction industry that the 
phenomenon of multi-headed leadership was noted. Most other 
sectors of industry revealed examples of strong functional 
patterns which overlay the formal structure. In the T ’angshan
Steel Works, for example, the General Machinery Department and
the Machine Electrical Power Department frequently both
concerned themselves with the same problem on the shop floor, or
took action in a particular shop without informing the shop 
62supervisor. Such functional confusion stemmed from the 
weakness of vertical chains of command and may well have been a 
carry-over from pre-liberation days. There were some areas, 
however, where, as in the construction industry, the growth of 
patterns of functional leadership was a direct consequence of 
post-liberation organisational reform.
An example of this in the Iron and Steel industry would be 
the production order (tiao-tu) system. In the larger enterprises 
various levels of production order officer were established 
after liberation to ensure that each production department and 
shop adhered to the enterprise work plan (tso-yeh chi-hua) and 
that the disposition of labour was carried out in a uniform way. 
In the Anshan Iron and Steel Works production order officers 
were directly subordinate to staff (chih-neng) departments and 
were constantly entering into disputes with line managers. In 
the Iron Smelting Plant, for example, production order officers 
were subordinate to the Plant Production Department (a staff 
department) and such officers at shop level frequently refused 
to subordinate themselves to shift managers (chih-pan-chang):
this situation was condemned as a violation of "one-man
63management". '  The functional power of such officers is 
illustrated in the following diagram:-
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The above oxamplcs demonstrate that the partial implementa­
tion of the Soviet model frequently resulted in the growth of 
functional patterns that were the very antitheses of the "one- 
r;an management” principle which was prescribed. By 1 9 5 3 « 
however 9 the consequence of stressing controls from above at the 
expense of single channels of command were felt keenly and a 
campaign was launched to attack the phenomenon of multi-headed 
leadership under the rubric of establishing a responsibility 
system* let us now discuss how the above problems were dealt 
with.
fro YriormG in the Construction Industry
ihe confusion occasioned by the superimposition of a work- 
cupervioion (shih-kunn) network on top of the old building gang 
system was the subject of much debate in the early part of 1 9 5 3« 
1 one sconle arraicd that it was essential to keep work sections
(gangs) separate from work supervision units9 since work
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supervision units (or construction engineering units) (kung-
ch'eng-tui) were able to organise technical training, the
provision of welfare facilities and act as general overseers of
construction work, without getting bogged down in the actual
details of construction. Foremen could devote all their energies
to the job in hand without bothering with problems such as
technical training for which their level of literacy rarely
eauipped them. The work supervision unit specified the work
tasks to be undertaken and entered into contracts with the work
sections with regard to supply of labour. Thus the system not
only facilitated cost accounting but also ensured that there were
not large numbers of workers in the sections with no work to do.
In addition, it was felt that mutual supervision on the part of
54
both unit and section would facilitate plan fulfillment.
Others argued that these advantages were merely theoretical.
In fact, as we have noted, the result of such a system was acute
staff-line tension, sections and units engaged in mutual
recriminations and, in the words of one commentator, there were
65"too many officers and not enough men". ; As a result of this 
experience the units and the sections were amalgamated in 
accordance with another feature of the Soviet model which up to 
1953 had not been given very much prominence in the construction 
industry, the production territorial system (sheng-ch'an ch'd-yd 
kuan-li-chih).^
A
Just as one-man management stipulated that one man was to he 
in charge of each level of administration, the production 
territorial system stipulated that as far as possible all work 
being carried on in a particular place should be under unified 
command.^7 Accounts which described the confusion on building 
sites were specifically designed to prove the superiority of this 
production territorial system and so staff-line tension was 
described as a direct result of organisation separation. This 
is by no means self-evident. Staff-line tension will occur in 
any situation where the educational level of staff members is 
higher than the educational level of line managers. I suspect 
that the issue at stake was really one of a conflict between two 
different types of expertise, theoretical knowledge on the part 
of work supervisors and practical knowledge on the part of work 
section chiefs. In chapter one we noted the tension occasioned 
by the promotion of trainees to staff posts at the expense of 
skilled workers. The existence of such tensions is a political 
problem that can only be effectively solved by political means, 
and there is no reason to suppose that the tension between work 
supervisors and section chiefs was any the less once the former 
were stripped of their functional power.
The new post of foreman (kung-chang) was to be filled 
wherever possible by former section chiefs, provided that they 
could read charts, fill in forms, that they had some experience 
in work supervision, that they had the ability to work according 
to plan and were good at uniting with the masses.^ Work
section chiefs were said to he rather poor at the first three
requirements and rather good at the fourth, whereas former work
6°supervisors were said to have the opposite virtues. y Under the
new system, if a section chief were appointed as foreman the work
70supervisor was to become his deputy and vice versa.' One might
imagine the tension that would ensue when a semi-literate section
chief was transferred to a staff post in a situation where
71senior staff looked down on their juniors' or when a 
relatively competent work supervisor was made deputy to a less 
literate foreman. The logical answer to such a problem would be 
to demote redundant personnel to the level of ordinary building 
worker, and one which management would have no compunction at 
arriving at in the middle 1950s. In 1953> however, redundant 
personnel were given staff appointments. This was the beginning 
of a bureaucratic cycle where surplus staff personnel were 
beginning to accumulate at the middle levels, and to this 
problem we shall return later.
The 1953 Reforms at the Anshan Iron and Steel Works
We have seen the superimposition of the production-order 
system at the Anshan Iron and Steel Works prevented the effective
establishment of staff-line systems of organisation according to
the principle of one-man management. In the early 1950s Anshan. 
was held up as a model of advanced Soviet experiences and the 
inability to establish one-man management systems there did not 
suggest the successful implementation of such systems elsewhere.
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hs a result or the drive to press ahead with the implementa­
tion • of Soviet organisational forms in 1 9 5 3 the production order
system, '.filch was hold to do the principle obstacle standing in
no
tac way of • 15 one-man management"' , was considerably modified.
The now organisational chart within the iron smelting plant at
07
Anslism was as followss-'^
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The plant was reorganised according to a four-shift system 
and the post of general production order officer (tsrrr -tiro-tu- 
vvin) established directly under tho Deputy FOII in charge of 
; reduction* Lovjer level production order officers wore made 
subordinate to each of the four shift managers, nevertheless,
. f u hough production order personnel were now placed firmly under 
the command of line management, there was still scope for them to 
o:: . vise functional.leadership over the lower levels. The 
general production order officer was still to be responsive to 
instructions emanating from the production department (a staff 
v’ . jcrtnenf) if they concerned professional/technical word: (yeh-
n 71\
wu) and lower level production order officers were still 
responsive to instructions emanating from the general production
order officer if they concerned such professional/technical
75work. y
Though this was a considerable step in the direction of one- 
man management, it was not a rigid staff-line system, A perfect 
staff-line system (if such a system were possible) would only 
allow the production department to issue instructions to the 
general production order officer through the FGM and would 
normally only provide reference materials for line management to 
consult. Similarly such a system would require the lower level 
production order officers to receive all directions through the 
shift managers and the deputy FGM in charge of production 
including those concerning professional/technical work. Such a 
system would be very cumbersome and the system adopted probably 
reflected the fact that whether one liked it or not some 
functional patterns would exist. The effectiveness of such a 
system would depend directly on how clear a line of demarcation 
could be drawn between instructions concerning professional/ 
technical work on the one hand and administrative orders on the 
other. Such articles that I have seen seem to assume that the 
distinction was self-evident, which is doubtful to say the very 
least. Suffice it to say that the system adopted in 1953 was 
only a partial realisation of the principle expounded by 
Kaganovitch in 1934-.
The M ovement t o  E s t a b l is h  a R e s p o n s ib i l i t y  S ystem
The attempts made in 1953 to overcome the problem of multi­
headed leadership were part of a much wider process that took the 
form of a movement to establish responsibility systems which, 
right from the time of liberation, was considered along with the 
democratisation of management and the establishment of an 
economic accounting system as one of the three major components
nrr
of industrial policy at the basic level.
Chapter three noted that during the New Record Movement the
original policy of establishing systems of responsibility was
one of caution. The routinisation of spontaneity was to be the
last stage of the whole process of organisational change, for a
successful responsibility system depended upon relative
organisational stability. In early 1950 active measures were
taken to introduce systems of responsibility in the North East,
since it was feared that indiscipline was increasing as a result
77of the euphoria engendered by the New Record Movement. r The 
atmosphere in early 1950, however, was hardly one which was 
conducive to discipline. In early 1950 Kao Kang noted that 
cadres who had been transferred to the industrial sphere showed
no
a marked unwillingness to bother with organisational detail.'
Compared with the demands of war (or what old soldiers imagined
the war to have been), the details of industrial construction
were boring and transferred cadres did not seem to take to
heart Kao Kang’s injunction that the best test of a Party
member's revolutionary enthusiasm lay in his sense of
79responsibility concerning matters of detail.f '
Throughout the next three years the press contained 
numerous accounts of accidents, waste and failure to fulfill 
planned targets, due to the fact that "everyone is responsible
s or\
and yet no-one is responsible". ' The system of detailed 
individual responsibility which the Soviet model prescribed was 
frustrated by three factors. Transferred cadres were unwilling 
to have the scope of their initiative restricted; stable patterns 
of organisation were difficult to implement in a period of rapid 
organisational change which did not come to an end until after 
the Three and Five Anti Campaigns. Thirdly, the very idea of 
individual responsibility contradicted both traditional Chinese 
patterns of solidarity and the organisational ethos of the 
Communist Party. Solidarity in traditional China had always 
stressed group responsibility, and this pattern of solidarity was 
as valid for the guerilla band as it was for the family or the 
traditional work gang. An organisation characterised by a 
technological conception of solidarity was an alien creature and
one which was to be severely modified during the Great Leap
0/1
Forward." In the early 1950s, however, the Soviet view of 
modernisation was no less insistant on the need for specificity 
of role and function than Talcott Parsons.
Responsibility in a staff-line system is determined not 
only by the nature of the work done but also by the geographical 
location of the workers. A functional agent supervises all those 
who perform the same function regardless of where they are, 
whereas a line manager supervises all those workers who are
located in a particular area. It was for this reason that by 
1953 the adoption of the production territorial system, which 
attempted to locate all the workers engaged in the same Job in 
the same geographical area, became closely associated with the 
principles of unity of command and individual responsibility. 
These three principles were embodied in a Ministry of Heavy 
Industry Directive of May 1953 which was to launch a full scale
o p
nation-wide movement to implement the Soviet model. "
The directive began by noting that many attempts made in the 
past to establish systems of responsibility existed merely on 
paper. In many cases no specific person was responsible for 
ensuring that adequate conditions existed for plan fulfillment, 
for ensuring inter-shop and inter-team cooperation, for the 
supply and handling of raw materials, for quality and production 
control, for ensuring the adherence to technical regulations, for 
the timely solution of technical problems and for the care and 
maintenance of machinery. When accidents occurred no-one could 
be held responsible. Accounts were kept by a number of people, 
which made it difficult to correct mistakes; costs were 
incorrectly assessed and charts not produced on time. In
conditions such as these no matter how perfect a plan might be it
83could not be completed. '
The directive demanded that the production territorial 
system be implemented and a three-tiered level of management 
established; the factory (kung-ch1ang), the shop (chf e-chien)
and the work section (kung tuan) with one man in full charge of
84
each. In addition, seven types of responsibility system were 
prescribed:-
1. the system of sole responsibility by management (under the
f g m )
2. a technical responsibility system (under the Chief Engineer, 
who was usually also Deputy FGM in charge of production)
3. a responsibility system for production order (tiao-tu)
4. a responsibility system for equipment maintenance and repair
5. a responsibility system for safety technology
6. a responsibility system for supplies
7. a responsibility system for production costs and finances.
The first of these systems affirmed the principle of one- 
man management but carefully avoided using the term. In case 
anyone should have any doubts on this score, however, the
propaganda material explaining the details of the movement dealt
85explicitly with the principle of one-man management. ' Articles 
dealing with individual enterprises talked quite freely about 
the principle of one-man management, but official pronouncements 
talked merely about the system of "sole responsibility by 
management under the FGM" and I can only interpret such an 
approach as indicating disagreement within the Party Central 
Committee as to the desirability of one-man management; such an 
approach is similar to treatment of the name "Liu Shao-ch'i" 
during the Cultural Revolution.
The second of these systems assigned technical personnel to 
each piece of equipment and the third established measures for 
coordination and shift change and a control apparatus to ensure
oc
the implementation of the enterprise work plan. ’ The remaining 
systems are self-explanatory. As a whole, the responsibility 
systems enumerated above were not only a faithful copy of current 
Soviet practice but were themselves probably drawn up by Soviet
on
experts. ' They were supplemented by a number of other different 
types of system and sub-system, depending upon the nature of 
work undertaken in each branch of industry and were even
accompanied by responsibility systems for propagating advanced
88Soviet experiences which amounted to responsibility systems to 
implement responsibility systems.
Staff-Line Tension
I have suggested that the considerable degree of staff-line 
tension resulting from the superimposition of functional patterns 
of supervision over existing organisational structures would 
probably not be eased by tying staff members to fixed points on 
the line. This suggestion is more than confirmed by accounts of 
the progress of the movement to establish a responsibility system 
of 1953* Technical personnel frequently refused to submit 
themselves to line leadership and were held to be guilty of petty 
bourgeois "libitarianism" (tzu-yu san-man). Sometimes technical 
personnel felt that the new system which gave them responsibility 
without power required them to do nothing but work to rule, which 
was criticised as "the mentality of the hired hand" (ku-yung
kuan-tien). Line management frequently did not utilise the 
expertise of staff management, which was criticised as the 
"methods of the handicraft management"(shou-kung-yeh kuan-fci 
fang-shih)
The process of tying production order personnel more closely
to line management did very little to enhance their function or
their popularity. Line foremen still considered them ignorant of
basic level operations and senior engineering staff looked down
on
on their limited expertise." These production order personnel,
who were required to fulfill a coordinating role, were caught in
the middle of staff-line conflict. Many of them were of worker
qq
origin who had managed to get a little technical education" ,
which as far as senior engineers and technicians were concerned
was little better than no education at all. The lenient
treatment accorded to engineers and technicians during the
various political movements of the early 1950s probably made them
the one group in authoritative positions in Chinese society who
were least affected by revolutionary change and, as old
intellectuals, they did not take too kindly to the coordinating
function of the production order personnel. Many of these
technicians refused to attend production order conferences on the
02
grounds that production order personnel just made trouble" * and
many others refused to listen to rationalisation proposals put
forward by the workers on the grounds that such ill-educated
05
people had nothing to offer.
Problems such as these could not be solved only by
organisational means. It was naively hoped in 1953 that some of
the tension could be lessened by the regular convocation of
production conferences and production order conferences. A
directive of the Anshan Iron and Steel Corporation demanded that
production conferences should be held every month at factory
level and every 10-15 days at shop, section and team level. At
these conferences the relevant staff manager was to make a report
and receive mass criticisms. Such conferences could serve to
bridge the gap not only between workers and management but
qzj.
between staff and line management.y Another form of conference 
introduced during the movement to establish responsibility 
systems of 1953 were the joint forums of senior staff and line 
management (shop level and a b o v e ) . T h e  problem, however, was 
far wider than bad coordination and was a reflection of the whole 
problem of intellectuals which China has had to face during the 
whole twenty-two years since liberation. It could only be 
effectively solved by a whole change in the educational system.
The most immediate remedial measure that was to be under­
taken was to raise the educational level of junior line 
management so that they were more equal in expertise to technical 
staff. The logical end of this process would be to make all 
management personnel into engineers and technicians. By the 
1960s the Soviet Union had gone a long way towards this goal and
indeed in that country many enterprise Party secretaries have
06
engineering qualifications." In the China of the early 1950s 
however all that could be done immediately was to convene
training classes at factory level^ to explain to foremen and 
shop supervisors how to draw up plans and to impart some of the 
theoretical knowledge which had hitherto been the monopoly of 
staff management. The external educational system was of no 
immediate use since in the early 1950s its engineering graduates 
tended to follow the same path as graduates in most developing 
nations; they moved into high prestige staff jobs, leaving
qg
lower level line positions to be filled by promoted workers.' 
This education gap was to be tackled most severely during the 
Great Leap Forward and again during the Cultural Revolution, 
even to the point of holding the formal educational system in
contempt.
The Chief Engineer and the Responsibility System
The gap between staff and line management and between 
junior staff and senior staff was essentially a cultural one and 
was exacerbated by the fact that according to the Soviet model 
decision-making power came more and more to be vested in the 
line. A contradiction existed between the large number of 
articles that condemned the lack of unity between technical 
personnel and workers and the advocacy of a Soviet model which 
deprived technical personnel of effective decision-making power 
and contact with the shop floor. More specifically, there was 
contradiction between the demands of unity of command and 
demands for the rectification of a process whereby technical 
staff were being reduced to advisor (ku-wen) status, where they 
had responsibility but no power (yu-chih wu-ch'tian). The
process whereby engineering staff were treated as "guests”
(tso-k' o) was described as a hangover from the old society^0 , 
which it may well have been; it was surely also the consequence 
of adopting staff-line systems of command.
In early 1951 the North East Industrial Department
published a set of regulations giving the chief engineer (chu-
jen kung-ch1eng-shih) full command of the whole technical
network in enterprises within its jurisdiction and making him
answerable, in the final analysis, not to the FGM but to the
101head of the relevant bureau or corporation. This measure, 
which was designed to counter the growth of what was felt to be 
excessive line power, a.: was in accordance with the North East
Industrial Department's excessively centralised view of control 
that has been described in Chapter three. At the same time, 
technical personnel under the command of the chief engineer were 
not permitted to interfere in the line except in areas
102specifically designated by the appropriate line manager.
Such a system was not a functional one (in the sense that 
technical staff could direct basic level operations), but it 
could be defined as a type of "multi-headed leadership".
By 1955 the stress had changed from deploring the lack of 
power of technical personnel to deploring the prevalence of 
this multi-headed leadership, and an attempt was made to remedy 
the situation by placing the chief engineer (now usually 
referred to as tsung kung-ch!eng-shih) under the direct
authority of the FGM as a line manager. The chief engineer was 
now frequently also the Deputy FGM in charge of production 
(according to Soviet practice) with power over both the shops and 
the whole planning and engineering apparatus within the 
enterprise. " His m a m  function was to supervise the drawing up 
and implementation of the work plan (tso-yeh chi-hua) ^ ^  which 
specified the concrete tasks for each unit (and each individual) 
in the enterprise according to a more general enterprise plan 
which had been derived from centrally determined control figures.
According to the principle of one-man management (sole
responsibility by management under the FGM), the chief engineer
105was required to consult the FGM on all important matters, ^ and 
the degree of line power he exercised depended almost entirely on 
the personality of the FGM. Sometimes the chief engineer seemed 
to be exclusively in charge of the production and technical 
networks at the expense of the FGM. At the Paotow Iron Works, 
for example, the FGM was reported to be interested in neither 
production nor technology, and when an investigation team was 
sent down by the Suiyiian Provincial Office for Patriotic
100Competitions to Increase Production and Practise Economy to
investigate the works, the FGM told them he did not know anything
about production and they had better ask the Deputy FGM in charge 
107of production. ' In other cases the FGM Just handed over
routine business to the chief engineer, leaving the latter very
10ft
little scope for initiative. Some chief engineers appeared 
not to be very interested in planning or technology and Just
stuck their oar in factory general affairs departments when they
felt like it, y Others were too busy studying technological
110research that they neglected to do any. Still others were
reluctant to accept a system which give the chief engineer a
considerable amount of power on the grounds that this was a
Soviet system and was an inevitable result of her being a
technologically advanced country; some five or ten years would
111be necessary before China reached that stage. One could 
argue equally that precisely because China was a technologically 
backward country, she needed a system which gave the chief 
engineer considerable line power; I feel that some essential 
logical links in the argument have been omitted from the account.
The net result of placing the chief engineer in a line 
position directly under the FGM seems not to have defined his 
power but to have made it conditional on the personality of the 
FGM. As the above examples show, the chief engineer’s power 
could have been very great or very small. To clarify matters, 
various management bureaux published detailed lists of instruc­
tions for chief engineers in enterprises under their jurisdic­
tion. One such set of instructions, that of the Chemical Man­
agement Bureau under the Ministry of Heavy Industry, even went 
so far as to stipulate how he should divide his day and at
precisely what time of day he should read what kind of direc-
112tives, convene what kind of meetings, etc. According to the 
Chemical Management Bureau the chief engineer was to be 
something of a polymath. He was not only to draw up the work 
plan, supervise production-order work, organise stable 
production, supervise the formulation,
amendment and implementation of technical regulations, supervise
the control maintenance and repair of equipment, take charge of
safety technology, supervise labour protection work, organise
experimental work and the trial manufacture of new products,
ensure the implementation of suggestions from (foreign) experts,
foster and ensure the implementation of technical rationalisation
proposals, formulate and implement measures for technological
operations, improve technical organisation and ensure that the
level of technical skill of white and blue collar workers was
raised, participate in drawing up the factory’s annual plan,
long term plans and plans for new construction and rebuilding,
supervise the work of capital construction, v but also supervise
technical education. He was to share an educative function with
the Party secretary (politics) and the labour union (culture-
literacy). He was to promote the integration of politics,
economics (business management) and technology and to ensure that
the workers had the right frame of mind to study advanced Soviet
experiences. He was to make sure that line management was not
’divorced from technology”. He was to work out and supervise
the implementation of separate responsibility systems for each
staff department. He was to determine the organisation of shops
and was to examine all regulations, work norms, organisational
charts of lower levels, work graphs, production order reports,
114-etc. Such was the consequences of responsibilities 
determined geographically rather than functionally.
181.
r. ; Cor" ny.d fasten at Chon Level
Ike responsibility system prescribed for the North last 
during the New Record Movement indicated a process of extending 
control fror tho top down and paid consequently little attention 
to the determination of responsibilities at middle enterprise 
level* It was followed in late 1950 and early 1951 by a 
car.f aicn to strengthen the power of the shop supervisor in 
accordance v/ith the principle of one-man management. Ihe 
immediate consequence of this downward X'rocess of doternininc 
r c s:,one ib id it io s was that vesting c^^tor authority in line 
management at higher levels resulted in the yrowth of patterns 
of functional leadership at lower levels.
At the Seventh Rubber Factory under the North fast
I lust rial Eapartment for example, the campaign to strengthen
v.orlshop work enhanced the power of the shop supervisor to the
\ oint where intermediate levels between shop and team were
abolished and the post of foreman ceased wo exist. Foremen were
transferred from the lino to staff posts and, as inspectors,
115
exercised functional leadership over the team.
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The rubber factory claimed that such a system increased 
productivity, but a Tung-Pei Kung-yeh editorial comment revealed 
that the North East Industrial Department was a little worried 
about the growth of mini-functional systems. The editor declared 
that the success of this system had been possible because the 
factory in question was small; some of the old foremen had in 
fact only exercised leadership over one team and as such were 
redundant since they only duplicated the function of the team 
leader. Further research was necessary before any decision 
could be taken on the wider applicability of this system.
A second consequence of the growth of line power at shop
level and above was that, now shop supervisors were under the
direct line leadership of the FGM and his deputy (the chief
engineer) as opposed to the functional leadership of senior staff
officers, members of the production department found themselves
117with little to do. Such personnel were required to concern
themselves with professional/technical work (yeh-wu ) , which may 
have been somewhat difficult to define.
A third consequence of the new power located at shop level 
was that some shop supervisors felt that they were independent 
(tu-li) and did not inform higher levels about what they were
y\/\ o
doing. ~ Factory level leadership was considerably worried 
about the ability of the FGM to control the shops without the 
functional supervision of a production department, for the 
burden placed upon an FGM who was required to integrate all the 
advice of factory level staff departments and process it into
'11 o
operational instructions was quite considerable. v We have 
already seen the considerable list of duties assigned to the 
chief engineer once he was made deputy FGM in charge of 
production. Those of the FGM were greater.
Not only was concern expressed about the burden placed upon
the FGM, but some disquiet was felt about the experience and
ability of the shop supervisors to undertake the responsibilities
120which were assigned them. The suggestion here was that the 
existence of functional patterns of supervision in the early 
post-liberation situation were a direct consequence of the low 
level of technical competence of junior line management, who 
could not be trusted with increased line power. To overcome this
problem special training classes were to be set up for shop
121supervisors.
The strengthening of line power at the level of shop
supervisor was the first step in a process whereby staff
functions were decentralised. Staff-line systems tend to
produce a situation where, as one proceeds down the organisation,
each level of administration is a miniature version of the
preceding level. Consequently, each level in an enterprise was
required to work out its own work plan, to maintain its own
accounts (internal economic accounting), and (to all intents and
122purposes) the shop supervisor was a mini FGM.
The decentralisation of staff functions was said to he
designed to improve contact between staff members and the shop
123floor now the principle of functional intervention was given
up. Figure eight shows the organisation of a workshop at the
Fushun Steel Works, where the downward transfer of staff
functions was carried to the point of assigning a technician to
each work section and locating responsibility for shift change at
work section rather than shop level. Most staff functions,
however, were located at shop level and were placed under the
124-control of vice-supervisors.
Figure is a very clear example of the implementation
of the production territorial system. The size and organisation 
of the work section was determined by the number of men required 
to operate two furnaces (three shifts of thirty men, fifteen for 
each furnace). One technician was assigned, two furnaces and one 
engineer was placed in charge of all the furnaces in the shop; 
thus there was perfect congruence between the network of technical 
competence and the network of administrative command. It was 
comparatively easy therefore for the shop supervisor to determine 
the relationship of a technician to the work section. At the 
lowest level the production territorial system made for very 
clear and specific relationships between staff and line. At 
higher levels, however, as we have noted, a geographically- 
determined field of concern led to the situation where the 
responsibilities of senior line management were excessive.
lc. rncfjc-hon b
STS-.fr Sc.or<o.\/S
* Vccz
j ;.c I StfMcviSer*
tStiop SVP3&IS.0R
i
| ««C ffloZi^ ncds
Sscuoaj e;i/SZCT&fiJ CMS?
 ^ ccd£tr^ s?\c
0  7^ ^~brz£inna^Z
r
(CermQs~/o f*s&r/('j£A*a Aykr® Om4
C~^y?r<>z24£*nrfj s/v^Z-t • &?z*i*Cn&4 
'V^.csJ&’/Vj *^I Ac *^ c/cr^  Cj4-
Z/roi££ *&eC*>c<AQ& /^ li/cnAC/J
J & J Aiv y
1
WlrT UTtihCK
( j u K )
K>C-s
a<?,
o
il
0) .
s
"S
1t
o5
s
^4"
STo
u
<
r
\s
H
j ftnxncZ CHlcP
I
C /S"
I
> v ;v>
C J
< 4
<c
%H <»
'i
5*
*(S
*H
V t*
r? &^  aiW >JT £
v>
■&
s?-
<sv j;
$
CS
• £
V’*
J,V!Cf£.V
t^^> cA\CsVTj4? O-jZ'i'^^ 
y^ /Vw.CCS^
1 4 1
o*x
V^
V|s
*S
v5 9
§ i
«■*
h
<K
v
vSnVi
t6
I
( ^ ' / f'-C -Vi v><5"
V
7*"
A /e 'f'Q  &2rQ srxcsn (U rvU cl/^cr? a o a ^ r a ^  -ifo  -&&-cA / £ ^ o ^ c f.v . '
Ct$S&rrj) Cif&cg jfaffl ffclc/ c*sf crrQ c^ Z &JZ AgcCt C^ r<JirC^ i ■
■> //? g  9  QR&follSflTiOfiJ e?  f t  WORKSHOP Q J  TH E FUSHOM STi
titeA/(S
In factories operating a shift s y s t e m , t h e  shop
supervisor was to appoint shift managers and shift leaders, who
1 2(~>were to he in full charge of operations during their shifts,
A responsibility system for shift change was to be determined
and each person (whether worker or line or staff manager) was
127required to hand over to a clearly-defined opposite number. '
In some factories meetings of shift leaders at work section level
128were convened to coordinate shift change , though how this was 
possible when the factory was operating 24- hours a day is
difficult to determine.
Shift change offered perhaps the severest test of the
criterion of individual responsibility. In his novel about the
fictitious Liaonan Iron and Steel Works, Ai Wu narrates in great
detail the life of three furnace chiefs (one on each shift) and
' \ 2 °the conflicts between them.  ^ The hero, a young and impetuous 
furnace chief, was deeply resented by the other two chiefs, one 
an old experienced worker of considerable skill and the other a 
lazy and inefficient man. The old skilled worker felt that the 
hero was producing steel at temperatures which were too high in 
order to gain the prestige for producing heats of steel in record 
time, and when the roof of the furnace collapsed there were 
mutual recriminations. It turned out that no-one was free of 
guilt, though the real villain of the piece was a counter­
revolutionary who was trying to sabotage production. The point 
was made, however, that under a shift system where heats of 
steel sometimes overlapped shift changes and where it was 
difficult to determine who was responsible for the care of the 
furnace, the doctrine of individual responsibility did not hold. 
The novel was written during the Great Leap Forward when the
doctrine of strict individual responsibility was being 
reconsidered, and it may well be that the author was influenced 
by a political climate which gave greater weight to group 
committment than individual responsibility. I feel, however, 
that in a situation where three shifts operated the same 
relatively fragile equipment, the doctrine of strict individual 
responsibility could not but give rise to recriminations, 
regardless of the good will or dedication of the people involved.
The Foreman
I have suggested two factors which led to the growth of 
patterns of functional supervision in the period after 
liberation - the superimposition of new channels of command over 
pre-existing organisational structures to facilitate control and 
the fact that low levels of technical expertise on the part of 
junior line management precluded the complete transfer of power 
down the line. Clearly the existence of gang bosses made 
impossible the immediate implementation of a Soviet model which 
sought to establish one or two levels of management below that of 
shop supervisor. In chapter two we saw instances where gang
bosses were appointed to junior line posts with disasterous 
results. After democratic reform, however, some progress was 
recorded, although the lack of technical expertise (and sometimes 
even literacy) on the part of foremen made necessary such 
systems as the work supervision system and the production order 
system.
The Soviet model of organisational command saw the work
section (kung-tuan) as the basic level of administration with
its head the foreman (kung-tuan-chang or kung-chang) as the
lowest rung of management, who was in Stalin's term Mthe junior
151commander of production". There was frequently an even
lower level, the team (or brigade) (hsiao-tsu) and in Chinese
terminology its head the team-leader (hsiao-tsu-chang) might be
referred to as a "basic level cadre*0^2 The principle of one-
man management (sole responsibility by management) placed the
foreman in exactly the same relationship to his work section as
the shop supervisor to his shop or the FGM to his factory or
enterprise. No staff organ at factory or shop level had the
right to issue orders directly to him and he was responsible
155only to the shop supervisor. ^  He was responsible for his
section's portion of the work plan, care and maintenance of
machinery, the adherence to technical regulations and quality
control specifications, the organisation of production
competitions, the promotion of advanced experiences, cost
accounting within the section and was required to act as the
154-workers' spokesman concerning wages and bonuses.  ^ Such duties 
required a considerable degree of literacy and technical 
competence, which took a long time to achieve. In late 1953 
even at the advanced Anshan Iron and Steel Works complaints 
were still voiced about the technical skill and literacy of 
foremen, which was said to be a major contributing cause to the 
phenomenon of - . g "multi-headed leadership", since
technicians continued to take direct action on the shop floor 
without bothering to go through the tiresome process of
explaining everything to the f o r e m a n . O c c a s i o n a l l y  additional
labour was sent down to the teams without any reference to the
136foremen, and this led to resentment. Some foremen complained 
that they had responsibilities but no power (yu-chih wu-ch'tlan) ? ^  
Others felt that their teams were too large to control and in 
effect technicians exercised control in their place.
The educational gap between foremen and technical staff led
to urgent campaigns to institute training programmes for
foremen J and to campaigns to restrict the functional power of
technical staff. Strengthening of line management, however,
often resulted in the same problems that we noted in the case of
shop supervisors. Foremen began to act independently and
wallowed in the ideology of "departmentalism" (hsiao-pen-wei ssu-
hsiang) where they Just 'did their own thing', provided the shop
IIfO
supervisor was happy . Not that line channels were always very
effective. Sometimes workers were appointed to the post of
14*1foremen when they had no work sections to take charge of and 
redundant foremen who had been deprived of their position due to 
administrative reorganisation, as in the case of the amalgamation 
of construction engineering units and work sections, found 
themselves in staff Jobs which only contributed to the process 
where surplus personnel accumulated at the middle levels of 
administration.
The effectiveness of a Soviet staff-line type organisation 
at the lower levels therefore depended to a very large extent 
upon the effectiveness of factory-organised training programmes.
The problem, however, was not just one of technical training and 
organisational reform. Not only was the technical and literacy 
level of foremen to be raised so that they would be more equal to 
technical staff, but technical staff had to be persuaded that the 
trained foreman and line manager was in fact their equal. This 
political problem took a very long while to solve and as the 
responsibility of the Party branch will be discussed in chapter 
eight.
The Bureaucratic Cycle
We have observed that in a functional system technical and 
other staff tend to concentrate at the top of an organisation,
whereas in a staff-line system technical staff tend to concentrate 
at the middle levels of organisation due to the decentralisation 
of staff functions. In the period under review the 
decentralisation of staff functions was only really effective 
after the conclusion of the Three Anti Movement, and consequently 
it is only realistic to speak of a bureaucratic cycle in terms 
of the period 1 9 5 2-5 7* In the period prior to 1951 the 
superimposition of new forms of organisation on to pre-existing 
structures led to a growth of non-productive personnel which was
the focus of a retrenchment policy during the Three Anti
141Movement. We have noted however that in 1955 junior 
supervisory staff who were made redundant were transferred to 
staff posts. This was characteristic of a new bureaucratic 
atmosphere in which the ratio of non-productive to productive 
workers in enterprises grew. In a Kwangtung sugar refinery, for 
example, the ratio of white collar workers to blue collar
workers to blue collar workers grew as follows
1951 47:100
1952 52:100
1955 65:100
1954 66:100
Such an increasing ratio was directly attributed to the 
introduction of one-man management and the figures were
144published as part of an intensifying critique of that system.
By the end of the cycle in 1957? full scale retrenchment was 
being undertaken which was to culminate in the Great Leap 
Forward of 1958.
A similar cycle was to begin in 1960-61 which was to 
culminate in the organisational reforms which began in 1964.
These reforms were almost the complete reverse of the process 
which has been described above and provide a very neat contrast.
At the end of 1964 the Tsitsihar Vehicle Factory was put forward 
as a model of factory organisation and descriptions of this model
achieved prominence in the 1965 Peoples Handbook (Jen-min Shou-
145t 1 se). ^ In this factory staff functions were transferred back
to factory level and staff members instructed to lead production
directly (i.e. to exercise functional leadership). Such steps
were deemed the best possible method to counter the problem of
146overstaffing and over-bureaucratisation. The downward transfer
of staff functions had evidently not been able to bring technical 
personnel closer to the shop floor and the Tsitsihar model 
attempted to achieve this by strengthening functional leadership 
and attempting to achieve ideological integration through a 
strengthened Party apparatus. The problem of alienation between
staff members and workers was to be overcome by insisting that 
such personnel spend some time on the shop floor. This was very 
near to the ideologically-integrated functional model that was 
constructed at the beginning of this chapter. The organisational 
tendencies during the early 1950s and middle 1960s are 
contrasted in figure 10.
Conelusion
The first three chapters were concerned with the change 
from a representative to a participatory definition of 
democracy, the attempt to bring to an end the stratification 
caused by the gang boss system and the inculcation of a new 
conception of rationality. In chapter four, we have seen that 
the prescribed Soviet model was one which could only be 
implemented when democracy was defined in a participatory sense, 
for committee forms of management were too near to the 
discredited "parliamentary system". The establishment of the 
Soviet staff-line system of command was only possible once 
democratic reform was effectively concluded and, even then, had 
to be modified in a situation where the educational level of 
junior line management was very low. As a consequence of the 
need to control lower levels of line management in this 
situation, patterns of functional supervision grew. In early 
1955 sin all-out attempt was made to restrict these functional 
patterns but I am not convinced that this attempt led to the 
very rigid staff-line systems that might be suggested by the 
term "one-man management".
Ue have noted that the hierarchy of values and ends against 
which any criterion of organisational rationality nust be
^acured were orcscribed by the Soviet rodel and the prevalence * •>
of functional patterns in the period prior to 1953 arose from 
uncertainty as to which 01 two factors occUj-’ieci uhc iii0i.*ei 
place in that hierarchy - the creation of staff-line patterns of 
ccirccrd or the extension of control down to the oasic levcx.
In the Soviet Union in 1950 those factors wore not in 
contradiction. In China the low level of technical competence 
at the basic level meant that they wore.
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CHAPTER F IV E  INCENTIVE AND WORK MOTIVATION
Chapter three described a policy which sought to relate 
remuneration only to productivity. As such it was anti- 
egalitarian and individually-oriented. Incentive policy was not 
concerned with relating wage payment to any notion of natural
'I
equity and attempts were made to create highly progressive wage 
systems. This approach was the complete opposite to that of such 
Western psycho-economists as Jaques, who see a correlation
p
between equity and equality m  conditions of under-abundance. 
According to Jaques, as an economy becomes richer the equitable 
distribution of incomes becomes more differentially steep, whereas 
according to the Chinese view borrowed from the Soviet Union in 
194-8, steep differentials had to be created m  order to achieve 
abundance in the first place and to achieve this, new standards 
of equity had to be internalised.
This chapter will examine the process of wage reform, not 
from an economic point of view in terms of the allocation of 
resources, but in terms of its effect upon the relationship 
between workers and management and between staff and line. 
Particular stress will be laid upon the criteria employed to 
grade workers and management. The individual and group 
dimensions of incentive will be discussed in connection with 
piecework and the production competitions which, as we have seen, 
were closely integrated with wages policy. Finally, an attempt 
will be made, as in the last chapter, to compare the dimensions 
of incentive policy with those of a later period where the focus
had s w itc h e d  fro m  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  th e  g ro u p .
The Elimination of the Supply System
Any attempt at wage reform had to be postponed until
inflation had been brought under control. The Lushun Talien
wage system, which was discussed in chapter three, was expressed
in monetary terms. In other parts of the country, however, the
chronic inflation that lasted until 1950 was compensated for by
assessing wages according to a system of points, known variously
4.
as or fen in different parts of the country. Each point
was the equivalent of a certain quantity of consumer goods (rice, 
wheat, coal, oil, salt and cotton cloth)^ and payment might be 
made in these goods or in their monetary value at current 
prices. The prices of the constituent elements of the wage 
point were all controlled and an attempt was made to allow for 
the greater degree of fluctuation of uncontrolled prices by tying 
wage payments to a cost of livring index, in a way similar to the 
Lushun Talien model which was described in chapter three.0 
Though the wage point system was phased out in various places 
in the years after liberation, it was not formally abolished 
until 1956.^
Soon after liberation attempts were made to standardise the 
constituent elements of wage points, though the wage reforms 
that followed proceeded on the.assumption that there would be no 
immediate change-over to payment in monetary terms. The major 
task of wage reform was the much more difficult one of 
standardising wage grades. Various wage reforms had taken place
in the liberated areas prior to 1950, but they had proceeded in a
o
piecemeal fashion. Even after liberation wage reform took place 
in different areas in different times according to a pattern with 
which we are now familiar - the North East in 1950, the North in 
1951, the East in 1951-2 and the Central-South in 1952.' Wage 
reform commenced in the North East as soon as inflation had been 
brought under control though, in the rest of the country, the 
commencement of wage reform depended upon the completion of 
democratic reform; the existence of gang bosses who took their 
customary cut of wages would have frustrated any attempt at 
uniform wage grading.
The first task of wage reform was to eliminate the element
of "free supply" that had remained from civil war days. This
wage supplement was considered to be unnecessary in a situation
where inflation had been brought under control and where the wage
. . 10point system related wages to the cost of living. The only
element of subsidy for blue collar workers that was to remain
after wage reform were allowances paid to a worker whose post-
11reform pay was less than his pre-reform pay. In addition to
abolishing subsidies, wage reform also involved measures to
. . 12restrict traditional gratuities such as double pay at New Year.
Since workers were already paid to a great extent according 
to a graded wage system, and were guaranteed a subsidy if their 
new scale was lower than their old scale, they had nothing to 
lose by the abolition of former subsidies. The problem of cadres, 
on the other hand, was a more serious one. Although liberated
areas such as the North East had established wage scales for 
management cadres in state-run factories in 194-8,^ a number of 
new cadres had been transferred to factories following the 
liberation of cities, who brought with them what was described as 
the free supply mentality (kung-kei-chih ti ch'ang-hsiang) and 
who resented a system of payment that sought to measure their 
contribution (kung-hsien) to production.^ In the opinion of 
Kao Kang, it was this type of cadre who was to a large extent 
responsible for the lack of a. sense of responsibility within 
North East factories and whose attitude he caricatured as kan-ru- 
kan, i-chin-pan (whether I do the work or not, I'll still get one
✓I c
and a half chin of grain as wages). ^
Egalitarianism in the sense of a theoretical committment to
equal payment regardless of work was, as far as I know, never a
feature of official policy in any of the liberated areas. Such a
doctrine had been condemned by Mao in the Kutien resolution of
1 9 2 9 as the illusion of the small peasant producer in a situation
where capitalism had not yet been wiped out. Equal payment,
which was practised in units of the Red Army at that time, was
i f)said to derive from necessity rather than theory. During the
Anti-Japanese war, free supply systems for cadres had become
prevalent as well as a grain ticket system of payment for troops
17which related wages to the procurement of local tax gram.
Such systems, however, seem to have been the result of physical
necessity rather than due to any theoretical committment to
immediate payment according to need. In fact Mao Tse-tung
argued in favour of progressive piecework systems and against
"1S
egalitarianism as early as i9^2.
The effect of such systems was to create more of an
egalitarian ethos than an egalitarian ideology. The dividing
line between the "free supply mentality", which was the result of
habit as the Chinese term suggests (kung-kei-chih ti ch1ang-
hsiang) , and a committment to equality as an end in itself (p 1ing
-chdn-chu-i), is however a thin one, and there were some people
who considered the ultha egalitarianism of the "peasant
socialist" period of land reform should be applied to the
19industrial sphere. '
The free supply system for cadres was to survive wage 
reform, but I have seen no instances of any managerial personnel 
remaining on this system. In the light of my own observations 
in the middle 1960s, when transferred Army cadres remained on 
army pay scales after they were transferred to other walks of 
life, it is not inconceivable that some Party personnel 
transferred to factories remained on this system, but I have 
seen no account that discusses the salary of enterprise Party 
secretaries during the period under review.
Grading Blue Collar Workers
I have suggested above that one definition of the term 
egalitarianism was a belief in free supply for its own sake.
This was not, however, the definition that was most commonly 
made. What was usually meant by the term in the industrial 
sphere was the maintenance of very small differentials between
wage grades, even though the number of these grades might be
20enormous.
It is virtually impossible to generalise about the nature 
of wage grade systems that were in operation in the period 
immediately before wage reform. Not only were there variations 
between areas, but even within the same local industrial network 
a number of different grading systems might be in operation.
The Ta Chung Coal Mine under the T'aihang Mining Corporation, 
for example, revealed in 194-8 a uniform wage of 7»2 chin of 
millet for carpenters regardless of work skill, whereas other 
units under the corporation had three wage categories (nine
grades), four categories (12 grades), or even five categories
21(15 grades). As early as 194-8 this lack of uniformity was
explained as the result of the free supply mentality and other
22erroneous modes of thought.
In the period immediately prior to the post-liberation wage 
reform, some industrial units had as many as 14-8 wage grades
with differentials of only 0 .9 wage points between each grade and
25others had as many grades as there were workers. Such systems
were described as "egalitarian", even though the ratio of
highest wage to lowest might be of the order of 3:1 to 5 :^ *
Wage reform tended to reduce this ratio4 since previous living
allowances were transformed into basic wages, with the result
that pay increases at the lower levels were proportionally
24higher than pay increases at the higher levels.
Though wage reform reduced the ratio of highest to lowest
25wage to something of the order of 1 :3 , the resulting wage 
system was considered to be less regalitarian" because a
reduction in the number of grades made the differentials between 
grades much steeper. The ideal number of grades for blue collar 
workers was seven or eight, the former seeming to be more 
appropriate for heavy industry and textiles and the latter for 
the bulk of light industry. Ideally grading was not to be 
worker-oriented but job-oriented. A number of work points were 
assigned to specific activities on the basis of required skill 
(ying-hui) , required knowledge (ying-chih) ^  and working
conditions in accordance with prescribed ranges laid down by
28regional government.^ ’ The ranges prescribed for heavy industry
2°were higher than those prescribed for light industry J (the
reversal of the pre-liberation situation) and those for state-run
. . 30industry higher than for provincial or municipally-run industry.'
A model for wage grade determination during the 195^ North 
China Wage Reform was the Power Plant of the Shihchingshan Iron 
and Steel Works near Peking. This thirty year old plant had 
inherited no less than 110 wage grades with very small 
differentials. Not only was the grading system Megalitarian" but, 
in some cases, skilled workers were paid less than unskilled 
workers; for example, a highly skilled worker had'-been graded at 
309 chin of millet whereas an old forge hand received 460 chin.
A wage reform committee (p 1ing-tzu wei-ydan-hui) was set up in 
July 195^ to carry out wage reform. The committee consisted of 
cadres (presumably management Party and union officers) and 
skilled workers who had been in the plant for some time. The 
committee worked out a grading plan which was submitted to the 
shop floor and discussion was held at plant, shop and team level.
Pilot teams were selected, their experiences propagated, and
within three days every member of every team had been assigned to
. . . . 31a definite position m  the eight grade scale.
The above exercise in participatory democracy depended to a 
very large extent upon the political consciousness of the workers 
involved, for we have seen what happened when a worker of low
political consciousness was in a position to determine his own
32wages. A worker was required to have sufficient political
consciousness to realise that political factors should determine
his attitude towards wage grade determination but not the grades
so determined. In the liberated areas prior to wage reform
"labour attitude" was frequently an important factor in grade
determination.  ^ At the time of the 1950-52 wage reforms
however, the employment of political criteria in grade
34-determination was strongly opposed. It was felt that on the 
one hand such a practice might cause resentment between old 
workers who were highly skilled but politically not very
conscious, and young political activists whose level of skill
33was very low,  ^and on the other that it might act as a
36disincentive for young activists to study technology.
Evidently at this stage the political consciousness of the young 
political activists was not considered in itself a sufficient 
motivating factor.
The contradiction between a process of political education 
which demanded that political considerations be discounted in 
grading is an example of a contradiction between medium and
message that will he elaborated on in chapter eight. It was a 
contradiction which was only to be partially solved. Even after 
the major wage reform of 1956 which reinforced the doctrine that 
no payment should be made for nlabour attitude’1 the campaign 
against the employment of political consideration continued^® 
until policy was reversed in 1958, which would indicate that such 
a practice was difficult to eradicate.
The major emphasis in wage reform lay in assigning blue 
collar workers to grades on the seven or eight grade system 
according to technical rather than political criteria. It is 
difficult to assess how successful this process was since, after 
wage reform, one could still find instances of grading systems 
other than the seven or eight grades systems which were 
prescribed. y However successful the establishment of the seven 
or eight grade system was, wage reform was least successful in 
working out a standard system of grade differentials. Ideally
systems should have been progressive; they were more frequently
40  41constant and occasionally irregular (neither progressive nor
constant), which may be attributed to an overemphasis on form
(the number of grades) at the expense of content (the size of
differentials)
The Evaluation of Cadres
Whatever difficulty might have been experienced in 
discounting political attitudes when evaluating blue collar 
workers, the problem of cadres was a much more complicated one 
and caused far greater difficulties, since political attitude 
was the raison d ’etre of the Party cadres, vital in line
managers who were required to concern themselves with personnel, 
and could only he discounted in the case of technical cadres.
In the early 1950s the prescribed qualities of a cadre were 
summed up in the three concepts ts 'ai, te and tzu. These are 
usually translated as "ability”, "virtue" and "qualifications"; 
a lot however is lost in the translation.
In 194-9 Kao Kang defined ts1 ai as one's capacity to complete 
tasks assigned by the people, ibe as one's loyalty to the cause of 
the people and tzu as one's experience in struggle and the 
degree to which one is close to the people. ^ Each of these 
concepts has ideally a technical and a political dimension.
One's capacity to complete work tasks depends upon having the 
right attitude (political) and the required skill (technical). 
During the early 1960s ts'ai was interpreted in largely technical
1\Ll
terms, whereas in the Cultural Revolution it was interpreted in
45largely political terms. ^ Loyalty to the cause of the people
may be measured in adherence to the mass line or in terms of how
hard one works, and experience in struggle depends on how one
defines struggle; struggle in a Chinese context has a whole span
46of definition from class struggle to work itself.
Despite Kao Kang's wide definition of tzu, in the early
1950s tzu tended to be defined in terms of paper qualifications
and did not achieve the theoretical importance of the other two 
47concepts. ' Ts'ai tended to be defined as knowing how to do 
things and having the talent to do them and te_ as knowing why
such things need to he done. Throughout the past twenty two 
years writers on ts1 ai and t_e have condemned any attempt to
counterpose the two concepts; this is as time for the early
48 491950s as it is for the Great Leap Forward. J Within an
industrial enterprise both the FGM and the Party secretary were
required to possess te and ts1ai in great measure, the difference
being that a Party secretary was required to concern himself with
other peoples* _te whereas the PGM was to concern himself with
other peoples' ts1ai.
In the early 1950s there was a tendency to give greater 
stress to ts * ai than to te. An Tzu-wen, Deputy Director of the 
Party Organisation Bureau and Minister of Personnel, condemned 
this tendency and answered those cadres who had declared that it 
was impossible to combine a great degree of ts1ai and te in one 
person.^ Some cadres had put forward the idea those with te 
and no ts'ai should run Party affairs and those with ts'ai and no 
te should do administrative work. Some even tried to lay down 
criteria for administrators and managers on the basis of 50% te 
and 70% ts'ai, which was criticised by An as the "simple business 
viewpoint".^
In 1958 Mao also sharply criticised those who sought to
52counterpose chuan (expert) and hung (red), (which were exactly 
the same as ts'ai and te). The difference between the formulation 
of the early 1950s and that of the Great Leap Forward was that 
the former defined the te (hung) concept increasingly in terms of 
technological values whilst the latter defined the ts'ai (chuan)
concept increasingly in terms of political values. Both views
condemned any tendency for there to appear groups of people
clearly defined as "reds" and "experts" in the enterprise;
appointments to all leading line management posts were made in
terms of both qualities. The Great Leap Forward tendency to put
the te (hung) concept first was founded on the belief that proper
te (hung) in itself led to a desire to gain expertise. The
adherents to the Soviet model also put the t£ (hung) concept
first in the belief that proper te (hung) in itself included a
high degree of expertise. In the early 1950s one could find pure
experts in industry, but these were usually retained personnel.
In the mid 1960s there were still some retained personnel, though
I find the labels "red" and "expert" which Barry Richman assigns
to various leading personnel in the enterprises he visited quite
extraordinary. What Richman does is to assume that those who
manifestly lack chuan (ts1ai) are by definition hung (te).
According to Kao Kang personnel transferred from outside the
industrial sphere in the early 1950s rapidly became imbued with 
54ts'ai. ^  Similarly, political cadres transferred from the 
military in 1964 either rapidly achieved ts'ai or failed utterly 
to understand how production worked and were not much use from a 
hung point of view. Indeed the Cultural Revolution in the 
factories was essentially a battle not between chuan and hung, 
but between two different kinds of hung.
The evaluation of line managers and political cadres there­
fore demanded a consideration of political attitude. Technical 
cadres were much easier to grade and for this reason separate
grading systems were worked out for staff and line cadres,^5 ^h.e 
former appearing usually long before the latter. In the North 
East, for example, a comprehensive system of grade standards for 
technical personnel were worked out for the whole region in 
1952, ^  whereas grading schemes for line management in some 
sectors of industry were not formulated until much later. In the
construction industry, for example, a nation-wide grading system
57was worked out only in 1955* which was the year in which a
comprehensive national plan was put forward for grading all
cadres, both in state administration and in the industrial
sphere, and the year in which the free supply system was finally
50
brought to an end. y Significantly the national grading schemes 
for line managers were not put forward until after the abolition
of the large administrative regions into which China was divided
60until 1954-* which meant that sometimes technical personnel were
graded according to the former regional standard, whereas line
management were graded according to a national standard. In the
Anshan Metallurgical General Building Corporation technical
personnel remained until 1957 on the North East standard for
1952, whereas line managers found themselves after 1955 on the
national standard for the construction industry, which was lower
61than the North East standard.
The payment to technical personnel of salaries higher than 
line management was a violation of the Soviet model and the 
provisions for wage reform of 1950-52 had stressed that line
6 2managers should be graded at a higher level than staff officers. 
Though it would appear that the problem of technical personnel
paid at a rate higher than line managers was particularly salient
after the nation-wide grading systems were put forward in 1955* ^
it is my impression that this process was a natural consequence
of the policies of not alienating technical staff, the relative
ease in grading technical personnel and the fact that in the
beginning of the Five Year Plan the engineer enjoyed a prestige
64-higher than the administrator. In 1957 one critic went so far 
as to say that the phenomenon of higher pay for technical 
personnel resulted in a situation where managerial recruits into 
industry tended to be engineering graduates rather than 
graduates in economics (business management).^ One can indeed 
demonstrate that the number of engineering graduates increased 
out of all proportion to economics graduates (see figure 11), but 
I feel that this was more a consequence of copying the Soviet 
pattern than the consequence of its violation; and in any case, 
in a situation where provision for higher education was planned, 
it is doubtful that higher pay for technical personnel could 
influence the number of university places for engineering 
students.
One can show fairly conclusively that the provision in the
Soviet model of higher pay for line management was frequently
violated at the higher levels. I am not so sure about the lower
levels. One of the bones of contention of lower level staff
officers in the construction industry was that they were paid at
a lower rate than junior line management whereas their technical
66qualifications were higher. This kind of question can only be 
solved definitively after very detailed research into the mass of
FIGURE 11 RELATIVE INCREASE IN TEE NUMBERS OF GRADUATES IN 
ECONOMICS (INCLUDING BUSINESS MANAGEMENT) AND ENGINEERING.
YEAR Graduates in Finance & Economics 
(including bus iness 
management)
% of all
graduates
Graduates in 
Engineering
% of all 
graduates
1 9lf9-50 3 , 3 0 5 18 >+,711 26
1950-51 3 , 6 3 8 19 i+, 1+16 23
1 951 -52 7 , 2 6 3 23 10,213 32
1952-53 10,530 22 l'+,565 30
1953-5'+ 6 , 0 3 3 13 1 5,596 33
195^-55 >+,699 8 18,61>+ 3>+
1955-56 A 6 0 7 22,01+7 35
11956 - 57 3,651 6
L  . j
17,162
■_ - . ...
31
Note the considerable decline in the number of graduates in
^inance and economics after 1953 when the Soviet model was 
fully operational.
Source : Cheng C. Scientific and Engineering Manpower in
Communist China 19*+9-6.3, Washington D.C. National Science 
Foundation 1965 p 73 Table 7*
from State Statistical Bureau: Ten Great Years, Stat 1stics 
of the Economic and Cultural Achievements of the People!s
Republic of China FFLP 1960 p 196.
material on wages that exists for the early and middle 1950s.
•The very limited aim of the above discussion is to show that 
there was a remunerative dimension to staff-line tension and that 
the wage reforms that took place in our period of study were 
least effective in dealing with managerial staff. The result was 
that there was a lack of homogeneity between the various systems 
for grading line managers and such uniformity that was achieved 
in grading technical staff in the North East was itself a 
contributory factor in staff-line tension.
Piecework
In chapter four we noted that the prescribed Soviet model 
demanded at the same time control over the basic level and the 
establishment of staff-line patterns of command. These elements 
were contradictory in a Chinese context and the need for control 
resulted in the temporary growth of patterns of functional 
leadership, which was a violation of the Soviet model. In this 
chapter we have noted that the prescribed Soviet model demanded 
at the same time systematisation of salary scales for management 
and provision for higher pay for line management. These elements 
were contradictory in a Chinese context and the need for 
systematisation resulted in an uneven pattern which gave technical 
staff higher salaries than line management; this was similarly a 
violation of the Soviet model. A third contradictory pattern 
which we shall explore here is between a demand that piecework 
systems of remuneration be introduced and the pressing need to 
raise the level of technical education.
We saw in chapter three that the prescribed method of wage 
calculation was a progressive piecework system which was con­
sidered to be the best way of adhering to the socialist principle 
of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his 
work”. Piecework related wages to productivity and thus was felt 
to provide a very good incentive for technical education.^ The 
relationship between technical education and piecework, however, 
can be seen in two ways, dialectically or in terms of a vicious 
circle. In the New Record movement, records were to be broken 
and rationalisation proposals submitted in order to establish 
norms. Upon these norms piecework systems were to be created and 
the continued desire to overfulfill one's norm was to lead 
workers to study technology to improve their efficiency. Thus new 
rationalisation proposals could be put forward and new records
68broken which would provide the basis for new and higher norms.
Such was the dialectical view which saw the contradiction between 
education and wages solved repeatedly at ever higher levels. One 
may look at this contradiction however in another way. The 
ability to establish new records and put forward rationalisation 
proposals depends in the first place upon a worker's level of 
technical education. If this is low he will not break records 
and not put forward the rationalisation proposals upon which 
norms might be established and piecework systems built and thus 
not have sufficient incentive to raise the level of his 
education. In such a situation the arbitrary imposition of norms 
and piecework systems will result in a situation where the worker 
feels he is exploited. The worker may only break out of this 
vicious circle once he feels that his technical competence is
is sufficient to break new records and put forward rationalisation 
proposals. This must be in a situation where technical staff do 
not despise worker suggestions and where the development of 
production competitions is not too erratic, as it was in the 
early stages of the New Record Movement.
A certain amount of time was necessary therefore before
educational levels were sufficiently high, technical staff
sufficiently humble and production competitions sufficiently
stable to introduce piecework systems. The implementation of
piecework systems depended too upon the satisfactory completion
of wage reform and, apart from the North East, such reforms were
only deemed to have been satisfactorily completed after the wage 
69reform of 1956. In fact over most of the country piecework
systems, like one-man management, were just introduced in time for
them to be subject to the most severe criticism in 1957-58, y
when the doctrine of strict payment according to work began to be
reconsidered.^ In striking contrast to the optimism which was
recounted in chapter three, it was reported that by 1952 only
54-. 5% of the production workers in state enterprises were 
71pieceworkers;' and even in 1956 they did not constitute the
majority.^ In the North East, where a campaign^ was launched
74
as early as the spring of 1950' to introduce piecework systems
7 5
on the grounds that time work encouraged slackers,  ^there was an 
atmosphere of caution. The advanced "technical norms" of the 
Soviet Union which required a complicated method of calculation 
were considered too difficult to introduce.^ A system of 
average advanced norms (p'ing-chdn hsien-chin ting-o) was adopted
and these norms were determined by selecting a point between the 
overall average target for output and the levels of production 
which workers commonly reached* Factories were warned not to
proceed too quickly, to designate a trial period and not to alter
. . . . 77initial norms for a period of six months* ((
There were three main reasons for this caution. Firstly, as 
has been mentioned, education levels were low and a premature 
stress on piecework might dampen enthusiasm. Secondly, workers 
frequently didn't understand the complicated methods for 
calculating piecework and, thirdly, inexperienced management 
might have recourse to manipulating norms to balance the books, 
which might have bad repercussions on workers' morale.
Democracy and Piecework
Grade and norm determination were to be conducted according 
to the participatory principle of democracy. It was comparatively 
easy to assign work points to a particular task but the 
determination of norms and piecework systems was particularly 
complicated. The Leninist conception of participatory democracy 
was very closely linked with the degree of consciousness and 
understanding of the participants, and in the campaign to 
abolish piecework in 1958 the existence of piecework systems was 
held to be a contributory factor to the failure of workers to 
participate effectively in basic level management.^  Whilst 
accepting this, I feel that the failure of workers to participate 
effectively in basic level management during the first five year 
plan period was attributable more to the structure of command 
and control than to the existence of piecework systems especially
since, in the period under review, piecework systems were only 
operative in one third of industry and I have seen no definite 
evidence that worker participation was any more effective in 
factories that had not yet adopted piecework systems.n In fact 
factories which had not yet adopted such systems were usually 
those where political consciousness was considered to he lower.
The creation of the degree of consciousness and understanding
necessary to make piecework a success was the function of the
Party^ and more particularly the labour unions. The unions were
to organise discussion of grades, norms and systems. They were to
combat egalitarianism, make certain that every worker understood
the way his grade was determined and the way piecework norms were
formulated and how to calculate his wage. They were to play an
active part in the examination of apprentices and the promotion
of wbrkers who had improved their skill. They were to make
certain that norms were realistic and could be attained by the
majority of workers. In fact, they were to supervise the whole
ROprocess of wage determination and payment. During the wage
reform in the North East in 1950, the head of the Wage Department
of the North East General Labour Union, Chou Shu-k'ang, was none
too complementary about the way basic level unions had carried
out these tasks. In fact, Chou noted that union cadres often did
not participate in the discussions of wages, let alone organise
them, but just handed down gradings determined previously by 
R1
management. In 1951 criticism switched from the unions' 
bureaucratism to their economism, where apparently the increase 
in discussion did not lead to an increase in consciousness, at
least in the way the Party defined it. Ve shall return to this 
in chapter nine. However successful the unions might have been 
in stimulating discussion during 1951» it is unlikely that the 
understanding of workers was raised to any new height, since 
piecework systems were not introduced on a large scale until 
after 1954--^
Norm Manipulation
What was perhaps more significant than the lack of democracy 
in lowering workers1 morale and engendering their hostility to 
piecework was the fact that the regulations for maintaining norms 
for fixed periods of time were frequently violated. This was 
partly a consequence of a contradiction between two other 
elements in the Soviet model, the wage fund system and production 
competitions.
The size of the enterprise wage fund was determined by the
current plan. When norms were greatly surpassed, as in the case
of successful production competitions, more funds would be needed
than the wage fund made available. Management could either get
funds from unauthorised sources or raise norms in anticipation of
88further production increases. ^ To prevent this unions were
required to make certain that the size of the wage fund was
84-appropriate for the fulfillment of production tasks, though
what they might do if they found that it was not is not clear.
Unions were also required to make certain that norm revision took
88place at the planned intervals. ^ This was probably not a very 
great problem when planning was relatively flexible in this early
period and when a large proportion of enterprise funds derived
n r
from unauthorised sources. Later, however, as economic control 
became tighter worker criticisms began to appear in the Press to 
the effect that norm manipulationswas like ’’turning a screw” . ^
Equally common was the opposite tendency, that of lowering
OQ
norms, which was described as an ’’economist” tendency. Such a 
practice, which was sharply censured during the middle 1950s, 
resulted in workers receiving wages which were sometimes higher 
than management. In October 1956, following the wage reform of 
that year, many cases are on record of workers receiving higher 
wages than FGMs,^ which made for resentment on the part of white 
collar workers.
Appropriate norm determination was therefore essential if
piecework systems were not to cause tension. It was not only
norm manipulation, however, that led to tension. In 1957-8 when
piecework systems were being dismantled it was noted that workers
00not on piecework were frequently Jealous of those that were. ^
Workers refused to be assigned to Jobs for which they were paid on
01 . . .  
an hourly basis.^ They were infuriated with the huge bonuses
that were paid to FGMs for overfulfilling their targets
(sometimes ¥ 300-400 in post-1955 currency) and had to be paid
02
bonuses as bribes to keep them quiet.^ From an economic point 
of view piecework led to waste and even when workers were 
penalised for waste, they did not care because they knew they 
could gain back all they would lose through increased 
production.^ This was to be the culmination of a process begun
in Lushun and Talien in 1949> spread to the North East in the 
period under review and implemented in other parts of the 
country after 1954.
Production Competitions
In chapter three we saw that the formulation of wage systems 
was closely associated with the development of production 
competitions. Competitions were used to formulate norms which 
would provide the basis for piecework and bonus systems. During 
the early stages of the New Record Movement the irregularity of 
these competitions caused imbalance between output and other 
norms, with the result that attempts were made in early 1950 to 
regularise the whole process. During 1950 the stress was on 
working out stable norms and commencing wage reform, and it was
04
not until the Korean War donation drive of 1951 that the 
development of production competitions was given new impetus.
The fervour of production competitions continued into the 
movement to Increase Production and Practice Economy of September 
195^ >^  which was to be the precursor of the Three Anti Movement. 
During the movement to Increase Production and Practice Economy 
the stress was on the second part of the slogan' and, as the 
movement drew to a close, further efforts were made at 
regularisation.
The character of the 1951 campaigns became heavily 
influenced by the Movement to Resist American Imperialism and 
Aid Korea with which they coincided. The terms of the 
competitions were frequently incorporated into patriotic 
compacts^ and widespread use of military metaphor was made.
Teams might issue "challenges to combat" (t'iao-chan k ’ou-hao) ^  
to other teams within the same enterprise. Competitions might be 
concluded between enterprises producing similar goods, between 
enterprises within the same locality producing different goods,^ 
or even between enterprises in China and the Soviet Union.
After the experiences of the New Record Movement, particular
101stress was laid upon planning. Municipal general labour
. . 102unions laid down guidelines for competition plans and each
competing unit would work out its own plan with the consultation
105
of relevant Party and union personnel. ^ After group discussion
work tasks would be assigned to each individual, who would work
out his own plan. Success in fulfilling the terms of these
individual plans would determine who would be designated a model
worker (or advanced p r o d u c e r ) . T h e  whole process of planning
105was to be supervised by the labour unions ^ who, as we have
noted, were frequently under cirrticism for bureaucratism in 1950.
Municipal directives condemned those union cadres who didn’t
bother with competition plans due to a distaste for detail and
106those who rejected plans without bothering to explain why.
In striking contrast to the autumn of 194-9* the Harbin General
Labour Union in December 1950 forbade the holding of competitions
107unless planning had been adequately carried out. ( The 
"economist" tendency in labour unions in 195^1 was equally non- 
conducive to production competitions and it was not until after 
the Three Anti Movement that labour unions began adequately to 
fulfill their role in supervising the planning of labour 
competitions.
In these ea r l y  labour competitions, it was not only the 
unions that were found wanting. The problem of technicians, 
which we discussed in chapter four and in this chapter in 
connection with wages, applied equally to the sphere of 
production competitions. Technicians were instructed to examine 
whether competition targets were realisable or not and to work 
out their own individual plans specifying what help they would 
give to the competitors. Many technicians, however, were 
unwilling to be so tied down,^^ which added yet another 
dimension to staff-line tension.
The Individual Hero
In the early 1950s the stress was very much on the
individual rather than the group. Responsibility was seen in
primarily individual terms. Individual bonus systems were
preferred to collective bonuses. Individual piecework was
preferred to collective piecework and the feats of the individual
model worker were given great publicity. Although charts were
110displayed showing unit (team, shop, etc.) progress, it was the
individual who was given the most kudos during the production
competitions of this period. Photographs of advanced workers
were displayed, rolls of honour compiled and articles describing
individual achievements displayed in house organs and the local
111and national press. Although individual model workers
received considerable bonuses for their exploits, great efforts
were made to promote individual fame as an element of non-
material incentive, as is graphically portrayed in Ai Wu's novel
11?
"Steeled and Tempered".
The people who seemed to get most kudos were the team 
leaders of successful teams and such teams were known by the name 
of the team leader. One of the most famous of the team leaders 
who achieved prominence in 1950-51 was Ma Heng-chang, of the Fifth 
Machinery Works in Shenyang under the North East Bureau of 
Machinery. His team, consisting of 10 workers and three 
apprentices, surpassed its production targets every month from 
April 194-9 through to 1951 and met all the quality control 
specifications. During that period the team invented 15 different 
kinds of tools, set up 25 new records and received three banners 
for advanced production (one from factory management, one from the 
North East General Labour Union and one from the North East 
Industrial Department). Every member of the team established 
some kind of record and in September 1950 Ma Heng-chang was 
elected a delegate to the All China Congress of Model Workers and 
Combat Heroes^^ (a similar body to the Soviet Congresses of
114
Stakhanovite Workers) ; at the same time the team was designated
116a national model. J In the final quarter of 1950, 678 model
teams and over 7,600 advanced workers, 92 advanced shops and 123
advanced staff sections had been designated in Shenyang, though
116
there was an increased accident rate of 0.9%•
In January 1951 the Ma Heng-chang team issued a challenge to 
the whole country^^ and this gave rise to a movement designed to 
catch up with and surpass its achievements. Throughout the early 
part of 1951 the press published a mass of statistics showing the 
numbers of teams who had accepted Ma Heng-chang's challenge. By 
March 1008 teams in P e k i n g , 244 teams in Shanghai^^ 583
1 ?ntextile mill teams in various parts of the country had taken up
the challenge, and in some places municipal general labour unions
convened conferences of teams who were in competition with the Ma
121Heng-chang team. By the end of June 11,159 teams had accepted 
122the challenge. In the course of this movement Ma Heng-chang
123reported several times to Chairman Mao ^ and achieved a 
reputation as great as many an old Central Committee member.
After such a sudden rise to fame Ma Heng-chang fell ill from
124 ✓overwork in August 1950 (though he modestly attributed his
125illness to an old complaint) ^ and did not return to work until 
April 1951. He was, therefore, spared the gruelling life of many 
of the other model workers (of less prestige than himself).
MProtect the Model Workersn
Various articles appeared in the press throughout 1951
complaining about the excessive duties of model workers. It
would appear that, up to a certain point, a model worker gained
in prestige amongst the workers as he achieved new production
records, but beyond that point his prestige might decline sharply.
126The case of Juan K'ai-li illustrates this point most clearly.
During the ‘Red May1 production drive of 1950 when the New Record
• 127Movement was extended to Shanghai, ' Juan put forward a number of 
rationalisation proposals that made it possible for his mill to 
double its monthly steel output. His prestige became very great 
and he was elected as a delegate to the National Congress of Model 
Workers and Combat Heroes held in Peking. Upon his return, his
work mates went on to increase steel output three fold (as 
compared with the output figures prior to the 'Red May1) hut Juan 
had very little to do with this achievement, since a large part of 
his time was spent attending meetings (only some of which could be 
classified as involving the spreading of advanced experiences.
Within the mill, Juan's concurrent duties were to act as a 
team leader, a member of the factory labour union committee, a 
member of production committees, and a member of the factory 
management committee. He was required to carry out the duties of 
a Party propagandist and to serve as deputy director of the 
factory committee for the suppression of counter revolutionaries. 
Outside the mill, Juan served as a worker delegate to the 
Shanghai Peoples Congress, was Vice Chairman of the Consultative 
Council of his ward and was required to serve as representative 
to meetings of his residential district. The number of meetings 
he had to attend was very great indeed. They included various 
meetings called by management, the mill workers and staff 
congress, meetings of the labour union committee, propagandists' 
meetings, mill management committee meetings, meetings of local 
government at residential district, ward and city level, meetings 
called by the Shanghai General Labour Union and the Shanghai 
Metal Workers Union and forums called to launch each mass
A p O
movement in the political and economic sphere. In addition, 
he was required to address other organisations on subjects such 
as conducting propaganda concerning current affairs, the 
enlistment of young workers in training institutions for military
cadres, the movement against the American rearming of Japan, the
suppression of counter revolutionaries and national celebrations
129such as February 7th and July 1st. J
These meetings involved one third of his working time and 
almost all of his spare time. On one occasion he had to 
participate in a series of meetings after his twelve hour shift 
which lasted until the beginning of the next shift. From December 
19^9 to Kay 195^ he averaged 3-5 hours sleep per day and sometimes 
fell asleep at work. Each month he was given five injections of 
glucose to keep him going. He complained that he felt dizzy at 
work and spent most of his working time thinking about what to say 
at meetings.
As a consequence, the production of his team fell below that
of other teams and his prestige declined. Workers jeered at him,
declaring that 'He was a model in attending meetings'. He was
therefore "alienated from the masses" and useless as a model
worker. The Shanghai Party newspaper, Chieh-fang Jih-pao,
declared that the case of Juan was not an unusual one. The
newspaper carried out a survey and found that almost all model
workers complained of too many duties and this shortened their
life as models. Chieh-fang Jih-pao noted a general decline in the
prestige of model workers and a tendency for workers to hold them
in comtempt as they manifestly did not continue to live up to their
initial records. The slogan 'Protect the model workers' was 
131advanced. ^
There were two possible answers to this problem. Either the
whole ideal of labour models could be given up, or the number of
labour models greatly increased so that the duties of the few
would not be so burdensome and the whole process fall into
disrepute. In mid 1951 Li Li-san sharply criticised the tendency
for model workers to get bogged down in meetings and repeated the
call that production competitions should become "a regular form
of labour and a regular form of life for the broad masses of the
workers". He condemned most strongly worker sectarianism (which
may have been partially the result of production competitions)
132and advocated collective heroism instead of individual merit. ^
During 1951 the' number of model workers multiplied, which was
partly a reflection of the fact that the number of workers
involved in production competitions went up from 683*000 in 1950
to 2,380,000 in 1951* rising to 80% of all workers in the second
half of 1952,^^ but was also a reflection of the fact that the
best way to protect model workers from excessive attendance at
meetings was to multiply their number. By 1951 over 86,500
134-model workers had been designated. ^
Conclusion
Both wage reform and the development of production 
competitions shifted the focus of incentive policy from the group 
to the individual. The former led to divisiveness, which was 
sharply attacked during the Great Leap Forward. The latter, 
however, whilst cultivating individual heroes, was ultimately 
dependent upon the group as the competing unit. Even Ma Heng- 
chang would have been very little vd.thout his team. In the latter
case sectarianism was probably a more serious shortcoming than 
individual discord.
One cannot however create an individual ethos overnight, 
especially when ideological prescriptions condemned 
"individualism" as a bourgeois phenomenon. Just as one may 
contrast an egalitarian ethos which resulted from circumstance 
and "egalitarianism" which was the product of conviction, so one 
may contrast the individual focus of incentive policy during this 
period with a desire for individual betterment at the expense of 
other individuals. Similarly, as an egalitarian ethos may change 
into an egalitarian conviction, so an individually-focused 
incentive policy may change into what was described as "bourgeois 
individualism".
Underlying all the many contradictions we have discussed, 
between the desire for control and the establishment of a staff- 
line system, between the desire for systematisation in grading 
and the prescription of higher wages for line management, between 
the level of technical education and the development of piecework 
and between the fostering of model workers and a desire to 
propagate their experiences, there existed a contradiction that 
determined all the others - the contradiction between policy and 
resources.
If there were not enough skilled foremen, staff-line systems 
could not be implemented; if there were insufficient criteria for 
evaluating the required political qualities of line management,
there could not be a unified grading scheme for both staff and
135 .
line, if facilities were inadequate for training workers, 
piecework systems would not get off the ground and if there were 
insufficient model workers, the few would be overburdened to the 
point of causing alienation between them and the many. In the 
period under review one may trace the steady growth of these 
resources but it was not until after the First Five Year plan was 
under way after 1953 that the various elements of the prescribed 
Soviet model began to be implemented really effectively, and only 
after some experience in its implementation could one determine 
what elements were in contradiction because of inadequate 
resources and what elements were intrinsically in contradiction 
with what Mao and the Party considered to be creativity and 
rationality.
In this early period the Soviet model prescribed the 
integrated hierarchy of values and ends against which rationality 
might be evaluated. After 1954-* when elements of that model 
(such as one-man management) were seen to be intrinsically 
unsuited to higher political goals, rationality began to be 
measured in a sense that was only partially totalist, since the 
hierarchy of ends and values began to disintegrate. In the field 
of incentive this took the form in 1958 of the rejection of what 
was considered to be an excessively individualist incentive 
policy, which was said to be only necessary when the consciousness 
of workers was low. At that time the primacy of the group was 
asserted both in the field of material and non-material incentive. 
In the field of organisation we attempted to create a matrix in
234
terms of staff-line/functional systems integrated technologically 
or ideologically. In the field of incentive one night create a 
similar matrix: between natorial and moral incentive in their 
individual and group dimensions. In the early 1950s the 
proscribed direction was from group to individual dimensions, 
with material incentive occupying a prominent position. In 1950 
■the proscribed direction was from individual to group dimensions, 
with moral incentive occupying a higher place than before (see 
figure 12). Nevertheless, Just as non-material incentive 
occupied a significant place in the early 1990s, so material 
incentive continued to occupy an important place throughout the 
•..•hole history of tho Chinese Peoples Republic.
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CHAPTER SIX FLAMING AND ACCOUNTING
The focus of this essay is sociological and political rather 
than economic. It seeks to examine the prescriptions of the 
Soviet model of organisation and incentive that was applied to 
China in the early 1950s and the effect of this model on 
authority relationships within the Chinese industrial enterprise. 
Nevertheless, in discussing an organisation which was defined 
according to the economic accounting system and of which the 
raison d'etre was economic, it would be quite wrong to avoid 
economic problems. This chapter therefore will attempt to 
summarise that portion of secondary economic material that has a 
bearing on the major concern of this essay and will examine four 
questions directly relevant to the themes of democracy and 
authority; the involvement of workers in the discussion of plans, 
the relationship between a stress on output targets and the 
development of bureaucratism, the effect of tight controls on the 
conception of legality and the bureaucratic consequences of the 
adoption of the "economic accounting system". We shall be 
constantly aware of the contradiction between policy and resources 
that has figured so large in the previous discussion and 
especially on the contradiction between the levels of skill on 
the shop floor and the provisions of a detailed system of 
planning and accounting.
The Establishment of Control and Planning Organs
In chapter four we saw that the establishment of control 
tended to take precedence over the implementation of any 
prescribed form of organisation. In the period following
liberation, functional patterns of control were employed because 
they were the most appropriate in a situation of scarce 
managerial talent and low level of skills at the basic level.
In the field of planning, the need to establish control resulted 
in the early creation of a banking system with very great powers 
and the promulgation of detailed regulations for physical 
control, such as those discussed in chapter three, because they 
were felt to be most appropriate in a situation of price and 
currency instability and where the supply situation fluctuated. 
The establishment of a planning network was to take much longer.
The Peoples Bank of China, which was set up on November 18th
194-8 , was an extremely important control organ and has remained
so throughout the past twenty two years. It is the one organ of
government that has remained highly centralised throughout the
history of the Chinese Peoples Republic, even at times when other
financial organs, such as the Ministry of Finance, were 
2
decentralised. The establishment of the Peoples Bank was 
followed by a series of regulations limiting the amount of money 
in circulation. Following the registration of assets, every 
enterprise was required by law to open a bank account and to 
deposit with the bank all cash over three days' normal 
expenditure (or in the case of enterprises in places where there 
was no branch of the bank, one month's normal expenditure).^
The bank was expected to have a complete picture of the opera­
tions of every enterprise in the country and to practise strict
Zl
financial control. It was to ensure that the financial 
operations of enterprises were in accordance with the
stipulations of the state plan, to make deductions for 
industrial and commercial tax, to control the amount of above- 
plan profit that might be retained by the enterprise for 
investment purposes and to control the amount authorised for 
retention as working capital or in the form of bonus funds, 
welfare funds, etc. The bank was also empowered to make loans 
for purposes of capital construction, though until 1953 these 
were channelled through central ministries and only made directly 
to enterprises after that year.^ In 1954- a Peoples Construction 
Bank was set up which took over much of this function.''7
We have already considered the measures that were taken in 
the North East in early 1950 to ensure physical control over 
lower level industrial operations. The tightness of such control 
meant that operational plans were of extremely short duration 
(10 days), due to the fact that the New Record Movement was in
o
danger of running out of control.
Plans of longer duration had been in existence, however,
since the end of 194-7* when the first annual construction and
financial plan for the North East was put forward.^ In the years
which followed, annual planning became more and more important,
especially after the currency situation became stable and prices
were brought under control. In 195^ a regional planning
10commission for the North East was set up and this was followed
in 1952 by the establishment of a State Statistical Bureau
11(kuo-chia t'ung-chi-chtQ and a State Planning Commission 
(kuo-chia chi-hua wei-ydan-hui) in preparation for the First
1?Five Year Plan which began in 1953* The priority given to the
establishment of a planning network was reflected in the fact
that, on its establishment in November 1932, the State Planning
Commission was given status equal to the Government Affairs
1 ^
Council (the cabinet), ^ which meant that its head, Kao Kang, who
had been transferred from the North East, enjoyed status in the
formal government apparatus equal to the Premier, Chou En-lai
(though his status in the Party organisation remained lower)
1SIt was only after the Kao-Jao case ^ that the State Planning
Commission was brought under the newly-created State Council
16
(kuo-wu-yflan) (1954-) and made subordinate to the Premier.
The Scope and Duration of Plans
The aim was to create an integrated Soviet-type planning 
network, but here as in other areas the contradiction between 
policy and resources was a glaring one. So long as allocation 
problems restricted the proportion of the market supply of 
products controlled by the state, the scope of planning would be 
restricted. By 1952 only 28 commodities were distributed by the 
state in a "unified” manner, rising to 96 in 1 9 5 3 ? compared with
Sv
17 7
over 1500 in the Soviet Union, ' and in 1953 only 195 categories
18appeared on the planned product list. Planning was frustrated
19by wide cost disparities between sections of the same industry y
and a continuing erratic relationship between planned and actual
20output due to supply difficulties. Annual targets continued to
have a limited operational significance right through into the
period of the First Five Year Plan and in 1953 overall production
21targets were revised three times in one year. In the view of
one economist who has written on this subject, Dwight Perkins, 
such a situation was inevitable in a situation of under develop­
ment where more sophisticated planning techniques on the whole
22were not very important.
As a result of supply difficulties, annual plans often
appeared quite late in the year. Even though general control
figures might be set as early as August and September of the
previous year, some seven to nine months might elapse before a
23definitive plan went into operation. ^ Such a situation led to
the phenomenon of "storming" which has always been a bugbear of
24-Soviet management. In situations where only the latter part of
the year is covered by definitive targets the pace tends to speed
up towards the end of the year, with a deleterious effect on
quality of production and worker morale. Overtime becomes
common and difficulties occur in adhering to wage targets. In
China during the New Democratic period, this phenomenon seemed to
25be most marked m  the construction industry, ^ which is quite
understandable in a period of rapid rehabilitation of industrial
plant. Many articles appeared in industrial journals condemning
tardiness in putting plans into operation and regulations were
imposed governing the amount of permitted overtime. In September
1950, for example, the North East Industrial Department limited
overtime to two hours per day and 4-8 hours per month and demanded
27that unions check that this regulation was adhered to. ' It was,
however, frequently violated. Sometimes workers' rest days were
28taken up by production duties and workers were occasionally
coerced into working extra shifts in connection with movements 
such as the Korean War donation drive.^ Complaints about such 
practices continued throughout the period. Such a problem could 
not be tackled effectively by dealing only with the symptoms 
(overtime, etc.) when the root cause was tardiness in planning 
due to supply difficulties, exacerbated by continuing warfare and 
military blockade.
Planning and the Participatory Conception of Democracy
It was not only irregular supplies and the rudimentary
nature of planning that caused the late publication of annual and
quarterly plans. Another important factor which caused delay was
the requirement that workers should be involved in the process of
planning. The formulation of plans was ideally to proceed
according to a formula of ’’two down and two up”. The relevant
ministry, industrial department or management bureau would issue
control figures which were sent down to the enterprise. The
enterprise would then work these figures into a draft plan which
would be sent back to the higher level. After making necessary
amendments the higher level would send down the plan once again,
whereupon the enterprise would organise detailed discussion of its
provisions and draw up concrete work plans for each of its
subdivisions (staff departments, shops, sections, etc.). Finally
the resulting documents would be sent back to the higher level
for final approval. This whole process might, in the case of an
annual plan, take as long as eight months and involve a
50tremendous amount of discussion.
In the early period following liberation, factory management
committees were required to discuss and approve plans submitted
31to them by the FGM. When the committee system was effective, 
workers would be represented on the factory management committee 
where matters of importance were deliberated on and discussion at 
shop, section or team level concerned detailed problems of 
implementation according to detailed sub-divisions worked out by 
the standing committee in its daily head-knocking sessions.^
The decline of factory management committees which directly 
represented workers’ interests could lead to two possibilities. 
Either the discussion of all workers’ interests would now be 
conducted at shop, section or team level with the result that 
such discussion would become inordinately long, or the discussion 
of detail at lower levels would proceed as before, with important 
questions settled by senior management. This latter course gave 
rise to criticisms of "bureaucratism". ^
In solving this problem, the role of the Party organisation
was crucial. The Party organisation was required to ferret out
34-all ideological obstacles in the way of plan fulfillment^ and to
35keep management informed about worker opinion.  ^ It was on the 
one hand to control any tendency towards bureaucratic ism on the
part of management and on the other to educate the workers as to
36 . .their role in completing plans. In performing a liaison
function between management and workers the Party organisation
was to steer a middle course between acting as the representative
of the workers and an agent of management which might invest
administrative commands with moral force. The tendency towards
the latter end of the above spectrum will be the main theme of 
chapter eight.
By 1953 the slogan "the state plan is law" had been advanced 
and the educative role of plan discussion was given particular 
stress. The process of "education" was, however, as time 
consuming as the process of consultation. The Anshan Iron and 
Steel Corporation, for example, submitted its 1953 draft labour 
plan to the Ministry of Heavy Industry at the end of 1952 and 
this was sent back to the corporation with the demand that the 
planned total number of employees should be reduced by 10,000,
An amended plan could only be sent back once the various 
departments in this huge industrial complex had been mobilised to 
carry out discussion and education on the need to reduce the 
planned number of personnel. This procedure took a considerable 
amount of time and it was not until much later that the planned 
figure for personnel reduction was worked out at 10,288, with a 
corresponding planned rise in the labour productivity rate. A 
summary of the planning process was not published until October, 
when the corporation reported that by the end of the year the 
total number of employees would be 2,067 less than the revised 
plan approved by the ministry.^1
To evaluate the precise relationship between consultation 
and education in plan discussion, and indeed how democratic the 
whole process was, one must be in a position to examine not only 
the discussion of amended plans during the second "down" stage 
but also the discussion of the initial control figures sent down
"by the higher levels, for it would he in this first stage that 
matters of principle were considered. Articles on the discussion 
of plans, however, seem to deal almost exclusively with the 
second, "down” stage and were published for the guidance of cadres 
engaged in organising discussion.
Perhaps the main reason why discussion of the first stage
of the planning process was not described in industrial journals
lies in the fact that such discussion might contain material
classified as "economic secrets". We noted in chapter one that a
particular concern with economic secrets was manifested as early
as 194-9 and some managers went so far as to advocate not informing
workers about the planning process, though such advocacy was
sharply criticised. During the Three and Five Anti movements at
the end of 1951 and beginning of 1952 the "theft of economic
38secrets" was considered to be a major crime, and some former
capitalists then employed as managers in the state sector were
accused of utilising information gained by virtue of their new
position to help private concerns which were still under their
3q
own or their relatives control. ' Although a restriction on the 
publication of planning information would not do much to rectify 
this, it would at least restrict the amount of information 
directly accessible to the private sector and to other sections of 
the state sector eager for their share of scarce resources. The 
"up" and "down" process of planning was very similar to the 
process whereby official documents (such as the Party and state 
constitutions) were approved and it is significant that although 
examples of these have found their way out of China, as far as I
know, no similar economic document has emerged. I suspect that
one will only he in a position to examine the discussions of
initial control figures once one can talk to former managers in a
way similar to Joseph Berliner, who was able to construct a
4-0detailed picture of Soviet management from interviews.
It is my impression that as the planning system took shape
after very little worker initiative entered into the first
stage of plan formulation. The slogan the "state plan is law" was
taken very seriously and any attempt to alter control figures
seems to have been resisted. In his report on the activities of
the Party branch at the model Wu. San factory, the Party secretary
Liu Shih-hua is quite unequivocal:
"There can be no disagreement, amendments (to the plan) or 
lowering (of targets). This is because the state plan is law.
It is sacred and may not be violated. It is the concrete 
manifestation of the Party’s policy for industrial production 
within the factory. If it is amended, this could affect the 
whole (nation's) economic construction and national 
industrialisation,
After the liberation of Shanghai it had been possible in a
few cases for workers to take the initiative in determining not
only planned targets, but what factories should produce. After
the take over of the Shanghai factory of the Coca Cola Company,
for example, workers were in a position to resist a demand that
production be switched to making confectionary and to demand that
4-2the machines be used for producing soy bean sauce. Three years 
later worker initiative had been restricted to matters of 
operational detail.
Figure 13 shows in some detail a scheme put forward in 1952 
by the Machine Industry Management Bureau of the North East 
Industrial Department, ^ for discussing the formulation of the 
two major enterprise level plans. These two plans were the 
production, technical and financial plan and its technical 
counterpart the plan for technical and organisational measures, 
which provided the basis for the drawing up of concrete work 
plans (tso-yeh chi4»-bua) , which have already been mentioned.
Figure 13 shows who was to take the initiative in formulating a < 
particular plan (level 1), what other staff departments it should 
discuss this plan with (level 2), the name of the plan (level 3)» 
who was required to discuss the terms (level 4), the resulting 
plans at shop, section and team level (level 3)* the incorporation 
of these partial plans into the production, technical and 
financial plan and the plan for organisational and technical 
measures (level 6) and plans and contracts deriving from these 
two key plans (level 7)* Intermediate guarantees might be 
formulated in the form of joint contracts and patriotic compacts 
(level 3) and these will be discussed in chapter seven. The 
whole process was to be supervised by the Party, union and Youth 
League organisation, who were to involve themselves actively in 
the formulation of a collective contract which tied the 
stipulations of the plan to working conditions, agreed wage 
rates, etc. It would be difficult to imagine how such a scheme, 
which demanded a considerable degree of coordination, could deal 
with anything other than matters of detail.
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Priority of Targets and the Growth of Conservatism
Policy demanded that workers participate in basic level 
management and yet the growth of a planning system restricted the 
scope of their participation to matters of detail* Similarly, 
policy .demanded that management give full vent to their creativity 
and yet the nature of the planning system resulted in what was 
described as "conservatism”.
In chapter three we saw that during the New Record Movement,
ten norms were prescribed. Of these, policy assigned priority to
the quality norm, though in fact output norms tended to carry the
greater weight, with the result that waste increased. As attempts
were made to spread the planning network over the whole country,
twelve targets became mandatory. Five of these were physical
targets; output, total number of employees, trial manufacture of
new products, total number of employees at end of the year and
certain technical-economic norms. The remainder were money
targets; gross value of output, cost reduction rate, cost
reduction quota, total wage bill, average wage, labour productiv­
ely
ity rate and profits. The most important of these targets
tended to be in practice the gross value of output, which in the
opinion of Perkins was determined by the very nature of materials
balance planning, since funds for future investment and bank
loans were dependent upon the gross output value target to the
4-5detriment of other targets. ^
In chapter five I argued that it took some time to determine 
what elements of the Soviet model were inherently contradictory
and what were temporary contradictions caused by shortages of the
necessary resources, and it was not until 1 95 7 that published
accounts appeared indicating that the excessive stress on output
targets was due to systemic causes. In that year, the stress on
the gross output value target was vehemently attacked by the
economist Sun Yeh-fang (subsequently labelled as "revisionist"),
who argued that it had nothing to do with value and was merely an
4-6accounting device for measuring physical volume. The primacy of 
this gross output value target led to considerable waste, which 
Schurmann argues was one of the main reasons for the period 
drives to increase production and practise economy (which began in 
1 9 5 1), with the stress always on the second half of the slogan.^ 
Despite these drives, however, there remained a tendency to
48overlook waste and high costs in the modern sector of industry.
During the New Democratic period many articles appeared
criticising the neglect of other targets and the tendency for
management to take increased production as the sole success 
4 .0
indicator, y but such a practice was not described as due to
systemic causes. Such a practice led not only to waste but also
50to "conservative thinking". Management was unprepared to
switch to new products that required a trial period of
manufacture or which required modification of equipment, because
51such actions would slow down the rate of production. A second 
tendency was to concentrate solely on overall output figures 
without attempting to break them down into their constituent 
parts. In the sector controlled by the Ministry of Heavy 
Industry during the period January-April 1953* for example, the 
overall production figure was in excess of the plan, but when 
these figures were broken down it was found that in January 54%
of enterprises had not met their targets, in February 4-5%,
March 30% and April 4-6%.^ Such a practice concealed 
inefficiency.
'’Conservatism" in this sense indicated a reluctance to 
listen to any new ideas in pursuing a success indicator easily 
measurable by higher echelons. In such a situation rationalisa­
tion proposals would not be listened to since they would require 
testing. One might well argue that the stress on output targets 
contributed to the isolation of management from workers and was a 
contributory factor in the growth of bureaucratism. It is 
significant therefore that when the Great Leap Forward was 
launched, the even greater stress on output targets was 
accompanied by an unprecedented stress on technical innovation 
and getting management on to the shop floor.
Controls and the Growth of Illegalitv
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The primary mechanism of physical control was the centralised
system of allocating raw materials, machinery, etc., which was
backed up by formal contracts between enterprises selling and
purchasing these materials.  ^ In 1950 such contracts were seen
by Kao Kang to be essential prerequisites for the establishment
54-of a planning system. Physical control was also exercised by
the formal control apparatus and the statistical system. As has
been indicated, the main instrument of financial control was not
financial targets as such, but controls over the sources and use
55of enterprise funds exercised by the banking system.^ Such 
controls seem only to have been moderately effective. Just as
the provisions for a responsibility system that were laid down
for the North East in early 1950 were violated to such an extent
that a new campaign was launched in 1 9 5 3 » so provisions for
controls over planning did not prevent a situation where, during
the Three Anti Movement, enterprise managers came under attack
for attempting to turn state enterprises into private concerns.^
Nor did such controls prevent new supply problems developing in
the wake of the Three Anti Movement, resulting from the removal
of large numbers of people in supply departments who had been
57accused of graft.
Even after the Three Anti Movement, enterprise managers
continued to break through the rigid controls that were imposed
58upon them by delaying payment and purchasing on credit. Such
activities were technically illegal, though insignificant
compared with the charges that were made during the Three Anti
Movement. One commentator on Soviet management, David Granick,
has pointed out that the one area in which Soviet and American
managers are similar lies in their ability to break the law to
get things done. In fact Granick goes so far as to say that the
only way in which Soviet managers could achieve what was expected
of them in the period of very rigid controls was to break the 
5 0
law.  ^ Economic law breaking was always much easier m  China
than in the Soviet Union because there was always a substantial
section of top Party leadership who winked at people who
60disregarded unreasonable regulations. This difference may well 
stem out of a different conception of the role of law in the two 
countries, but more probably it reflected growing disatisfaction
with the inflexibility of the Soviet model. In the period prior 
to 1 9 5 3 , however, there was probably a greater concentration on 
the need to adhere to state regulations on the part of senior 
Party personnel than later. By the second quarter of 1934, 
however, despite the regulation of 1950 prohibiting the obtaining 
of credit from sources other than the Peoples Bank, 17.2% of the 
total working capital of enterprises under the five industrial 
ministries derived from illegal sources (such as other 
enterprises)
We have seen that the overwhelming emphasis in this early 
period was on getting production moving again and the pragmatic 
approach to problems that characterised the New Democratic Period 
meant that, when necessity demanded it, certain features of the 
Soviet model, such as the provision of one-man management systems 
of command and the introduction of piecework, were postponed. It 
is understandable therefore that once what were felt to be serious 
cases of law breaking were dealt with in the movements of late 
1951 and early 1 9 5 2 , minor infractions would not be considered 
all that seriously. In a situation where the establishment of 
contracts was seen primarily as precursors of an effective 
planning system and only secondly as guarantees of plan fulfill­
ment, one would not expect to find that curiously ambivalent
attitude towards the "fixers" (tolkachi) that characterised
6?Soviet management at the time. In the Soviet Union the insti­
tution of the "fixer" arose out of a highly bureaucratised plan­
ning apparatus where someone was needed to cut through red tape. 
The flexibility of planning during these early years in China when
managers were able to conclude supply and sales contracts fairly 
freely, probably meant that such a role was unnecessary. Even 
during the middle 1950s when tea-house transactions and the 
activities of unofficial brokers began to resemble Soviet 
practice, enterprises were able to employ purchasing agents 
quite legally. ^
The Economic Accounting System
The term ’’enterprise" was defined according to the
"economic accounting system" (ching-chi ho-suan chih). A state
run industrial enterprise was that unit of industry which
maintained its own bank account and which enjoyed a certain
degree of autonomy in the use of funds either allocated by the
state or borrowed from the bank in accordance with the
stipulations of the state plan. In the Soviet Union the economic
accounting system (khozraschgt) originated at the time of the New
Economic Policy, when the basic economic accounting unit was more
frequently the horizontally integrated "trust" than the much
64smaller enterprise. We have seen that m  China following 
liberation, trust-like organisations were occasionally advocated 
though the prescribed form of basic level organisation in the
North East, which provided a model for the rest of the country,
66was usually a unit of one factory, ^ except in the case of 
vertically integrated corporations. The economic accounting 
status of constituent elements of corporations is by no means 
clear.^
The economic accounting system was interpreted in primarily 
Stalinist, as opposed to NEP, terms, although Chinese material
explaining the economic accounting system described the NEP 
version in some detail and spelled out the contradiction between 
central planning and self reliance (tzu-li k e n g - s h e n g )^? which 
was fought out in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and was to 
become salient in China in the middle 1950s. The Stalinist 
version of economic accounting was something much more than mere
CO
cost control. It included almost everything that would be
described in the West as business management and represented the
whole operational side of the planning system within the 
6°enterprise. ' Franz Schurmann has discussed in great detail the 
fluctuation within China of economic accounting defined as such
and defined merely as a method of providing success indicators
70 . . . .measurable in monetary terms. This latter definition, which
was advanced in the early 1960s, was associated with those 
"revisionists” who advocated a return to something more like a 
market economy.^ In the early 1950s, however, the term 
"economic accounting system" was inextricably associated with the 
planning system.
The first step in the implementation of the system was the
registration of assets, which was the responsibility of the
various take over organs and proceeded immediately after
liberation. This was no mean task in a situation of regional
72price variations and currency instability. Following the
registration of assets, directives were issued calling for the
establishment of economic accounting systems, which was described
75as the "central task of management"r ^  in a situation where waste 
was considerable. In chapter three we saw that the order of
priorities underwent some change during the course of the New
Record Movement and after early 1950 control was given greater
priority than mobilisation. Writing in February 1950, Cheng
Hung-su noted considerable success in implementing the economic
74accounting system m  the North East, though in the light of the
scathing criticism of waste made by Kao Kang in the autumn of 
751951, one might perhaps qualify Cheng's enthusiasm.
Articles explaining the system went to great pains to
demonstrate that the prescribed view of an industrial enterprise
was of an organisation that took as its objective "the rational
76pursuit of profit"; it was not a "yamen". Fixed capital and
part of working capital was part of the state budget and the
remainder of working capital was to derive from bank loans or
ploughed back profits. Once fixed and working capital was
determined, the enterprise was to act independently in pursuit of
77planned targets. r Within the enterprise, control mechanisms 
were set up as part of the system, of which the most important 
was an independent accountant system^ which gave the accountant 
the right to examine and supervise accounts without interference 
from line management or staff departments. The economic 
accounting system included a system for periodic planning, 
procedures for the acceptance of draft plans, inspection systems, 
the accounting of purchases, the storage and requisition of 
materials and the submission of accounts for approval. Systems 
for the periodic submission of statistics, the determination of 
norms, cost calculation and book keeping, the accounting of goods 
in transit pending sale and regular summaries of work done were
established. Also included under the rubric "economic accounting 
were provisions for establishing the rights of creditors and 
liquidation of debts and a system for strengthening labour
nq
discipline and planishing cadres.
Though the main elements of the economic accounting system 
described above were the provision of systems for accounting 
production purchases and sales, the scope of definition was wide 
enough to be coterminus with management itself. In that it 
concerned itself with labour discipline and punishing cadres, 
the system had a very significant political as well as economic 
dimension. The close association of graft, waste and bureau­
cratism which were the "three Antis" of 1959* existed right 
from the time of liberation.
In that the economic accounting system embraced the whole 
of management, the various contradictory elements in the Soviet 
model that have been discussed had inevitably an effect on the 
working of this system. An obvious contradiction was between 
the demands of one-man management and that accounting be 
practised at all levels in an enterprise and the role of the 
accountant as an independent control officer. Where one-man
management was effective, the role of the accountant was
80circumscribed and it was not until the early 1960s that he
eventually came into his own and was in an effective position to
81refuse the payment of unauthorised funds. A more important 
contradiction, however, resulted from the low level of education 
of junior line management. In 1950 cadres were instructed to be
264
flexible in implementing the economic accounting system and not 
to copy everything from the Soviet Union regardless of the
o p
concrete situation. At the same time a large amount of
material appeared in the press describing in considerable detail
the operation of khozraschgt in the Soviet Union.^ Articles
demanded that economic accounting be practised not only at
enterprise and shop level but also at work section team level and
84-at the level of the individual worker, and all production
activities be expressed prominently and clearly in charts (piao-
85pao). ^ This involved a considerable amount of paperwork and 
depended for its success on the existence of an adequate system 
for communicating statistics.^ It depended even more on a 
literate and highly skilled body of foremen.
We have seen that the one area where foremen were probably 
least competent was in the construction industry. In examining 
the contradiction between policy and resources therefore, let us 
look at the provisions for team level economic accounting in that 
industry where one would expect the procedures to be the most 
simple.
Economic Accounting at Team Level in the Construction Industry 
In the construction engineering corporation under the 
ministry of Heavy Industry, the highly complex accounting 
procedures were replaced in July 1953 "by a* simplified* 
p r o c e d u r e T h i s  procedure involved the production of an 
'economic accounting handbook1 consisting of 14- forms. Three 
days before the commencement of a particular job of work, the
production order (tiao-tu) team concluded a piecework contract 
with, a team of workers which, was based on the work plan. Four 
copies of this were made, and sent to the work team in question, 
the statistics team, the wages team and the work supervisor/ 
inspector (this latter constituted an engineering work 
allocation form). At the same time the tiao-tu team filled out 
two copies of a form limiting the amount of materials that could 
be drawn (from stores), one copy being sent to the work team in 
question and one to the materials team where it constituted a 
materials allocation form. In addition, the production order 
(tiao-tu) team filled out a tools allocation form according to the 
requirements of the job, and this was forwarded to the tools 
team. In accordance with the allocation form the tools team 
prepared tools and made appropriate entries in a tools 
requisition handbook. After discussion the relevant work 
regulations, quality standards and responsibility systems were 
determined (and entered on paper).
During the course of work, the work team in question could 
draw upon tools held by the tools team by applying a seal to the 
tools requisition handbook. Materials could be acquired when the 
head of the work team applied his seal to the card limiting the 
use of materials for the particular job and the materials 
despatch officer applied his seal to a materials requisition 
form; this procedure would be followed as and when necessary and 
was designed to avoid the situation where teams acquired more 
materials than they actually needed and correspondingly wasted 
them. The leader of the work team was required to keep a daily 
log even when the team was not working, and this would be
submitted daily to the statistics team which would draw up a
'form showing the daily use of labour time1. This form showing
the daily use of labour time would be compared with the work plan
and thus would serve as a guide to the implementation of the
latter. If an accident occurred during the work process, the
safety technician would fill in an accident report form and if a
work stoppage occurred or a situation occurred where work needed
to be repeated, then a statistician would fill in a work stoppage
form or a form showing work having to be done again. . If the
contents of the piecework contract, stipulations regarding
materials' quality or quantity underwent change then the
production order (tiao-tu) department would fill in a 1 document
showing changes in the contract' or fa document showing changes in
80
the stipulations regarding materials1. J
When the work was completed, that is when the work team had 
completed the tasks stipulated in the contract, the work 
supervisor and the technical inspector would inspect the quantity 
of materials used and the quality of the finished work, and would 
fill in a 'slip requesting release of wages upon inspection of 
completed work1. This would be handed to the statistics team and 
the wages team. They would compare the contents of this request 
form with those of the 'form showing the daily use of labour 
time' and a previously completed attendance record, and upon this 
would make payment. After that, all the statistical information 
contained in these various forms would be scrutinised by higher 
levels when determining accounts according to the procedure of 
economic accounting.^
The above was described as a “simplified” procedure and
applied only to team level, One can imagine what might happen
at higher levels when faced with an emergency construction job
and indeed the above description helps us to understand the
growth in the ratio of non-productive to productive personnel
described in chapter four. One may understand too the venom with
which red tape was attacked during the Great Leap Forward, when
there was said to be a 70% reduction in the number of forms used 
91m  planning, and again during the Cultural Revolution.
The account of how economic accounting procedures should be
carried on in the construction industry appeared before the
various articles of late 1953 which expressed disquiet about the
op
general level of skill and literacy of foremen in that industry-' 
and one might suspect that the detailed procedures were rarely 
put into operation. According to the economist Tso Ch'un-t'ai, 
writing in 1958, the lower level economic accounting systems 
were only tried out experimentally m  a few enterprises^ and one 
may well imagine why. There can be no clearer example of the 
contradiction between policy and resources than this.
Conclusion
It was probably in the field of planning and accounting that 
the contradiction between policy and resources was most marked.
In the very early period price fluctuation and currency 
instability^ made the whole process very difficult indeed.
Costs were calculated according to many different methods; they 
were sometimes expressed in single figures for a certain period,
sometimes according to various stages in a production process;
they sometimes related to each hatch of finished products and
sometimes separate sets of figures existed for each product made
05
by a particular f a c t o r y . I t  was difficult to unify the whole 
process and flexibility was the order of the day.
At a higher level sophisticated planning techniques were 
probably not very important and at a lower level the detailed 
provisions of Soviet planning and accounting could have little 
relevance in a situation where levels of skill and literacy were 
low. Nevertheless, some of the problems that writers on Soviet 
management have noted, such as storming and stress on output, 
became quite marked during this period.
In this early period attempts were made to involve the 
workers in the discussion of plans but many factors militated 
against this - notably the sheer complexity of planning and the 
need to shorten the process of plan formulation.
During this early period it was probably difficult to see to 
what extent elements of the Soviet model were inherently 
irrational (in terms of its own goals) and to what extent 
problems were caused by the low level of technical resources that 
existed in China. By the mid 1950s such a distinction became 
possible. The reaction which followed had two dimensions. The 
first reaction, which became systematised in the early 1960s, was 
subsequently criticised as revisionist. It advocated less stress 
on central planning and more autonomy located at the level of the
FGM, who would he subject to a greater degree of market
Qfs
control.' The second reaction, that of the Great Leap Forward, 
advocated less stress on central planning and the location of a 
greater degree of autonomy at levels higher than that of the 
FGM (province and municipality)(Schurmann’s decentralisation 
11)°^ and lower than that of the FGM (shops and t e a m s ) w i t h  
the whole process ideally linked by a Party organisation 
responsive to mass demands.
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CHAPTER SEVEN INTERNAL CONTRACTS AND COMPACTS
We Have considered so far the various elements of the 
"enterprisation" process individually. We shall now turn to the 
process whereby all these elements were brought together into 
formal documents which specified the responsibilities of 
individuals and units, laid down concrete wage scales and bonus 
systems for individual enterprises and integrated these with 
labour regulations and the current plan.
Right from the time of liberation, contracts were drawn up 
within industrial units specifying the rights, privileges and 
duties of management and workers and soon such contracts came to 
include guarantees that specific planned targets would be 
fulfilled. These collective contracts (chi-t'i ho-t’ung) 
varied in their duration and scope and might be anything from a 
charter of employment to a short-term productivity deal. In 
this chapter we shall consider the comprehensive model contracts 
that were propagated in Lushun and Talien in mid 19^9 and their 
transformation into less ambitious documents as they were 
implemented elsewhere. Normally such contracts were concluded 
at enterprise level, though we shall see that sometimes they 
existed at higher and lower levels. Following the argument of 
chapter four that in certain sectors of industry new forms of 
organisation were superimposed on to existing forms of 
organisation, we shall note that this pattern of superimposition 
resulted in a pecul iar kind of contract - the pao-kung 
contract which was to have quite significant political 
implications. Another kind of contract that will be discussed
here is the joint (co-ordination) contract (lien-hsi ho-tung) 
that added a contractual dimension to the network of 
responsibility within the enterprise.
In addition to internal "contracts", we shall consider
the patriotic compact (ai-kuo kung-ytleh). The strict
terminological difference between a contract (ho-tfung) and a
compact (kung-ytleh) lies in the fact that the former is the
product of bargaining between two parties (management and
unions), whereas the latter is an undertaking to fulfil a
1certain obligation which might be unilateral, j In the case of 
the patriotic compact that obligation was, at first, a general 
committment to support the Korean War effort though later the 
patriotic compact became integrated with the planning network.
Annual Collective Contracts
A collective * contract was an agreement between labour
union and management in which both sides agreed on terms of
service, wage scales, production norms, bonus systems, welfare
facilities, working hours, shift organisation and provision for
the day to day settlement of labour disputes. As one might
expect, the earliest examples of such contracts may be found in
the joint Sino-Soviet enterprises in Lushun and Talien and, in
the light of our discussion in chapter three, one might also
expect that such contracts would be highly ambitious and not
suitable for immediate application elsewhere. In appendix 2, I
have summarised one of the more comprehensive contracts that
appeared in the Lushun-Talien area in 19^9* that of the glass
2
factory under the Far East Electronics Bureau.
The Glass Factory contract reflected a situation which
hardly pertained elsewhere. In Lushun and Talien, social
security provisions had already been worked out, production
was relatively stable, wage payment was made to a very large
extent in money terms (though there was still a subsidy
element in wages) and, in th£ glass factory, initial norms had
already been worked out. Nevertheless the glass factory
contract, which was put forward as a model, was rare even for
Lushun and Talien and was concluded only one month after
regulations governing collective contracts were put forward for 
4
that area; only one other factory m  Lushun and Talien, the 
paint works under the same bureau, was able to conclude a 
contract m  so short a time. I know of no industrial unit 
outside Lushun and Talien that was able to conclude a contract 
of such comprehensiveness as the glass factory and even in 
Shenyang where production was rapidly restored and where there 
were many advanced industrial enterprises, it was felt that 
the Lushun-Talien model was too comprehensive and of too high 
a standard to serve as a model for its own collective 
contracts. The contract is summarised in this essay because 
it was a national model, as is made quite clear by some of its 
stipulations (such as those for grade 2 factories) which had 
no relevance for the glass factory and were only appended for 
the guidance of other enterprises basing their own collective 
contracts on the Lushun-Talien model.
Within factories in Lushun and Talien during this early 
period there were usually three important documents at factory 
level upon the basis of which action concerning production,
employment, working conditions and welfare were taken - the
production plan, the collective contract and the internal
factory regulations. The production plan dealt with measures
taken to fulfil the various targets described in chapter six.
The collective contract dealt with production competitions,
wage and bonus payments, guarantees and compensation, working
hours, holidays, labour protection, the disposal of the social
insurance and culture and education funds and the settlement of
labour disputes within the factory. The internal regulations
which usually appeared as an appendix to the contract dealt
with such matters of detail as internal security .regulations,
procedures for requesting leave, procedures on entering and
7leaving the factory, the issue of identity cards, etc.'
These latter two documents were usually combined into one 
but in mid 19^9 the provisions of the collective contract were 
not usually integrated with planned targets. This is probably 
because contracts of the Lushun-Talien type were worked out on 
an annual basis and it is doubtful whether annual plans had 
much operational force at that time within the enterprise; 
furthermore the relevance of annual targets for a contract that 
was concluded in July could not have been very great. For the 
integration of production targets into the terms of the 
contract, the duration of the contract must be coterminous with 
the operational production plan.
The terms of the contract which appear in appendix 2 are 
fairly self explanatory though one point deserves mention here. 
Provision was made in the contract for the establishment of a
conciliation committee (t1 iao-chieh wei-ytLan-hui) and if 
necessary the conveying of arbitration conferences (chung-ts1ai 
hui-i) at a higher level to settle labour disputes. One would
Q
like to know the relationship between the Party, the unions, 
the conciliation committees and the local labour bureau (when
q
established)7 who were all explicitly charged with the 
settlement of internal disputes but I have seen no specific 
account of the process of arbitration and conciliation during 
the period under review.^
Monthly and Bi-monthly Collective Contracts
A more common type of contract employed in the North East
in late 194-9 and thereafter was the monthly or bi-monthly
contract in which the stipulations of the short term
operational plan were written into the terms of the contract.
For example, the collective contract of the Shenyang Third
Machine Building Factory for November and December 194-9 stated
11precisely the planned targets down to the last machine. It 
specified in what way costs were to be reduced and called for 
the establishment of certain management systems such as a 
system of personnel management, a costing system, a statistical 
system, a work schedule system, an inspection system, a system 
of individual responsibility, an accounting system, etc.
Precise stipulations were made concerning the time machines were 
permitted to be in operation (not less than 96% of working time). 
A planned attendance rate was agreed upon (97%)- Provision was 
made for schools and training classes, master apprentice 
contracts, the examination and reassessment of wage grades, 
regulations governing the treatment of rationalisation proposals
and agreements to reduce the injury rate. The Machine Building
Factory also attempted to write into the contract the precise
responsibilities of staff sections involved in planning; thus
an attempt was made to integrate not only planning but also the
system of responsibility into the terms of the contract.
Whereas the Lushun-Talien contract was more like a charter
stipulating terms of service, the Shenyang contract was a cross
between a charter and a productivity deal concluded between
management and unions. Though the Shenyang contract was less
comprehensive than the Lushun-Talien contract it was more
detailed in terms of its immediate goals. The fact that these
short term contracts were an integral part of the planning
procedure and concerned themselves with explicit; production
targets was reflected in the fact that they were sometimes
12called "production contracts".
The short term Shenyang-type contract was much less 
detailed than the Lushun-Talien contract on the question of 
wages and this type of contract was deemed to be appropriate 
for plants where norms and wage scales were still in the process
1 z
of being formulated.  ^ The implication was very clear that, 
in future, longer term contracts such as the Lushun-Talien type 
would become the norm, though in fact the opposite was to be 
the case. As the planning machinery became more consolidated, 
the contracts of the Lushun-Talien type were not to reappear, 
especially since many of their provisions were later taken care
14
of by regional or national agreements (on social security, etc) 
The terms of the contract came more and more to reflect 
specific measures for plan fulfillment.
In the model Wu San Factory the collective contract which
was drawn up quarterly at the same time as the factory work
plan, was described as ”a step in the direction of planned 
15management”. ^ It was a way of linking not only welfare 
provisions with the production plan, hut also of linking 
production tasks with each of the major and minor movements 
that were launched in industry throughout this period. For 
example, in the second, third and fourth quarters of 1951 three 
successive movements were given priority in the industrial 
sphere in the North East. These movements were to improve 
quality control (2nd quarter), to increase production and 
practise economy (3rd quarter) and to strengthen workshop work 
(4th quarter) and provision for each of these was made in the 
three collective contracts concluded by the Wu San Factory 
during these nine months.^
In the Wu San Factory the collective contract had by 1951
almost the force of law. It was seen as a kind of mini
”Common Programme” (the provisional state constitution) for
17Party, management, labour union and Youth League. { Later the
analogy between collective contracts and constitutions became
more explicit and in the 1960s actual ’’constitutions” for
industrial enterprises began to appear, of which the most
famous was that of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company, which was
written by Mao and was said to embody his theory of industrial 
18organisation. In this earlier period, however, collective 
contracts appeared more like productivity deals than 
constitutions, and were explicitly linked to planned targets.
In Cultural Revolution retrospect it would seem that the 
brevity that such contracts gained by the removal of those 
clauses which were covered by regional or national regulations 
was more than compensated for by the growth in the number of 
factory regulations that were appended to them. These were by 
no means inconsiderable in 1949;^ by the time of the Cultural 
Revolution cases were on record of factory regulations which 
consisted of booklets of over 200,000 characters and which 
included strict regulations on everything down to the placing
x. 20of teacups.
Collective Contracts at Sub-factory Level
Normally collective contracts would be concluded only at 
enterprise level, though in the very early period contracts 
were sometimes concluded at lower levels. In the Wu San 
Factory, for example, a mini collective contract existed at 
team level until 195  ^when it was replaced by a team compact 
(hsiao-ststi kung-yfleh) (a kind of patriotic compact which will 
be discussed later in this chapter). This was probably a 
consequence of the process described in chapter four where what 
happened at one level tended to be repeated in miniature at the 
next level down. By 1951* however, the existence of bi­
partite agreements at lower levels was seen to be inappropriate 
and lower level contracts were replaced by patriotic compacts
which reflected the determination of a unit to fulfil certain
22tasks and did not involve bargaining between two parties.
Collective Contracts at Supra-factory Level
Although collective contracts were concluded usually at
enterprise level and contractual agreements between the
enterprise and supply and marketing agencies were quite
separate from the collective contract, some overlap occasionally
occurred. When, for example, it was felt necessary to tie down
some planning or supply agency, a collective contract might be
concluded at a level higher than the individual enterprise.
For example, the Third Machine Building Factory in Shenyang
could get no support for its September 1949 contract from the
Municipal Machinery Bureau. ^ The account does not say why or
in what form this lack of support manifested itself, but one
might imagine that the bureau could not guarantee a supply of
raw materials and was reluctant to ratify an agreement that
might over-commit itself. This problem was dealt with by the
Machinery Bureau initiating a collective contract that covered
a number of factories and which formed the basis for individual
24factories to draw up their own contracts. In such a case the 
freedom of action of unions and management in the individual 
factories was probably considerably restricted.
The imposition of a contract from above was a violation of 
the principle that contracts should be concluded by 
negotiation between union and management at enterprise level. 
Occasionally, however, the situation demanded that contracts be 
concluded at levels above the enterprise and attempts were made 
to secure full consultation and agreement at lower levels. 
Perhaps the most famous example of this was the collective 
contract of the Ch'angch'un Railway network of mid 1951 which 
covered all the workshops and construction units under its 
control.^ The 62 clause contract was only concluded after
eight revisions, nineteen full days of discussion and the 
sifting of 6,074 suggestions which took four months. Such a 
contract seems however to he the exception rather than the 
rule.
Simple Pao-kung Contracts
A major theme of this essay has been the modification of 
the prescribed Soviet model in conditions of inadequate 
resources. The rudimentary nature of planning meant that the 
prescribed Lushun-Talien-type collective contract was not 
implemented very widely. Similarly, the persistence of 
contractual relationships in the construction industry 
combined with a pattern of organisational superimposition to 
produce a special kind of contract, the pao-kung contract.
Like the growth of patterns of functional supervision which 
stemmed from the same causes, the pao-kung contract contained 
clauses very different from the ideal contractual relationships 
stipulated by the Soviet model and exemplified in the Lushun- 
Talien-type contract.
The term pao-kung is extremely difficult to translate. It
is used normally to signify the process whereby a factory
employs workers through an external contractor which in former
days would be some species of gang boss. Such a contract, which
continued to be concluded throughout the 1950s, is an external
contract and is not discussed here. There was however a form of
internal collective contract which also went under the term
pao-kung contract. Such a contract would be concluded in
factories engaged in rehabilitation of plant and undergoing
emergency repairs and represented a transitional stage during
27the process of abolishing the gang boss system. f
Under the old gang boss system, wages and bonuses would be
paid to the gang boss and he would decide on their distribution*
When the gang boss system was abolished in the manufacturing
industries, wage and bonus systems were established whereby the
enterprises paid workers directly without going through any
intermediary* In the construction industry, however, such
systems were as difficult to institute as staff-line systems of
command. When construction work was undertaken by a state
construction corporation, an external pao-kung contract could be
concluded (wai-pao) and workers could be paid directly by the
construction corporation. Such a process was theoretically
very simple, though in practice state construction companies
came under very heavy criticism for graft during the Three Anti 
28Movement. Where construction work was an internal matter, 
however, although wages could now be paid directly to the 
workers, the weak control exercised by the factory for which the 
work was being done in a situation where construction tasks and 
repair tasks were constantly changing meant that an individual 
bonus system was particularly difficult to put into operation. 
Collective bonus systems were introduced, therefore, by which a 
lump sum was made over to a group of workers and divided out 
amongst its members according to criteria which the group 
itself decided.^
In drawing up a pao-kung contract which formalised this 
process, the workers engaged in construction tasks were 
frequently represented not by the labour union, which being of 
an industrial as opposed to a craft nature represented everyone 
within the factory or mine, but by a ’’committee for emergency
repairs” (ch'iang-hsiu wei-ydan-hui) elected by the
30construction workers themselves. Such contracts consisted 
simply of an undertaking by management to provide the 
necessary materials and to make individual payment and 
collective bonus payment in return for the completion of 
specific construction tasks.
Shih-kung Contracts
The simple pao-kung contract was a temporary expedient in 
the period of rapid reconstruction following liberation. In 
chapter four we saw that, in the construction industry, single- 
line gang organisation tended to be replaced by functional 
work-supervision (shih-kung) systems. The existence of such 
systems resulted in a modification of the simple pao-kung 
contract whereby bodies of workers entered into shih-kung 
contracts with the appropriate work supervision department.
In the Chin Hsi Cement Works, for example, an inspection 
was carried out at the end of 1950 when it was found that some 
270 items of construction work had to be undertaken, which was 
more than could be handled by the works basic construction 
department (chi-chien-k1 o) . Production units and technical 
departments were required to provide labour to undertake these 
production tasks, but workers in these units were unwilling to 
involve themselves with building work which they considered was 
not their concern. To overcome this problem cadres and workers 
were deputed from all departments and amalgamated into a 
Construction Engineering Department (Kung-ch1 eng-pu), which was 
divided into a number of specialist sub-departments and teams.
A small amount of the construction work to be undertaken was
contracted out (wai-pao) to an external construction corporation,
and the remainder handed over to this newly formed Construction
Engineering Department, which was required to make plans for
31each item of work.
After plans were formulated stipulating the numbers of 
workers necessary for each construction task, the labour union 
organised the ordinary production workers into teams, each of 
which entered into a shih-kung contract with the relevant sub­
section of the Construction Engineering Department. Such teams 
were placed under the functional leadership of each 
subdivision of the Construction Engineering Department 
responsible for a particular type of construction work at the 
basic level. Bonus payment was paid to the teams according to 
the degree to which they fulfilled the stipulations of the 
shih-kung contract. Because the bonus payments were determined 
by the particular construction Jobs undertaken, such a system 
was called the internal pao-kung piecework system (nei-pao-kung 
chi-chien-chih). ^
The Political Implications of the Pao-kung System
The shih-kung contract was merely a slightly more 
sophisticated version of the simple pao-kung contract and 
formalised the temporary growth of patterns of functional 
supervision in the construction industry during this period.
Its organisational implications are quite clear; its political 
implications, however, are far more interesting.
In concluding normal collective contracts, the workers
were represented by the labour union, whereas in concluding
simple pao-kung contracts, the workers were represented by no-
one and participated directly in the process themselves. As
such the pao-kung contract was praised in 1950 for giving
workers an opportunity to participate in the democratisation of
management.Workers were in a position to divide out the
bonus payment for themselves and were not bound by the union
hierarchy. The official attitude was ambivalent, however, for
warnings were issued that pao-kung contracts did not have
34-universal application^ and the shih-kung contract described 
above represents a step in the direction of greater control over 
the exercise of participatory democracy on the part of the 
workers. In the conclusion of the Chin Hsi shih-kung 
contracts, the role of the union was much greater than in the 
case of a simple pao-kung contract. The process whereby teams 
of workers were formed was described as "proceeding
35spontaneously under the leadership of the labour union"^ and 
whatever degree of spontaneity this implied was much less than 
in the case of a simple pao-kung contract where the role of the 
gang boss was replaced by a committee elected directly by the 
workers. Such a difference in formulation would seem to 
indicate the first stage in a process whereby direct worker 
representation was replaced by indirect union representation 
which, as we have noted, characterised the movement to 
democratise management.
The internal system described above does not seem to have 
survived the beginning of the First Five Year Plan, although
the term remained throughout the 1950s where it indicated an 
external contract. During the Great Leap Forward however, 
internal pao-kung systems were to reappear in a situation where
centralised controls were eased and where the concept of
. . . 35
participatory democracy was reaffirmed.^ Considerable research
needs to be done however before we can determine to what extent
the reappearance of such forms was due to loose control over
labour at the basic level in a situation of rapidly changing
production tasks and to what extent it was due to a belief in
the intrinsically democratic nature of such organisation. From
an economic point of view commentators on pao-kung type
agreements in the early 1950s noted that they led to hurried
planning, material supply problems and a lack of liaison between
3 7
staff departments and teams, ' which were precisely the 
problems encountered in 1958.
The Joint (co-ordination) Contract
One further type of bi-partite agreement that must be
mentioned is the Joint contract (lien-hsi ho-t'ung), which was
designed to achieve co-ordination between the various workshops
and staff departments within the enterprise. Like the
collective contract, Joint contracts appeared immediately after
liberation and were considered to be one of the most important
organisational forms employed during the early stages of the
38
New Record Movement.
The most important stipulations of such contracts 
concerned the quality and quantity of raw materials and semi­
finished products supplied by one part of the enterprise to
another or the frequency of supply. Such contracts were seen to 
he particularly important in effecting co-ordination between the 
various staff departments and production units, who tended to 
focus on different targets (for example, between an accounting 
department concerned with cost reduction and production units 
concerned with gross output) and in preventing wide disparities 
in quality control standards and norms between one part of the
7 , 0
enterprise and another. y
Joint contracts were considered to have a political
significance which it was the duty of the labour unions to 
40propagate. Such contracts were felt to be particularly 
useful in preventing ill feeling between one sub-unit and 
another. For example, in the Shenyang Wool Weaving Mill a 
contract was drawn up between the wool sorting team and the 
wool blending team stipulating the proportion of lumps or small 
broken pieces the former was permitted to send down to the
zm
latter and thus, it was hoped, avoiding mutual recriminations.
Concluding such contracts was one of the first tasks of
fledgling union organisations during the New Record Movement and
such a task was useful in recording on paper how successful the
union was in overcoming tension within factories. Joint
contracts were also seen as useful in developing a responsibility
system, for they specified the responsibilities of one sub-unit
to another, but it was anticipated that they would gradually be
42assimilated into collective contracts.
Contracts and Compacts
The above #arms of internal contract were so called 
because they were the product of negotiation between management 
and union (or emergency repairs committees in the case of simple 
pao-kung contracts)• We shall now consider a different kind of 
document which appeared later than the contracts and was only 
integrated into the planning system in late 195%  the "patriotic 
compact". In fostering such compacts the role of the union was 
not one of workers' representative in negotiations with 
management, but the propagandist of Party and management.
I have so far suggested three factors in work motivation - 
material gain, prestige accruing to model workers and guilt 
deriving from inadequate fulfillment of internalised group 
norms To these a fourth element must be added - patriotic 
fervour. Right from the time of the Yenan Production Movement 
through the movement to support the front during the latter 
stage of the Civil War, an attempt was made to add a patriotic 
dimension to work motivation. The movement to draw up 
patriotic compacts which arose out of the Movement to Resist 
U.S. Agression and Aid Korea in 1951 was, however, more 
sophisticated than these earlier movements in that it attempted 
eventually to integrate patriotic motivation with the systems 
of planning and responsibility.
The Korean War Donation Drive
A donation drive to support the Korean War effort 
commenced in the first half of 1951* During this drive,
individuals, families and units of production, residence and 
administration undertook to donate specific sums of money to 
purchase armaments for Korea. Contracting individuals or groups 
would make a donation plan, J which could he expressed either 
in monetary terms or more probably in terms of armaments. To 
facilitate this, an official conversion table was published as
l\ /;
follows:-
JMP ¥ 5,000 million = 1 bomber
JMP 1 2,500 million = 1 tank
JMP ¥ 1,500 million = 1 figihter aircraft
JMP ¥ 900 million = 1 piece of artillery (field)
JMP ¥ 800 million = 1 anti-aircraft gun.
Every effort was made to achieve identification between the
donating unit and the front and weapons purchased would be
4-5frequently named after the donating unit. ^
The movement was as much political as it was economic. It
aimed to integrate macro-politics with the day to day concerns
4-6of ordinary individuals in much the same spirit m  which
Committees for the Study of Current Affairs took a leading role
in the Democratic Reform Movement. Cadres whose over-zealous
desire to meet donation plan targets resulted in coertion were
vehemently denounced on the grounds that they negated the role
4-7of political education, which was of the utmost importance. '
In the early part of 1951 the donation drive was not 
linked with the process of planning and units of all shapes and 
sizes contracted to make donations. Contracting units might be 
anything from province, municipality or hsien right down through
4-8production team or family to the individual. Such agreements 
might either express a guarantee to make a direct donation or a 
contribution to the war effort through economy and increased 
production. In the latter case, the size of the donating unit 
was very important. The political aims of the donation drive 
would best be served if some degree of congruence could be 
achieved between the donating unit and the group with which the 
individual made the strongest identification. In the case of 
a worker making a direct donation, this unit might well be the 
family, but in the case of an agreement to increase production 
and practise economy in support of the war effort, this group 
would normally be the work team or work section. This was not 
only the unit with which the individual identified in production 
competitions but was also the unit against which activist-guilt 
orientation could be most immediately measured. If the
Zl Q
donating unit were too large, 7 it would be extremely difficult 
to achieve congruence between the various elements of work 
motivation, and if the unit were too small, agreements might cut 
across normal lines of group orientation and control would be 
particularly difficult.
Attempts were made, therefore, to achieve congruence
50between donating units and work units. In Peking, for
example, during the early part of 1951* the donating unit was
often the urban ward (ch^ jl) or a particular segment of society
(business circles, etc.). After May Day, however, attempts
were made to restrict the size of the donating unit in industry
51to the workhop or teanr and the role of Party and government at 
urban ward level changed to a co-ordinating one. Periodic
"Resist American Imperialism and Aid Korea Congresses” were lield
at that level to achieve standardisation in the donation
52movement and to provide some element of competition.
Early Patriotic Compacts
Whereas in early 1951 the size of a donating unit might
vary, patriotic compacts tended to coincide with work units
right from their very inception at the beginning of China's
55involvement m  the Korean War in November 1950. At first such
patriotic compacts did not include the specifications of
donation plans and were just declarations of intention to meet
production targets as a contribution to the war effort, to
maintain vigilance against spies and saboteurs, to conduct
54-patriot ic propaganda* and study current affairs.^ The 
procedure for developing the movement to draw up such compacts 
was exactly the same as that of the Democratic Reform Movement. 
Party and union cadres would organise a general programme of 
denunciation of the pre-liberation crimes of the Japanese and 
American imperialists and then, on the basis of this initial 
mobilisation, the focus of the movement was moved nearer to the 
daily activities of the workers. Off-duty time was used to 
educate workers on the need for such compacts. Porums were held 
at which the compacts of model teams were examined, and these
provided models for the formulation of compacts within the
. . 55remaining teams.^
In early 195^ compacts were frequently so vague as to be 
unworkable and the specific contribution to the war effort was 
stipulated in a separate donation plan. In the patriotic
compact of the Chen Huan (World Shaking) Spinning Mill in 
Wuch*ang, for example, clauses appeared such as "Support the 
Communist Party" and "Get a grip on production" without any
indication of what this meant in concrete terms and how one
56could check up on the fulfillment of these clauses.' To
achieve greater specificity handbooks were published showing what
57patriotic compacts ought to look like.
In one such handbook published in September 1951, the models
of specificity which it quotes seem to me to be still rather
vague. Two of these compacts of April and May 1951 are
translated in Appendix 3 . ^  They show that by the spring of
1951* the terms of compacts had not yet been integrated with
physical contributions to the Korean War effort and actual
planned targets. There appeared to be some confusion between a
demand for specificity and a demand that compacts reveal a
higher degree of political consciousness. For example one
production team had written into its patriotic compact an
undertaking not to listen to the "Voice of America"; this was
revised as an undertaking not to listen to any reactionary radio
station^ which, however laudable from a political point of view,
must have created problems of definition and was hardly a move in
the direction of specificity. These early compacts were most
specific in their provisions for patriotic education. For
example, compacts included undertakings for collective study of
newspaper articles, though the time devoted to this end was
60usually very short (sometimes only five minutes daily). This 
may reflect a low level of literacy or the fact that workers 
were too busy with production duties.
It was perhaps because the terms of the patriotic compacts
were so general and that they were not closely integrated with
concrete production targets that the charge of formalism was
frequently made. For example, an investigation of 16 units
(13 factories, one harbour district, one municipal ward and one
communications corporation) carried out by the Lushun-Talien
municipal committee of the Party in July 1951 noted that only
three of these units had anything like a good record in compact
fulfillment, the remaining units being characterised by
formalism. In some cases the leadership could not remember the
stipulations of the compact and had not transmitted their
provisions downward, let alone adhered to the principle of
62voluntarism and spontaneity. Demands were made for strict
inspection of the fulfillment of compacts and their periodic
revision, lest they fail to reflect current production capacity
63or were not renewed after completion. y Such demands would 
indicate that, in some cases, compacts had by that time been 
integrated with production tasks, but I have seen no examples of 
any compact which showed such integration as early as August 
1951.
Before any really effective method could be devised to 
integrate patriotic compacts with concrete donation agreements 
and production plans, an effective system for checking up on 
the implementation of such contracts had to be devised, and 
this was particularly necessary in a situation of growing 
bureaucratism on the part of Party and management and "economism" 
on the part of labour unions in the period prior to the Three 
Anti Movement. In addition to the routine publication of
blackboards and posters showing the current state of compact 
64
fulfillment, three methods of checking up progress in compact 
fulfillment were put forward.^
Firstly, an inspection group might be organised in each
unit that had concluded a patriotic compact to mobilise the
workers to ensure its daily fulfillment. This inspection group
would organise periodic forums to discuss the current
implementation of the compact where criticisms and self-
criticism might be practised. The ideal frequency for such
forums was weekly, and at the weekly meetings the inspection
66
group would deliver a summary of its daily inspections.
Secondly, compact fulfillment might be investigated by higher 
level labour union organisations, such as was undertaken by the 
Shanghai General Textile Union in April 1951*^ Thirdly, the 
periodic "Resist American Imperialism and Aid Korea Congresses” 
might investigate the compacts, though this would be applicable 
only for larger units (factories) since it would be impossible 
to listen to reports about compacts made in every production
6g
team in every factory in a whole urban ward of hsien.
By the autumn of 195^ the donation drive had grown into a 
ma^ jor movement to "Increase Production and Practise Economy" 
which was justified in terms of its contribution to the war 
effort. By that time, many of the original donation targets had 
been met and the donation drive as such drew to an end in 
December 1951*^ showing contributions to the tune of JMP 
¥ 4,617*800 million, which was said to be sufficient to purchase 
over 5*000 armoured vehicles or over 5*000 pieces of
70artillery. At that time precise figures showing the 
expenditure of funds were not given and no specific associations 
were made between a particular donating unit and a particular 
tank or aircraft.
During the last few months of 195^ various regions
formulated "Increase Production and Practise Economy Plans"
which were expressed in millions of tons of food grains, and the
purchasing power of these economy targets in terms of military
71equipment was often stated in the propaganda.( Similar plans 
were also formulated at enterprise level^ and helow; at team 
level their terms were incorporated into patriotic compacts 
As the compacts became more specific in terms of production 
targets however, their specifically patriotic element became 
more generalised.
The Wu San Factory - An Example of the Integration of the 
Patriotic Compact and the Planning Apparatus
As the donation drive grew into the major economy drive at 
the end of 195 *^ so patriotic compacts became linked to the 
planning apparatus. This point may be best illustrated in the 
case of the model Wu San Factory in Shenyang.
At the beginning of 195^* in addition to a team plan (hsiao- 
tsu chi-hua), three other documents existed at team level - the 
"team compact" (hsiao-tsu kung-ytteh) % the"team contract" (hsiao- 
tsu ho-t'ung) and a team "declaration of determination" (to 
fulfil production goals) (hsiao-tsu chtleh-hsin-shu). As we have 
indicated, the difference between a contract (ho-t!ung) and a
compact (kung-ytleh) lies in the fact that the former is an 
agreement between two parties, whereas the latter may be a 
unilateral agreement to fulfil a certain task; the difference 
between a compact and a declaration of determination (chfleh- 
hsin-ehu) lies in the fact that the former is an on-going 
document that is constantly revised, whereas the latter is only 
related to one specific temporary end. After the discussion at 
the Vu San Factory it was decided that the conclusion of bi­
partite agreements (ho-t *ung) at team level was inappropriate 
and such contracts should be concluded at factory level between 
management and unions. Similarly, declarations of intention 
were temporary documents that could be done away with in 1952 
when there was felt to be a need to "rationalise” internal 
agreements. This left the team compact which, being the concern 
of everyone in the team, was renamed the "collective compact” 
(chi-t'i kung-yfleh).'
We have seen that the relationship between the team plan 
which specified concrete production tasks and the patriotic 
compacts in the period prior to the autumn of 1951 was not very 
close. In the Wu San Factory the team compact (which was not 
called "patriotic” but which contained clauses concerning 
production, livelihood, ideology, education, etc., and was to 
all intents and purposes much the same as a patriotic compact) 
was changed into a collective compact which only contained 
guarantees of fulfillment of quantity and quality targets, 
guarantees that principle obstacles to plan fulfillment facing 
the team would be overcome, and concrete measures to unite the 
terms of the compact with the main current political or
301.
75economic movement.  ^ The collective compact was now closely 
tied to the team plan and was an integral part of the planning
apparatus. In that it specified who should do what in terms of
fulfilling planned targets, it was also tied in with the 
responsibility system.
Once the compact was tied to the plan, it was subject to 
the kind of problems discussed in the last chapter. Both plan 
and compact had to be discussed together at the beginning of 
each planning period. In the Wu San Factory the basic 
operational plan was a monthly one, and discussion had been 
streamlined to the point that, by 1952, the plan could be issued 
at the beginning of the month. It was sometimes not until the 
tenth of the month, however, that the monthly compact was 
concluded.^ Just as a delay in putting a plan forward resulted 
in "storming” at the end of the planning period, so a delay in 
putting a compact into operation was said to result in shoddy
work at the beginning of every planning period when workers had
not made agreements as to quality. The model Wu San Factory was 
able to overcome this by working out a system whereby the 
factoryfs planned production targets were handed down on the 
15th of the preceding month, submitted to the shops on the 20th, 
discussed in the teams on the 25th, incorporated into compacts 
by the 50th to go into operation on the 1st of the next month.
On the first and second of the month progress in implementing 
the preceding compact was summed up and compared with other 
teams. In the case of a team that undertook a number of 
different work processes, time was saved by appointing mutual 
aid groups to examine each individual process during the summing 
up period.^ In the light of our discussion ’in the last
chapter it would seem that few factories were so fortunate in 
being able to plan so far in advance.
Even at the model Wu San Factory the vice of formalism 
existed. Frequently during the summing up period at the 
beginning of each month workers apologised for not fulfilling 
certain tasks which they promised to do the following month, but
no
never did.( Clearly there was a need for some additional 
control mechanism to check up on the implementation of compacts 
while they were in operation and team leaders were given
nq
instruction in how to conduct "focalpoint investigations."'7 
Conclusion
The various types of contract and compact described above 
attempted to specify in documentary form the types of 
organisation and incentive that have been described in previous 
chapters and each of the problems we have considered in those 
chapters has a bearing on the nature of the documents.
In chapter one for example, we noted a contradiction 
between the representative and the participatory conception of 
democracy. This was of particular relevance for the role of the 
labour union in negotiating contracts. In the case of 
conventional collective contracts the union was to represent 
the workers; in the case of a shih-kung contract the union was 
to lead the spontaneous efforts of the workers to form teams and 
negotiate contracts (whatever that might mean), whereas in the 
case of a simple pao-kung contract the unions were to stay 
outside a process in which workers participated in contract 
negotiation through a committee directly elected for that
purpose. In chapter four we noted that the need to assert 
control over the basic level upon the abolition of the gang boss 
system resulted in patterns of organisation which were very far 
from the Soviet model. This resulted in a process where shih- 
kung contracts were concluded formalising these patterns of 
organisation. In chapter three we noted a considerable gap 
between the prescriptions of Lushun and Talien and what 
happened in the rest of the country, due to a lack of resources. 
Hence the model collective contracts that were formulated in 
Lushun and Talien were not found elsewhere. The stipulations of 
such contracts concerning piecework and the payment of white 
collar workers could not be emulated in other regions -until very 
much later, as we have seen in chapter five. In chapter six we 
saw that the process of involving workers in the discussion of 
plans delayed their implementation; the conclusion of internal 
contracts and compacts could not but add to the delay.
In our discussion of internal contracts we have seen that 
during the New Democratic Period, attempts were made to integrate 
all the various contracts and compacts into a unified network of 
planning and responsibility, since it was necessary to specify 
one integrated hierarchy of ends and values against which 
rationality might be measured. Even in model units such as the 
Wu San Factory, however, it was difficult to avoid the vice of 
formalism, which figured so prominently in chapters one and two. 
In the remaining two chapters we shall consider those two 
organisations that were specifically entrusted with the task of 
combatting bureaucratism and giving life to a process that could 
so easily become ossified.
CHAPTER SEVEN NOTES
304
1. This distinction is ta k e n  from Wu San f a c to r y  ( o p . c i t )  p 127•
2. See apendix 2. in  Chung-hua Ch’ flan -kuo  T su n g -k u n g -h u i P ie n -c h i  
C h’ u -p a n -s h e  (ACFL E d i t o r i a l  and P u b lis h in g  House ) ;  C h i - t ’ i  
Eo-t1ung S h o u -ts’e (C o l le c t iv e  C o n tra c t Handbook) V o l 2 Peking  
Kung-jen C h’u -p an -sh e  May 1930 PP 193-209.
3. (ibid) p 187.
b . (ibid) A decision on collective contracts was taken by the
Lushun-Talien Labour Union on Karch 1st, an order issued by 
local government on June 1st and the glass factory contract
drawn up one month later.
5. (ibid)
6. (ibid)
7. (ibid) pp 231 -23*+.
8. Perhaps the clearest example of Mao’s views on the role of 
Party branches in industry was when he castigated Party cadres 
for not dealing with the problem of bureaucratism by educative 
means before the strikes of 1956. The implication was that the 
Party should stop disputes coming to a head. Mao Tse-tung:”0n 
the Correct Handling....... ” (loc.cit).
9. On the role of labour bureaux see Howe, Christopher Employment 
and Economic Growth in Urban China 19*+9-57 Cambridge University 
Press 1971 Chapter 5.
10. It is unlikely that the process of conciliation and arbitration 
made much headway until after the labour union crisis and the 
Three & Five Anti Movements were over. The Three Anti movement 
was one in which direct action by the Party organisation was 
brought to bear on intra-factory problems (see chapter 8) and 
this led to a large number of sackings (see chapter 8 and Howe 
(op.cit) p 96). This did not indicate much success in conciliation 
and arbitration. By 1952 Howe notes that the mediating role of 
the labour bureaux was not given so much stress (Howe p 100).
The formal re g u la t io n s  f o r  s e t t l in g  la b o u r d is p u te s  may be found 
in PFLP: The Trade Union Law of th e  Peoples R e p u b lic  o f China  
1951 PP 27-32.
11. Chi-t’i Ho-t’ung 3hou-ts’e (op.cit) pp 2^9-263.
12. (ibid) pp 265-273.
13. (ibid) p 187.
ih. For a description of these various labour insurance regulations 
wee Kallgren, Joyce ’’Social Welfare and China’s Industrial 
Workers” in Barnett : Chinese Communist Politics in Action 
(op cit) pp 5l+0-573* The most important of these regulations 
were the NE regulations (1st April 19*+9) National regulations 
(passed 23rd February 1951) and National (amended) regulations 
10th January 1953*
15. Wu San Factory (op.cit) p W6.
305
16. (ibid)
17. (ibid)
18. See "Constitution of Anshan Iron and Steel Company - Spurs 
Revolution and Production" Peking Review 1970 No 16, p 3 
which compares Mao’s Anshan Constitution with the "revision­
ist" Magnitogorsk Constitution. The Anshan constitution was 
formulated on March 22 1960 but was not implemented until 
March 22nd 1968 when the Anshan Municipal Revolutionary 
Committee was set up and Liu Shao-ch’i finally discredited.
In the Anshan Constitution, 5 principles were laid down for 
running socialist enterprises :-
1. ’keep politics firmly in command’
2. ’strengthen Party leadership’
3. ’launch vigourous mass movements’
4-. ’institute the system of cadre participation in pro­
ductive labour and worker participation in management, 
of the reform of irrational and outdated rules and 
regulations and of close cooperation among workers 
cadres and technicians’.
5. ’go full steam ahead with technical innovations and the 
technical revolution. This order of priorities is quite
different from the earlier collective contracts’.
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PART THREE PARTY AND UNION
We have seen that one of the main reasons why the Soviet 
model could not he introduced in its entirety was that there 
were insufficient human and technical resources. In this 
section we shall see that the organisational perspectives of the 
Chinese Communist Party were such that there were also 
ideological problems which must be included in any explanation 
of how the Soviet model was received.
We saw in the first section that the Soviet model of 
organisation could not be implemented in the enthusiastic 
atmosphere engendered by the New Record Movement and the 
prescriptions of systems of responsibility could only follow 
that movement. Similarly, it was not until after all the minor 
political movements had escalated into the mammoth "Three-Five 
Anti" Movement of 1951-2 that additional progress could be made 
in implementing the Soviet prescriptions over much of the 
country. In initiating radical change, the Party in this early 
period exercised a degree of power in excess of that required 
merely to guarantee plan fulfillment and perform the function of 
propagandist, inspector and co-ordinator. By late 1952, however 
the composition of the Party in the industrial sector had 
undergone considerable change, and what enterprise Party branches 
gained in terms of numbers they lost in effective power.
In these final two chapters the main theme will be that of 
bureaucratism and initiative. We shall see that the complacency 
of cadres transferred from the rural to the industrial sphere 
led to "rectification". The Three Anti Movement, which in some
respects created conditions which represented a partial reversal 
of the process of Sovietisation, led to a situation where many 
Party branches were reduced to the role of adjuncts of 
management, which was condemned most strongly in the mid 1950s. 
The bureaucratism of overwhelmed union cadres led to a demand 
that they define their new responsibilities, and when union 
independence took the form of "economism", they were reduced 
once again into merely "schools for management". Union cadres 
could only complain that they were considered "fourth class".
As agents of radical change in our period of study the 
Party and the unions created the conditions whereby their own 
functions could be restricted, at least temporarily.
CHAPTER EIGHT THE PARTY BRANCH
In this chapter we shall examine changes in the power and 
role of the Party organisation within industrial enterprises 
during the New Democratic Period. The first half of this 
chapter will discuss chronologically the decline in the power of 
the Party over management from a situation immediately following 
liberation, where Party committees were sometimes in a position 
to take over the functions of management itself, to that of 1953 
where, in practice, many Party branches had become little more 
than adjuncts of management. We shall consider the phenomenon 
of "bureaucratism" and complacency in the period up until the 
end of 1951 and how the problem was dealt with during the Three 
Anti Movement. In our period of study the Three Anti Movement 
against graft, waste and bureaucratism occupies a very important 
position, since it was the one period which saw a reversal in 
the process whereby Party branches were weakened and horizontal 
linkages with local government and local Party committees 
eroded. In the second half of the chapter three functions of 
the Party branch will be discussed - that of liaison, control 
and propaganda, all of which underwent a change in the period; 
by 1955 the third of these functions was the most important.
Party Monopoly of Power
Following the liberation of the major cities in North East 
China in the autumn of 19^ -8, Party cadres were transferred from 
the rural areas and the military to serve in the industrial
'I
sphere. Many of these cadres had little idea about how an
2industrial enterprise operated, and had spent their
revolutionary career in a completely different milieu. Many of 
them not only lacked industrial experience but administrative 
experience in general, According to Ch'en Po-ta, the Army could 
not afford to release personnel with great administrative 
experience whilst the fighting was still going on, and the 
administrative ability of both Party and Management that Liu 
Shao-ch’i observed in Tientsin was almost unbelievably low.^
In such a situation "left" excesses in the treatment of
5technical personnel were quite common. Such excesses were 
described as "adventurism”, or the "standpoint of the rural
CL
villages", and these were precisely the problems which Liu
Shao-ch'i was sent to Tientsin to deal with. At that time in
Tientsin Party personnel were engaged in a struggle with
technicians and factories had been placed under an extremely low
7
level of Party control - that of the street governments.{ At a 
time when "take-over", democratic reform and the restoration of 
production were entrusted to the leaderhip of local Party
o
committees, horizontal links were probably of far greater
importance than vertical (ministerial) ones. In such a
situation the power of the Party military organisation was
extremely great. Party organisations were sometimes in a
position to absorb factory management committees, take over their
functions, and exercise leadership^ in much the same way that was
10attempted later during the Great Leap Forward.
Commenting on this situation in 1956, Li Hsdeh-feng, whilst 
condemning the Party’s usurpation of managerial position, looked 
upon this early period as one in which the Party did exercise
correct leadership over industrial enterprise in striking
contrast to the period of "one-man management" which 
11followed. Speaking at a time when the principle of collective
leadership was reaffirmed, Li was particularly concerned at the
erosion of the principle of collective leadership and
individual responsibility which had been practised by the
12Peoples Liberation Army during the war. In this early period 
cadres brought with them into the industrial sphere this 
tradition of collective leadership and individual responsibility 
but it was mixed with an attitude of contempt for the workers 
amongs their least conscious members. In August 195^ An 
Tzu-wen, Deputy Head of the Organisation Bureau of the Central 
Committee, noted that, not long previously, the prevalent 
opinion of members of a North China Party school was that since 
the revolution had been led by peasants and a few intellectuals,
not much attention should be given to the workers; after all,
15they had made rifles for the enemy. An observed a widespread 
tendency for Communist Party cadres who had served in the 
countryside to resent the privileged position of workers in the
14.
new society; their opinion of retained management could 
scarcely have been much better.
Numerous articles appeared in the press during this early
period condemning the cavalier treatment accorded to technicians
15by Party personnel from the rural areas and such conduct 
was sharply criticised by Kao Kang, who throughout this period 
tended towards a Stalinist line, which is perhaps ironical in 
the light of the subsequent criticism that he had proclaimed 
himself the leader of the "Party of the Revolutionary Bases and
the Army’O ^  Kao was particularly concerned about a tendency 
for the Party committee in factories to usurp the functions of 
senior line management, as is illustrated in the following 
quote:-
’’There are some comrades amongst us who consider that 
the secretary of the Party committee or Party branch can 
replace the system whereby the FGM enjoys overall 
responsibility. This idea is manifestly wrong. Party 
committees and Party branches are not administrative organs 
within the factories. They are the leading organs of the 
vanguard of the working class within the enterprise. They 
should call upon Party members to stand at the forefront of 
production and become models in fulfilling the production 
plan. They must supervise and advance the implementation of 
that plan. They may make timely suggestions when necessary 
but cannot replace the FGM or the system whereby the FGM 
enjoys overall responsibility. All members of the 
Communist Party in enterprises must know that each state 
enterprise must work under the economic plan for the whole 
country and that that plan is formulated by state organs 
under the leadership of the Party Central Committee or 
representative organs of the Central Committee. The 
responsibilities of the FGM are given him by higher organs 
of state and are determined not only by the needs of his 
own factory but also by the requirements of the co-ordinated 
national plan. If the FGM is made responsible not to 
leading organs of state or organs responsible for 
enterprises at a higher level but to a Party committee or 
Party branch within the factory and if the production plan 
of a particular enterprise is made not to originate from 
higher organs of state or higher level organs responsible 
for enterprises but is formulated by the factory Party 
committee or Party branch, then there will be no longer any 
co-ordinated leadership (ling-tap i-yflan-hua): 
co-ordinated leadership will be split and shattered. We 
must understand that Party organs should not and can not 
replace state organs.’✓jy
The above quote from Kao Kang indicates not only that the
power of the Party branch was to be weakened but that the
vertical component in the dual-rtfle scheme of control was also
to be strengthened, and we have seen already the very tight
provisions for vertical control that were formulated for the
/\ o
North East in early 1950. These were a far cry from the 
provisions made in Yenan in 194-2, when the dual-role scheme of
control was introduced to counter bureaucratism, and which
1Qstrengthened the power of Party branches at the lower level. 7
The Growth of Vertical Channels of Command
So long as military control commissions were the primary
form of local government, the horizontal component in the dual
rule scheme continued to be significant since these control
commissions maintained representatives in the enterprise with
ultimate power of veto. As the functions of the military
representatives were replaced by the Party organisation, and as
the power of industrial departments grew, however, the
significance of the horizontal linkages declined in enterprises
which were state-run. By mid 195^» Kao Kang noted that, in
sharp contrast to one year previously, local Party and
government organs had tended to abdicate all responsibility for
20state-controlled enterprises. Local Party and government
tended to regard the production status of state enterprises as
the responsiblity of superior economic organs and were unwilling
21to interfere m  their operation. Similarly, there was a
tendency for the management of state enterprises to recognise
22only leadership from above. Such a situation isolated 
management from their own Party committee, which was responsible 
in the first instance to local level Party committees, and their 
own union committee, which was responsible to the local general 
labour union. Kao Kang demanded that leading personnel of all
enterprises should take the initiative in obtaining the
leadership and help of local Party committees and that they 
should educate the whole body of white and blue collar workers
in how to obey the laws and decrees of local government. He
l a i d  th e  m a jo r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i n t e r n a l  l i a i s o n  d i r e c t l y  a t
the feet of the local Party organisation, which was to check up
on how state enterprises in their area, were carrying out
25central policies and their portion of the state plan. Local 
Party committees were to be directly responsible for mass work 
in all enterprises in their area and were responsible for the 
workers' political education. They were to correct any
illegal behaviour on the part of enterprise cadres, to root out
. ~ . . 24-graft and to assume responsibility for security work. Though
economic departments of local government had certain
responsibilities for state enterprises within their area of
jurisdiction concerning supply and control of raw materials, the
main link of a state enterprise with local government was via
the Party organisation. The Party was also to involve itself
25in labour control,  ^for this was one of the major fields of 
tension between enterprises in the post-liberation situation.
In 1951 problems occurred, such as the hijacking of personnel
by government organs without any reference to local Party or
26government authority , and offers of better living and working
conditions were made to workers already employed in other
27enterprises. In assuming duties concerning labour control,
the Party was to overlap the local labour bureaux that were set
28up precisely to deal with such problems.
Ever since 19^ -2 the strengthening of vertical channels of 
command in China has been associated with the growth of 
bureaucratism. ^ I suggested in chapter four that the increase 
in numbers of personnel at middle levels of organisation
resulted from the growth of staff-line systems of command and 
that this increase insulated the top of an organisation from the 
bottom. In view of the complex relationship between old and new 
patterns of control which characterised the period down to the 
end of 195%  it would be rash to speak of a bureaucratic cycle 
developing in this period. We shall see, nevertheless, that the 
growth of bureaucratism which became a major target in the Three 
Anti Movement of the autumn of 1951 was not simply the result of 
a hangover from pre-liberation days and not simply a result of a 
tendency to relax following liberation.
Bureaucratism
As the term was used during the early 1950s "bureaucratism”
signified a process whereby leaders lost contact with the
masses. The term, in itself, indicated nothing about how hard
particular cadres worked, or how enthusiastic they might be
about what they considered were their duties. In fact, the term
’hard-working bureaucratism” (hsin-hsin k ’u-k’u kuan-liao-chu-i)
was employed to designate those cadres who lost contact with the
50masses precisely because of their enthusiasm for work. The
growth of this phenomenon was, to a large extent, due to the
lack of knowledge on the part of senior Party and management
cadres who devoted all their energies to learning about
51problems of production. In the Wu San Factory, for example, 
almost all senior Party cadres and line managers came from 
outside the industrial sphere, whereas all the technicians were 
old factory personnel.^ If the newly transferred personnel 
were to be in a position to reform the knowledgeable technicians 
they had to learn rapidly about the rules of production. The
Party secretary of the factory, Liu Shih-hua, confessed in late
1952 that, after his transfer from the army to serve as Party
secretary of the factory following the liberation of Shenyang
in the autumn of 19 -^8, he resolved to spend all his time going
around the shops learning about technology, to the detriment
of his political duties. So long as Party and senior
management cadres devoted all their energies to studying
technology, they were in no position to penetrate the middle
layer of administration that had remained from former times.
In the North East, which experienced the highest turnover of
senior management following liberation, due to the fact that
managers had been transferred south and many factories were not
54-in operation at that time, some 70-90% of white collar staff
were designated suitable for remoulding and for immediate
55retention m  August 194-8. They were said, however, to have
the attitude of old intellectuals and to look down on the 
56workers. If senior Party personnel neglected their technical 
studies to undertake the political task of remoulding them, what 
they gained in terms of time might be lost in terms of respect. 
The abandonment of a radical solution to such a problem on the 
grounds that this would harm production resulted inevitably in 
the bureaucratic insulation of senior management and the 
perpetuation of a highly stratified form of organisation within 
the enterprises. Such was the logic behind the extreme Yang 
Ch’fian situation that was described in chapter two, in which the 
gang boss system was preserved almost intact until pressure was 
brought to bear from the outside.
So long as senior management and Party personnel were 
insulated from contact with the shop floor, due to their
preoccupation with studying how planning worked, a particular
power structure would exist within industrial enterprises
which was remarkably similar to that of the rural areas where
rich peasants continued to exercise a considerable amount of 
37p o w e r . O f  course, there was a considerable difference 
between the rich peasant and the retained middle level 
technician that I have chosen to call an "industrial kulak", in 
that the former usually derived his power more from traditional 
connections than a knowledge of agricultural techniques, 
whereas the latter derived his power more from a knowledge of 
technology than traditional connections, though as we have seen 
in chapter two, traditional connections were by no means 
inconsiderable in the industrial sphere. Furthermore, Just as 
former middle peasants became rich peasants once landlords were 
removed, so a new genre of "industrial kulak" emerged after 
democratic reform.
The Case of the Penhsi Coal Sorting Department
To exemplify this point, let us consider the case of the
Goal Sorting Department of the Penhsi Iron and Steel 
38Corporation. Here, both Party and senior management were too 
busy working out the details of implementing planned 
management to worry about the ideology of lower level cadres.
One middle level manager, Hsia Chung-yd, had come to the fore in 
the New Record Movement as an enthusiastic worker and had been 
promoted to a management position for which he lacked both 
technical and political qualifications. Hsia typified the new 
industrial kulak who had been promoted after the former middle 
level management had been removed during democratic reform. He
was feared by the workers and had only a moderate level of
At the end of 19^9 & worker by the name of Ch'ang T'ai-tzu,
who had been sent on a six month course to a workers' political
university, returned to Penhsi to find that an old dust
collecting machine was working as inefficiently as in Kuomintang
times and was polluting the atmosphere. Hsia Chung-yd had
tried to mend it but, because he had not sought the advice of
the workers, only succeeded in putting it out of action for a
whole day, which cost the corporation a considerable sum of
money. Ch'ang considered that the reason that the mending Job
had been botched was due to the fact that Hsia and the workers
were more concerned with achieving new records than they were
with safety and machine maintenance. On returning to the
corporation, Ch'ang had been elected the chairman of a branch
labour union and, in that capacity, forwarded a worker's
suggestion for the renovation of the dust collecting machine to
Hsia Chung-yd. On receiving this Hsia was furious because,
after failing to renovate the machine himself, he had no
confidence in an ordinary worker's ability to do so. He refused
to implement the suggestion on the grounds that a delay in
production would have to be sustained, and accused Ch'ang of
40attempting to sabotage the New Record Movement.
On hearing that a quarrel had developed between Ch'ang 
T'ai-tzu and Hsia Chung-yd, the Party secretary, Chiang Ning, 
did not investigate the situation and decided quite 
arbitrarily that anyone who was attempting to sabotage the New
Record Movement must be politically backward. He removed 
Ch'ang from his position as branch union chairman and treated 
with hostility anyone who spoke on Ch'ang's behalf. The 
immediate result of this was that workers became alienated from 
the Party and lost faith in the idea of democratisation and 
rationalisation proposals, for even Ch'ang, a graduate of a 
workers' political university, could not get his voice heard.
Ch'ang was not, however, to let the matter rest there. He
wrote a letter of complaint to the North East General Labour
Union, who forwarded it to the Organisation Bureau of the North
East Bureau of the Party Central Committee. The Organisation
Bureau sent down an investigation team (tiao-ch'a tsu),
consisting of two representatives of the Organisation Bureau,
two representatives of the North East General Labour Union, one
representative of the North East Coal Miners Union and one
representative from the newspaper Lao-tung Jih-pao. This team,
under the leadership of the Penhsi Municipal Party Committee,
conducted an investigation which lasted one week; after that the
team instructed the Penhsi Party committee how to deal with the
matter and handed over the results of the investigation to the 
4-2press.
The press comments were particularly interesting. Most 
blame was heaped, not upon the industrial kulak Hsia Chung-ytL, 
who was felt to be a suitable candidate for remoulding, but upon 
the Party secretary Chiang Ning, who apparently had not only 
dissolved the labour union without investigating the matter, but 
had attempted to Justify his action when the affair escalated by 
digging up circumstantial evidence that Ch'ang had been engaged
in sabotaging the Party's underground military work during the
war (again without investigating the true facts). Chiang's
bureaucratic action in dissolving the labour union was
considered by the North East Party newspaper Tung Pei Jih-pao
to be a reflection of Party work in general in the Coal Sorting
Department, where 14 out of 17 Party members were unskilled and
were in no position to decide whether the suggestion promoted by
43Ch'ang was good or bad. ^
I have recounted the above case at length because it 
illustrates quite clearly the point that where old industrial 
kulaks (gang bosses, etc.) had been removed and where 
considerable power resided at middle levels of management, the 
failure of the Party organisation to keep its grip on the actions 
of lower level cadres resulted in actions reminiscent of the 
former gang-boss days. What is particularly worthy of note is 
that the official attitude seemed more concerned with the 
technical competence of lower level Party members than the high­
handed actions of a new industrial kulak, and most blame was 
heaped upon Chiang Ning, who had responded in time honoured way 
to the possibility that he himself would be accused, by 
searching for historical evidence that Ch'ang had always been 
politically questionable.
The Expansion of the Party
Following the Second Plenum of the Seventh Party Central
Committee in March 1949* when a decision was taken to shift the
44focus of Party work from the countryside to the cities, an all 
out effort was made not only to improve the technical skill of
Party personnel transferred to the industrial sphere, hut also
to take into the Party large numbers of skilled workers and
technicians. During the New Record Movement, this latter
process, which bore a remarkable resemblance to Stalin's
45"Leninist Levy", ^ resulted in a rapid rise in Party membership 
and, in practice, a decline in the political qualifications for 
membership. One of the explicit aims of the movement was to 
increase the proportion of industrial workers in the Party, and 
enthusiasm for production began to be seen as a sufficient 
indicator of political consciousness;^ (in the light of the 
above discussion of the activities of Hsia Chung-yd, this was 
clearly questionable).
In the Raw Materials Department of the Antung Paper Works,
for example, Party membership rose from nine on the foundation
of the branch on October 1st 1949 (4.8% of employees) to 93 by
the end of November 1949 (26.5% of employees), and this
expansion was directly attributed to the New Record Movement.^
In the North East Smelting Works the proportion of Party
members rose from 3*2% in August 1949 to 14% by the end of 1930,
of whom two thirds were skilled workers, and the Youth League
was expanded to comprise 45*3% of those whose age qualified them 
48for membership. By May 1931 the proportion of Party members
in enterprises in the North East was said to be 11.4% of the
total number of workers^ and, at that time, (when there were
some three million industrial workers in the country as a whole)
the Party Central Committee announced that it planned to
recruit one third of all industrial workers into the Party
50within five years. In August 1951 An Tzu-wen reported that by 
the time 15*000 Party branches had been set up in industrial
enterprises and 200,000 workers had recently been brought into 
51the Party. Such a rapid increase could not but have an 
effect upon the quality of Party membership and an effect upon 
the relationship between old and new cadres.
Complacency of Old Cadres and their Resentment of the New
Perhaps the major reason why the New Record Movement was
used to expand the Party was because the Party was heavily
weighted in favour of its peasant component in a situation where
the workers were held to be the "masters of society”. There is,
however, another dimension which must be mentioned, and that was
that complacency was rife amongst the old cadres who had moved
to the cities. In the opinion of Kao Kang in September 19^9*
there were very few cadres in the North East who were hard
working and who did not struggle for fame and material
betterment.^ As has been indicated, the majority of cadres did
not know how to discharge their new duties, which was reflected
in the fact that they kept convening unnecessary meetings, and
although they tended to abide by higher directives, they were
not guiltless of attempting to feather their own nests. A
smaller group were bombastic show-offs obsessed by their own
official classification or, if on a salary basis, the number of
wage points they were earning.  ^ According to Kao Kang, the
Party had been affected by "the depraved ideology of remnant
feudal elements and capitalists, petty bourgeois individualism
54and defects in ideological and educational work".^ Kao noted 
that cadres frequently rationalised their indolent attitude in 
political terms and, when admonished for relaxing on entering 
the cities, they accused their accusers of "taking a rural
viewpoint" and of not realising the importance of the united
front between workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and
55national capitalists."^
The old cadres did not take kindly to the rapid expansion 
of the Party and the employment of new cadres whom they felt to 
be their political inferiors, thus displaying a lack of political 
consciousness on their own part. The following extract from a 
letter to Hsiieh-hsi, the semi-official theoretical journal of 
the Party,^ refers not to industry but to government 
administration. It nevertheless speaks volumes about the 
decline in the political consciousness of old cadres and their 
contempt for the political consciousness of the new cadres
"In our organ (of government) there are' very few old 
cadres. Many cadres have newly joined our work, the 
majority of whom are intellectuals straight from school.
They have not been steeled in a life of struggle and in 
general their level of political consciousness is very low.
I nevertheless have to do work similar to those new cadres 
and receive the same treatment. Some of these new cadres 
are even preferred by the leadership and are entrusted with 
even more important tasks than I. I feel that the higher 
levels have assigned to me work inappropriate (to my
experience) and do not trust me sufficiently...........
Some people say that the old revolution(aries) are not 
(considered) as good as the new revolution(aries). I too 
am of that opinion. When I conveyed my opinion to the 
higher levels, not only did they not accept it but 
criticised me for (displaying) the "ideology of the 
meritorious" (kung-ch*en ssu-hsiang) saying that my feelings 
were backward, proud and complacent. They demanded that I 
cogitate on the matter but I have thought for a long time
and am not convinced........... Can one say it is fair
treatment if the fruits of victory which we paid for with 
our flesh and blood are enjoyed by those who have not 
worked for them."r-n
Needless to say, this attitude was roundly condemned.
Within industrial enterprises, the friction between old 
and new cadres might take the form of conflect between cadres
transferred from the rural sphere and new technocratic 
management, and such conflict was criticised as a manifestation 
of ’’the ideology of power and prestige” (ch’flan-wei ssu-hsiang) ^  
Friction, however, might occur between different levels of the 
Party organisation itself. In Cultural Revolution retrospect, 
one might conclude that there was some substance in Kao Kang’s 
alleged insistance that there were two parties, that of ’the
5Crevolutionary bases and the army” and that of the ’’white areas’’^ ' 
which had developed with quite different organisational 
perspectives. Until the mass of Cultural Revolution is fully 
sifted we will probably be unable to say to what extent friction 
may have occurred in the period following liberation between 
those cadres who had been active in factories in the white areas 
before liberation and those who were transferred from the rural 
areas and the army. I have looked in vain for any contemporary 
account of, for example, how old Party members who had been 
active in the Shanghai Peace Preservation Corps co-existed with 
Party secretaries transferred from outside the industrial 
sector. In this connection, it is most significant that the one 
top Party leader who was chosen to deal with the left excesses 
in Tientsin was a man who had considerable experience in both 
the revolutionary bases and the white areas.
In lieu of any contemporary evidence, one might get some 
idea of the problem from Ai Vu’s novel ’Steeled and Tempered”, 
where two levels of Party secretary are portrayed, one newly 
transferred to the Liaonan Iron and Steel Works and initially 
helpless in the face of a mass of complicated personal 
relationships and Jealousies, and the other (a shop level
secretary) who enjoyed a considerable amount of influence in the
works due to the fact that he had been employed there some
years. The power and influence of the shop level Party
secretary was not, however, matched by a high level of political
consciousness, and he emerges as a rather slipshod but not
60unsympathetic character. As we have noted, this novel was 
written during the Great Leap Forward, and seems to have as its 
didactic purpose the portrayal of the wisdom of a transferred 
Party secretary who eventually came to understand the political 
situation in the Steel Works clearer than anyone else, and it 
may not be a completely true picture of reality. Secondly, 
there was no actual conflict between the two levels of Party 
secretary, Nevertheless, the novel does spell out a potential 
source of tension that further research might substantiate.
By mid 1950 the complacency of old cadres, their contempt
for the new cadres, and the dilution of Party spirit consequent
upon the rapid expansion of the Party, reached such a point that
the Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee called for a
rectification movement to overcome bureaucracy and complacency
61amongst Party and union cadres. This rectification movement
focussed on the field of financial and economic administration
(and included Party work in the industrial enterprises).
Launched by Mao on 6th June 1950, the movement aimed to root out
bureaucratism and commandism (much the same thing in this 
6?context) and dragged on throughout the rest of 1950 and 195 «^ 
As we shall see in the next chapter, the movement had a far 
greater effect upon the labour unions than the Party 
organisation, though certainly not the effect intended. We have
seen that the process of rectification was not able to cause the 
Party to give completely effective leadership during the 
”supplementary lesson in democratic reform” of 195 *^ and it was 
not until the Three Anti Movement that a full scale attempt 
was made to mobilise the workers to unleash the greatest 
political movement to sweep through the industrial sector in 
China from liberation until the Great Leap Forward, a movement 
which combined all the other parallel movements into one.
The Three Anti Movement
The New Record Movement, which was launched in the autumn
of 19^ -9* grew into a Movement to Increase Production and
Practise Economy, which was formally launched at the end of 
63August 1951i also in the North East. As we have seen, this 
movement absorbed the Korean War donation drive and assumed a 
macro-political importance. Its major aim was to eliminate 
waste, which was seen to derive from political as well as 
economic causes. It merged, therefore, with the three major 
political movements of 1950-51> the Democratic Reform Movement, 
the Party rectification movement and the Union rectification 
movement, to form a Three Anti Movement, which added two more 
targets, graft and bureaucratism, to that of waste.
At first an attempt was made to examine the political 
factors that had led to waste. One of these was the rural 
viewpoint which continued to consider large scale industry in 
much the same way as small scale agricultural production. The 
cavalier attitude towards planning on the part of cadres of a 
rural orientation was likened to that of peasants who believed
rh
they could move seedlings from one place to another. An 
attempt was made to* involve the whole Party and all administra­
tion in a discussion of waste, the rural mentality, and the 
economic consequences of bureaucratism.^ The discussion then 
moved to a stage of great generality in which all the post 
liberation targets for reform, such as the tendency to relax 
after victory, to feather one's own nest and tardiness in 
implementing democratic reform, were put forward. During this 
stage, principal targets of the movement were entrusted with the
task of leading it so that their own lack of zeal could provide
66an indicator of backward thought. Once criticism started it
moved closer and closer to the daily concerns of the workers and
extended beyond the Party. During this process the large
number of activists who had been involved in disclosing cases of
waste, graft and bureaucratism were taken into the Party. The
Cultural Revolution parallel is striking,^ although one should
note this was the basic technique for all mass movements from
68194-3 down to recent years.
Formal leadership in the movement was usually vested in
Increase Production and Practise Economy Committees (tseng-ch'an
chieh-ytleh wei-yflan-hui) at municipal level,^ organised
according to the United Front principle,^ in much the same way
as the Democratic Reform committees discussed in chapter two.
In practice however, the Party organisation assumed leadership
71in the movement and acted through these bodies. As far as 
industrial enterprises were concerned, leadership in the move­
ment came from the local Party committee and this helped to 
counter the excessive growth of vertical channels of command,
which had been condemned by Kao Kang in June 1951.^ Within 
higher level vertically organised structures, Retrenchment and 
Economy Committees (Ching-chien chieh-ydeh wei-ytlan-hui) were
set up to flush out bureaucrats at higher levels of economic
75administration.  ^ Sometimes bodies of the same name were
74-formed within industrial enterprises, though they were
subject primarily to local Party control through the enterprise
75Party committee. ^
The initial stage of the movement was one of mobilising the 
workers within the enterprise. Teams consisting of the FGM, 
Party secretary, labour union chairman and Youth League 
Chairman would go down into the workshops to propagate the ideas 
of increasing production and practising economy, and to help 
them formulate Increase Production and Practise Economy Plans.^ 
Once cases of waste, graft and bureaucratism were discovered, 
enterprise Party committees would mete out penalties, 
providing that the cases were not too serious. Serious cases 
were to be submitted to the local Party committee, or in 
some cases Party committees in higher level economic organs 
(especially when the theft of economic secrets was 
involved).^ In the initial stage, which lasted down until the 
end of 1951* the focus was on serious crimes and statistics 
that were released dealt with the serious cases that had been 
handled by the courts. In the East China region, for example, 
higher level courts and organs of the procuratorate (chien-ch1a 
chi-kuan) had dealt with 179 cases of graft by mid December 
1991, involving some million and, according to the East 
China Peoples Control Commission (Hua tung Jen-min Chien-ch1a
wei-ytlan-hui), the amount of money involved in cases of graft
and loss of state property in the region from September 1950 to
November 1991 was some ¥124,000 million. 690 people had been
convicted by courts in the region, of which 470 were employed in
government departments or financial and economic enterprises.
Of these, 356 were retained workers and 135 new cadres.''7®
However impressive the above totals might sound, they were small
in comparison to the figure for the movement as a whole.
According to the historian Ho Kan-chih, by the end of the
movement, 4.9% of all state officials in China (including
enterprise management and Party cadres) had received some 
79punishment. '
In January 1952 the movement was accellerated and the
number of targets widened. At that time Kao Kang observed that
the Party had been corroded by bourgois ideology and influence
finin an increasing manner during the recent past, and retained
personnel (some of them Party members) were said to be
attempting to turn the new state enterprises into private 
fi1enterprises. Former capitalists now employed in the state
sector were said to be using economic information to help their
fiPrelatives and colleagues in the private sector and government
officials were said to be taking bribes to treat former
83capitalists leniently. ^ Kao Kang was particularly concerned 
about an increasing tendency to rehabilitate former managers, 
and prophesied that unless an excessive reliance upon the
84bourgeoisie was corrected, the end of the Party was m  sight.
Kao criticised enterprise Party branches for not extending the
85movement down beyond a few obvious cases of waste  ^and
criticised those leading cadres who had allowed a considerable
n r
backlog of cases to pile up. It would seem that by this time 
the policy of placing targets of the movement in leading 
positions was beginning to reveal a situation where movement 
designed to combat bureaucratism was being run bureaucratically, 
and Kao Kang was in a position to expose the guilty. Summoning 
leading cadres to a meeting under the North East Bureau of the 
Party on January 10th 1952, Kao demanded action on the backlog 
of cases within two days or immediately upon the return of such 
cadres to their units; otherwise they would be dismissed as 
bureaucratic and corrupt.^
Though primary responsibility for leading the Three Anti 
Movement within an industrial enterprise was that of the Party 
committee, most leading personnel were involved in one way or 
another, often to the detriment of their production 
responsibilities. Many leading personnel were so busy
QO
investigating complaints that production declined. The
situation was made particularly serious by the fact that, as one
might expect, graft was most prevalent in supply departments,
and once personnel were flushed out of these departments there
go
was no-one to guarantee a regular supply of materials. 7 A
further factor which hindered production was a deliberate go-
slow policy on the part of some management, who felt that their
90past was not unsullied.'
During the month of January 1952 the North East Bureau of 
the Central Committee reported that, out of a total of 49 
planned product targets in the Industrial Departments network,
29 had not been reached. In enterprises under the Light 
Industry Bureau, half had not completed their work for the month. 
None of the targets for principal products in the Textile 
Management Bureau had been reached. Other examples are given of 
the effect of the movement on production, such as a rise in the 
accident rate, failure to receive supplies, and a decline in the 
quality of products during the month of January 1952, the climax
91
of the movement.7 This fall in production, although only 
temporary, stands in contrast to the Democratic Reform Movement, 
in which it was claimed that production did not decline 
significantly.^ Failure to integrate successfully the 
political and economic movements meant that the Movement to 
Increase Production and Practise Economy continued long after 
the conclusion of the Three Anti Movement, which in 1952 merged 
into a Five Anti Movement^ and moved from the public to the 
private sector.
Efforts were made in February 1952 to minimise the adverse 
effects of the movement by working out a concrete division of 
labour within the enterprise. The FGM was by that time to 
concern himself solely with questions of production, and other 
management cadres were instructed to spend at least two thirds 
of each eight hour day dealing with production problems. The 
remaining one third might be spent on the Three Anti Movement, 
as well as part of their spare time. Immediate remedial measures 
were put forward to solve the problems of shortage of personnel 
in supply departments due to the removal of ’’tigers" (principal 
culprits), and white and blue collar workers were instructed to 
work out ways of combining "tiger bashing” (ta-hu) with
emulation movements. The North East Bureau of the Party Central 
Committee demanded that enterprises guarantee not only to fulfil 
their production plan for March 1952, "but also to make up for 
the decline in production suffered during the very active period
QZL
of January and February.y
After March 1952, the steady rise in production in the
state sector seems to have been resumed, and the whole focus of
mobilisation within state-run industrial enterprises switched to
the Movement to Increase Production and Practise Economy, as the
Three and Five Anti Movements were formally ended in various
95regions during June and July 1952.
The Movement to Establish a Responsibility System
The Three Anti Movement arrested for a time the process
whereby the horizontal component in the dual-rule scheme of
control was eroded. The movement gave a considerable amount of
power to the enterprise Party Branch, though no instances are on
record, to my knowledge, of the Party taking over the functions
of management, such as occurred in the period immediately
following liberation and were to occur in the Great Leap 
96Forward.y
Following the Three Anti Movement the focus changed in a 
way reminiscent of early 1950 from mass mobilisation to labour 
discipline, and the role of the Party changed from the mobiliser 
of the masses to an instrument whereby a sense of discipline 
might be inclucated. The new stress on responsibility and one- 
man management of early 1955, which was discussed in chapter
four, resulted in a strengthening of the vertical component in
dual-rule, which this time was reinforced by the extension of
0 7
external control organs down into the enterprises. Now the 
Party organisation was no longer to be the organisation 
exclusively concerned with checking up on the bureaucratic 
actions of management. Commenting on the problem of bureaucracy 
in January 1953* An Tzu-wen noted that many of the errors and 
shortcomings repudiated during the Three Anti Movement had been 
"revived or had assumed proportions even more serious than
QQ
hitherto”.7 The prescribed solution this time was not another 
mass movement but an attempt to strengthen external control 
agencies (Peoples control commissions, etc.)^ which, together 
with the stress on one-man management, tended to reduce the role 
of the Party to one of political education.
In July 1954* Jen-min Jih-pao noted that:-
”In the past few years, each branch of industry was 
busy with democratic reforms and the restoration of 
production. Consequently, however correctly labour may 
have been organised within the enterprises, not a lot of 
experience was accumulated. It was impossible therefore to 
establish a comprehensive system for consolidating labour 
discipline. Today the situation must be changed. Labour 
discipline must be established by means of legal forms.m^qq
The whole tradition of the Communist Party was one where
discipline was fostered by education and group pressure, not by
the force of law, and there was consequently a reaction to the
above demand. Some cadres felt that the imposition of legal
regulations encouraged passivity and was the "working style of 
101warlords". The official attitude was that the experience of 
the past few years had shown that the absence of regulations led 
to slackness and allowed individual bad elements to work their
way into peoples organisations.
"We must be clear that what threatens the normal 
progress of production and affects the labour activism of 
the masses is not that discipline is too strict but that it 
is too slack." tox
The new stress on discipline of 1953-4 took the form of a
movement very different to the Three Anti Movement. The Movement
to Establish a Responsibility System of 1953 did not involve
much mass mobilisation. Various articles noted that there was a
tendency for workers not to denounce leading cadres out of a
fear of retribution and workers tended to show a lack of
confidence in the effectiveness of discussions convened by the
103Party organisation.  ^ Some workers felt that the proper 
procedure for discussion should be "officials to officials and 
people to people" (kuan hsiang kuan, min hsiang min),^^ which 
was a complete negation of the spirit of late 1951 and early
1952. What was even more serious were disclosures that the 
reluctance of workers to get involved in the movement sometimes 
resulted in the preservation of the gang boss system as late as
1953.
In the building site of the Harbin Industrial University,
for example, an investigation into the reason why workers were
not getting their wages when there were work stoppages started
as an investigation into the phenomenon of a lack of
responsibility for wage payment, and finished up as an anti-gang
boss struggle when it was found that the head of the reinforced
steel girder team was a former gang boss who was pocketing a cut
10Sof the wages m  time honoured tradition. ^ The new stress on
discipline had prevented the workers from denouncing their 
superior, though one might ask why he had not been denounced in 
the Democratic Reform and Three Anti Movements.
The initiative in the above anti-gang boss struggle seems to
10fthave come from management rather than Party, which was
characteristic of the movement to establish a responsibility
system. The movement commenced at the Harbin work site when
management called a meeting of all technical personnel, at which
a high level Party cadre from outside the organisation spoke.
This cadre reported on the difference between management in
public and private concerns and pointed out that the aim of the
responsibility system movement was "not to rectify people but to 
107improve work". ' After that the workers were encouraged to 
reveal examples of a lack of responsibility, and technical 
personnel were educated on the need for such a system.
In the movement which followed all sorts of examples of
graft were revealed, where people had taken advantage of a
situation where no one had been responsible for a particular work
task. These ranged from deliberately falsifying accounts to
10ftusing three inch instead of four inch nails. The volume of
complaints in the 1953 movement, however, was much smaller than 
in the Three Anti Movement of 1951-2 and, if in fact the 
shortcomings repudiated in the Three Anti Movement "had been 
revived or had assumed proportions even more serious than 
hitherto", one can only assume that a movement that sought to 
improve work rather than rectify people was not the most 
appropriate one in the circumstances.
This was to be the keynote of the First Five Year Plan - 
not to rectify (at least in the radical Three Anti sense) but to 
improve work. In that the Party's job was to rectify people.
It was to have a lean time.
The Structural Liaison Function
In the light of the above summary of the political climate 
in which enterprise Party branches operated, we may now turn to 
consideration of what I feel to be the three major functions of 
the Party branch - structural liaison, control and propaganda 
education. Official Chinese descriptions of the functions of 
the Party branch talk about "leadership", "supervision", 
"education" and "guarantee" as its principal functions. With 
the exception of education, these terms are somewhat confusing 
and will be integrated with the first three headings in the 
following discussion.
We saw in earlier chapters that in conditions short of 
perfection, both staff-line and functional systems of 
organisation depend for their effectiveness upon co-ordinating 
structures, which in the former cut across vertical channels of 
command and in the latter ensure that the functions of technical 
agents do not overlap. In addition to structures which perform 
the function of horizontal co-ordination, any organisation that 
wishes to minimise alienation between structures at its top and 
bottom must make provision for mechanisms that effect vertical 
liaison. In Chinese terminology, leadership that proceeded 
according to the first principle was referred to as "co-ordinated 
leadership" (ling-tao i-ytian-hua) SyStem whereby 
vertical liaison was effected was included under the rubric
"democratic centralism" (min-chu chi-chung-chih) and the mass
'I JOline (ch'fln-chung lu-hsien).
In the immediate post liberation situation, the factory
management committee was to fulfil both the function of
horizontal co-ordination (between military representative/Party,
labour union and management) and vertical liaison between
management and workers. In the words of Kao Kang, "our factory
management committees are both democratic and centralist
institutions". Of slightly more importance as a horizontal
co-ordinating structure was the standing committee of the
factory management committee where the FGM, the Party secretary
and the labour union chairman met in daily "head knocking
session", and who were ideally linked vertically with the
workers through the Party and union structure. Similarly, the
main liaison structure at shop level was the "three-man Joint
meeting" (san-Jen lien-hsi hui-i) of similar composition
JJ2appropriate for this lower level. Such liaison structures 
were to be responsible not only for day to day co-ordination and 
vertical liaison, but also for the formulation and implementation 
of collective and Joint contracts stipulating the interdependency 
of the constituent parts of the enterprise.
We saw however in chapter one that the problem of 
horizontal co-ordination and vertical liaison was not solved 
effectively by the provisions of the democratisation movement 
and we have noted in this chapter that bureaucratism continued 
to be an important problem. Commenting on the confusion in 
enterprises in the North East in July Chang li-kfo noted
that up to that time liaison had been very bad and everybody
"did his thing" (ko hsing ch'i shih). Unless liaison was
strengthened, there would either be complete confusion of
function or rigid specialisation of function in which "the
labour union concentrated on democratisation and management
concentrated on centralism and carrying out one-man 
115management". In situations where the above structures were 
not very effective, the role of the Party as an agent of 
horizontal co-ordination and structural liaison was very 
important.
Where liaison is impossible, a body entrusted with this 
function either becomes utterly powerless and subordinates 
itself to one of the bodies between which it is maintaining 
liaison, or takes over leadership from both of the bodies and 
treats liaison as direction. Both patterns could be discerned 
in this early period. The Antung Machinery factory provides us 
with an example of the first extreme. Here the Party committee 
was unable to maintain liaison between management and labour 
union, with the result that the labour union was taken over by 
corrupt elements and a saboteur became union chairman. This 
drove the Party to the side of management, from which position 
it "helped the labour union to sort itself out" during the New
11 h .
Record Movement. The Wu Erh factory, which we mentioned m
chapter one, provides us with an example of the second extreme.
Here the Party committee took over the functions of the factory
management committee and turned that body into an enlarged
115Party committee. ' Such a situation was the subject of attacks 
by Kao Kang, which we quoted earlier in this chapter. A third
possible permutation, also attacked by Kao Kang, was where the
Party took a syndicalist line and backed the labour union in its
116usurpation of the functions of management; We shall return 
to this in the next chapter.
If the Party was not to take everything on to its own 
shoulders, what exactly was meant by the Party "exercising 
leadership". In the ideological sphere the exercise of 
leadership by the Party committee indicated the total 
responsibility for creating an organisation ideology and for 
macro-political education. In the field of organisation, I take 
it to mean exercising control over liaison structures which were 
to effect horizontal linkage and to unite the px'inciples of 
democracy and centralism. As an independent organisation the 
Party was, in the early period, to carry out this aspect of 
leadership through channels other than its own organisation.
It was to act through the factory management committee and 
three-man meetings where it brought management and union 
together, and its mass work was to be conducted through the 
medium of the labour unions. It was to exercise control over 
the formal and informal network of communication in the 
enterprise and to initiate joint discussion at those points
si jfo
where there was a blockage in communication. ' Party 
committees could, however, only act effectively through other 
organisational structures when those structures were performing 
properly. In a situation where labour union committees might 
be corrupt and where bureaucracy was rife, the Party committee 
might cut through formal liaison and co-ordination structures 
and exercise direct leadership over the basic level. Such
power exercised by the Party committee was not direct line 
power, for the Party committee occupied no position in the 
line, but functional power.
Functional power may be defined as power that stems not
from status or position in a formal hierarchy but from the
nature of the work performed. We have seen that technical
cadres frequently exercised such power in a situation where the
technical level of line management was low, and that attempts
were made in 1953 to restrict such functional power to matters
that were described as technical professional work (yeh-wu).^
Ideally the Party was to exercise such power in the non-technical
118sphere, but since "politics was the lifeblood of economics,"'
it was very difficult to define what exactly the non-technical
sphere was. In the Wu San factory, for example, the Party
organisation was expected to organise research into problems of
production, supervise the writing of teaching material on norm
11 q
determination, and guide discussion in such work. y So long as 
the Party was to exercise such leadership effectively, the 
phenomenon of "multi-headed leadership" (to-t'ou ling-tao) could 
not be avoided, and any attempt to implement staff-line systems 
of command could not but dilute the power of the Party 
organisation.^1^
As regards democracy, the functional role of the Party was 
extremely important. It has been argued by organisational 
theorists, that the prevalence of functional contacts minimises 
the tendency towards authoritarianism, since they impose
121restraints on the exercise of power throughout an organisation.
It has been argued that the greater specialisation and the 
consequent growth of functional networks which overlay formal 
patterns of authority helps to explain why organisational
absolutism has been less prevalent since the industrial
122revolution. Modern organisational absolutism attempts to 
deal with the problem of functional overlay by increasing the 
number of functional agents performing a given function at any 
level and by the creation of a number of parallel hierarchies, 
any one of which may be by-passed by the hierarchy that
communicates best with the leadership of the organisation at any
123 *given time. ^ So long as Party leadership did not share its
functional jurisdiction over a particular level of work, then
the existence of the Party organisation could offset the
authoritarian tendency of management. In the Three Anti
Movement, *for example, Party committees were in a position to
combat bureaucratism at any level of organisation. In 1953*
however, the attack on multi-headed leadership reached a new
height and the Party was joined by a number of parallel
hierarchies (external control apparatus, etc.) which diluted its
power, resulting in a pattern of single-headed leadership and
multiple control (in the Schurmann-Chou Fang sense of the word,
n 124which signified checking up after the event).
In the light of the criticism of the dilution of Party 
power, which grew in direct proportion to the growth of other 
parallel hierarchies, it would seem that the following hypoth­
esis was confirmed: "For any given level of functional
importance in a system the power residing in a functional agent 
(functionary) is inversely proportional to the number of other
344.
125system functional agents performing the function."  ^ In e i r
situation where a number of weak control organs co-existed intra-
enterprise communication tended to move along a single channel,
with the consequent growth of what industrial sociologists term
126"noise entropy", where communications became distorted by 
people at lower levels screening messages going to the leadership 
of an organisation in order to present their own performance in 
the best possible light. Attacking this tendency, An Tzu-wen 
noted in early 1953:-
"What is especially serious and most harmful to the 
Party is the fact that when reporting on work to the upper 
levbls, only the achievements and not the shortcomings, 
only the good news and not the bad news, only the merits 
and not the failures are told. ^ 7
One wonders whether An, as Deputy Head of the Party's 
Organisational Bureau, realised that such a phenomenon was the 
direct result of diluting the functional power of the Party 
organisation. One might wonder too whether Kao Kang realised 
that the decline in lateral liaison with local government was due 
to exactly the same cause.
The Control Function
Before discussing this second function of the Party 
organisation, some mention must be made of the terminological 
difficulties associated with the English word "control". The 
term "control" that occurs in Western management literature, is 
usually translated by the Chinese word k 'ung-chih ( ^ j ) ^ 8  
and signifies a process whereby the leadership of an 
organisation determines the actions of lower level structures 
and personnel. It is this term that appears in the word 
"control figures" (k'ung-chih shu-mu), which provided the basis 
for planning. Control in this sense was the prerogative of
management, not of the Party organisation. A number of other 
terms exist which have also been translated "control”. The 
first of these, chien-ch1 a ( f t *  ), is taken by Schumann
(from Chou Fang) to mean checking up after the event, in 
distinction to chien-tu ( ), which he translates
"supervision” and which signifies the checking up on actions 
whilst they are still going on.^^^ The term chien-ch1 a 
( f t *  ) is the term used in control commission (chien-ch1a 
wei-ytlan-hui) and procuratorate (chien-ch1 a-ytian) , which ideally 
judge legal cases after the event. In the industrial sphere, 
however, control organs (chien-ch'a chi-kuan) frequently became
involved m  checking up on actions whilst they were m  progress. i\
In addition to the above terns, two others are frequently used, 
both pronounced chien-ch1a? The first of these ) is
primarily a legal tern indicating examination and prosecution 
and the second ( ) is an extremely common tern indicating
the process of checking up on actions during and after the 
event, both in the legal sphere and outside. The question is 
made even more complicated by the use of other terms, such as 
tu-ch1 a ( ) (on-going inspection), k'ao-ch'a ( * *  > i
(exploratory research), tiao-ch'a ( m i  ) (Specific 
investigation), etc., all of which have some bearing on the 
English concept "control”. To avoid a discussion that it too 
abstruse, I shall accept Schumann's somewhat over-simplified 
distinction between chien-tu and chien-ch* a ( f t *  ) and 
confine myself to a discussion of supervision and control in the 
sense of checking up during and after the event.
In a lengthy document published in September 1951* the 
North East Bureau of the Party Central Committee attempted to 
define the function of the Party organisation in the industrial 
enterprise as follows
"The Party is the highest organisation form of the 
working class. It is an independent political organisation. 
It has total responsibility for the ideological leadership 
of the factory or mine and has the responsibility for 
supervising the production work of management, According 
to the laws and decrees of the state, the plans of higher 
level economic organs and the directives of higher level 
Party committees, the factory or mine Party committee 
unifies thought and guarantees that the thought and actions 
of Party, management, labour unions and Youth League are in 
accord. This is done by strengthening ideological 
leadership and taking the implementation of the economic 
plan as its central task."^^
Supervision (chien-tu) in this sense allowed the Party 
organisation to interfere in the implementation of policy at the 
basic level when it felt that the laws and decrees of the Party 
and state were being violated and, in the Three Anti Movement, 
the scope of this intervention was very wide indeed. In the 
period prior to that movement, organisations other than the 
Party were usually only involved in checking up on activities at 
lower levels when the Party was found to be bureaucratic or 
corrupt. Such ad-hoc investigations need not necessarily 
involve the formal control apparatus (Peoples Control 
Commissions). We saw in chapter two that in the Yang Ch'ilan 
case, the formal control apparatus was not involved at all and 
the initial investigation was carried out by a newspaper 
reporter. In the case of the Coal Sorting Department of the 
Penhsi Iron and Steel Corporation, the investigation team (tiao- 
chf a-tsu) was only sent down when the Party organisation was 
charged with being bureaucratic and again the formal control
a p p a ra tu s  was n o t  e m p lo ye d .
The problem of control from organs outside the enterprise
was complicated by the fact that Peoples Control Commissions
usually dealt only with people who did not hold Party posts, as
152illustrated in the following example.
In the 24-th North East Military Engineering Works, the PGM 
was responsible for demolishing a building near the works in 
order to use the building materials to expand his own factory. 
The building in question had changed hands several times since 
1937, and its last owner had handed it over to the Military 
Engineering Works for a token sum of money which had never been 
paid. At first the Military Engineering Works had tried to get 
rid of the building, and offered it to the hsien government, who 
could find no use for it. Finally, in January and February 1930 
the FGM secured the agreement of the former hsien magistrate and 
former hsien Party secretary to demolish the building and use 
the materials for refurbishing the Military Engineering Works.
As soon as demolition commenced, the workers joined in a 
free for all gutting of the building and helped themselves to 
materials such as lead from the roof. Someone sent a letter 
describing this situation to Tung Pei Jih-pao, who, instead of 
publishing it, forwarded it to the new hsien Party secretary.
bsien Party secretary should have conducted an investigation 
into the matter through the factory Party apparatus, but instead 
he just drafted a report on the basis of the letter which had 
arrived via the newspaper and sent it on to the Provincial Party 
Committee. Eventually the matter came before the North East
Peoples Control Commission, who appointed a control officer to 
investigate the situation. The control officer organised an 
investigation group, which eventually presented a report to a 
special meeting, at which the Head of the Military Engineering 
Department made a self confession about his dilatoriness in 
controlling what went on in his department. On the recommenda­
tion of the Peoples Control Commission, the FGM was dismissed 
his post and the former hsien magistrate and current Party 
secretary censured. The former hsien Party secretary, however, 
who had authorised the destruction of state property in the 
first place, was not punished by the Peoples Control Commission 
but handed over to disciplinary organs of the Party.
Thus we see a fairly clear example of control being
exercised by the formal control structure only after the Party
authorities had shown that they were incapable or -unwilling to
deal with the problem in hand. Nevertheless, although control
was exercised by organisations other than the Party, the
punishment of Party officers was in the final analysis held to
be the function of the Party itself (except in the simple case
of censure). Secondly, we see another example of the
tremendous importance exercised by the Press as a control
mechanism. As in the Yang Ch'iian case, the press took the
initiative in bringing the matter before the appropriate
authorities, and was reluctant to publish anything unless the
material had gone through the proper channels. In fact, Tung
Pei Jih-pao published its own self confession on 8th April 1930
stating that its initial account of the value and description
155of the property concerned had been inaccurate. "
Thus control during this early period might be exercised by
all kinds of structure above the enterprise when the Party
organisation in question was defective. In some cases, the fact
that structures other than the Party had to be employed was
explained as due to the fact that there were not enough Party
members in the enterprise in question. In the Shihchingshan
Iron and Steel Works, for example, the director (ching-li) and
military representative were held to be guilty of "hard working
bureaucratism" and had failed to notice that equipment was lying
about the works in heaps exposed to the elements. This time an
inspection corps (chien-ch* a-t*uan Q) ) was sent down by
the central Finance and Economic Commission and the Enterprise
Department of the North China Peoples Government, which
rectified the situation and gave impetus to the rapid expansion
154-of the Party to stop such a situation occurring again. '
The rapid expansion of the Party was, however, no guarantee 
against bureaucratism, as the Three Anti Movement demonstrated. 
During that movement, control over the bureaucratism within the 
enterprises was exercised by the Party organisation through the 
local Increase Production and Practise Economy Committees. 
Paradoxically, it was partly as a consequence of the fact that 
the enterprise Party committees were expected to exercise 
detailed control over the implementation of plans that they were 
made subject to such stringent controls from local Party 
committees. In September 1931 the North East Bureau of the 
Party Committee noted that, in the years since liberation, the
Party organisations in the North East area had been remarkably
155successful in learning managerial and technical skills; they
were thus able to control plan implementation. Some three 
months later, however, the head of that bureau, Kao Kang, noted 
that certain Party cadres were overlooking political questions 
in pursuit of production and that they considered being asked to 
do Party work as “taking advantage of honest men" . ^ 6
This was the old question of ts'ai and te. As cadres were 
transferred from the rural sphere following liberation, the 
criterion of te demanded that they achieve ts'ai, and in 
achieving ts1ai, they neglected be and were criticised during 
the Three Anti Movement. In late 1952, after the Three Anti 
Movement was concluded, an attempt was made to steer between the 
two extremes of subordination to management and interference in 
everything. In the words of the Party secretary of the model 
Wu San Factory:-
"In short when the Party committee is engaged in 
political and ideological leadership, when, with production 
as its central task, it is unifying operational measures to 
guarantee and supervise the implementation of higher 
directives and the state plan, under no circumstances may 
it interfere with the management work of the FGM. Of 
course it cannot descend into routine practical work and 
thus be indistinguishable from management.
As the power of the external control agencies grew and the 
horizontal component in the dual-rule scheme of control 
withered, the control function of the Party committee was 
restricted to convening meetings to discuss political obstacles 
standing in the way of plan fulfillment and reporting to the FGM 
on how the plan was being fulfilled. Such was the description 
of Party work at the model Wu San Factory made by its Party 
secretary at the end of 1952, in which the function of the 
Party as "guarantor" of plan fulfillment was given great
351.
138stress. The enterprise Party committees remained, however,
answerable in the first instance to local Party committees and
the fact that their independence of action was not totally
eclipsed was attested to by Li Hsdeh-feng at the Eighth Party 
13QCongress. They were in a position to be completely re-
140vitalised in 1957-8* in contrast to the Soviet Union, where to
all intents and purposes Khruschev was compelled to engage in
the creation of a different kind of Party with completely
141different relations with formal state administration.
Propaganda and Education Function
Although the Party organisation was required to act as a 
co-ordinating and liaison structure and was required, for a 
time at least, to control the bureaucratic behaviour of 
management, most of the literature on the functions of the 
Party organisation in the enterprise deals with its educative 
and propaganda function.
During the New Record Movement, as we have seen, there was
a tendency for the Party organisation to take everything on to
its own shoulders, and this was most noticeable in the fields of
142propaganda and education. Instructions of early 1950 urged
Party branches to share these tasks with management and 
143unions and an attempt was made to draw local Party committees
144into the task of co-ordinating propaganda work, at a time
when the horizontal links were growing weaker. We have seen
that in the early period there was a tendency for Party cadres
to concentrate solely on technical work to make up for their own
inadequacy, and cadres frequently complained that this did not
145leave them enough time to conduct propaganda.  ^ The focus of
educational work was on technical matters and improving literacy
146rather than political education. Various methods were 
suggested to overcome this one-sided stress on basic skills and 
discussion of these methods became a major topic of the various 
propaganda conferences which were held in enterprises at this 
time.14?
In organising propaganda work the Soviet experience was
148explicitly drawn upon, and a distinction was made between
"propaganda” and "agitation". "Propaganda" consisted of
explaining to workers the logic behind a certain policy and
systematising their thoughts, whereas "agitation" was defined as
the promotion of a single course of action and unifying thought.
In theory, "agitation" spelled out what a worker should do and
"propaganda" explained to him why he should do it. It was
pointed out that "propaganda" without "agitation" would make it
impossible to unite the workers to pursue a common goal, and
"agitation" without "propaganda" would make it impossible to
persuade workers why the goal was worthwhile in the first 
149
place. The Soviet distinction between "propaganda" aimed at 
Party members and worker activists and "agitation" aimed at the 
masses does not seem to have been made. The two extremes, 
therefore, were conscious confusion and unconscious unity. The 
task of the Party was to steer between these two extremes.
Initially a distinction was drawn between higher level 
"propagandists" (hsdan-ch1uan-ydan) with a good grounding in 
Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tse-tung’s thought, and lower level 
agitators (ku-tung-ytian) who understood government policy and
1 sohad close ties with the masses. " Later however, a more common 
distinction was to he between lower level "propagandists" (hsdan- 
ch'uan-yilan) and higher level "reporting officers" (pao-kao-ydan).
It was this second distinction that was put forward as an 
attempt was made to establish a propaganda network on a national
scale after the Central Committee Decision on Propaganda of
151January 1951* This decision called for the recruitment of
large numbers of Party propagandists to explain to the masses
current domestic and international developments (and thus to link
production with support for the Korean War), to publish Party
policy and the policies of the Peoples Government, to publicise
the duties of the masses, and in particular those duties
directly related to the period of time (i.e. the current
political or economic movement) and the locality in question, to
narrate model experiences in production and other fields, to
refute reactionary rumours and mistaken ideas, to assist the
Party in its choice of propaganda material, and to make regular
reports to Party committees on the state of the people's 
152consciousness. ^ Much of the source material for this essay 
derives from such material, for precise instructions were given 
on each of the major movements of the time and on political and 
economic organisation. The numerous pamphlets issued during this 
period have provided us with what is, in my opinion, the richest 
source of information on basic level policy from liberation until 
the Cultural Revolution, although perhaps the material of 1956-7 
is more startling in its revelations.
Within each factory, propagandists were appointed and their 
duties were determined by the enterprise Party committee.
Representatives of these propagandists were to attend regular
propaganda meetings at hsien level and above and as many as
possible were to attend special training classes at Party 
154-schools. " In addition, higher level Party committees were
required to send down reporting officers to the factories to
155give speeches on major issues. ^  To help propaganda work m
the factories, Journals were published^a§d regional posts for
157disseminating propaganda set up.
It is very difficult to make any generalisation on the
ratio of propagandists to workers in the factories. At the
y\ eg
beginning of 1951, ike ratio at Anshan was 1:20-25 (mainly
Party members), whereas by the end of 1952 the ratio at the Wu
San Factory was something of the order of 1:10 or 1:5-6, if one
includes the even lower level or propaganda-activist, which
15Q
compares with a Party membership rationof 1:11. ' These
figures are, of course, much higher than for urban areas in
general, where in Shanghai, for example, in September 1951 the
160ratio was 1:326. In the model Wu San Factory there were
either 24-8 or 316 propagandists (from two different undated
accounts around the end of 1 9 5 2), 157 propaganda-activists,
7 reporting officers, 12 broadcasters, who together organised
30 broadcase listening groups (with 500 people taking part), 60
newspaper reading groups (with 500 people taking part), 8 art
groups, one cultural workers’ team (wen-kung-tui), 11 smaller
161cultural workers' groups (wen-kung-tsu) and one band. 
Unfortunately, we are not told how many workers there were in
y\ r p
the factory, but I estimate some 2-3,000 people. The Wu 
San Factory did not pretend to be typical, but it illustrates 
the kind of propaganda organisation that was aimed at.
The one s t r i k in g  th in g  about th e  propaganda m a te r ia l  f o r  th e
e a r ly  1950s is  i t s  sh eer d e t a i l .  P am phlets  appeared on e v e ry
c o n c e iv a b le  s u b je c t ,  r ig h t  down to  th e  la y o u t o f  a m eetin g  
163h a l l .  " As f a r  as I  know, n o th in g  so d e t a i le d  e x is te d  b e fo re  
o r  a f t e r ,  a t  le a s t  f o r  g e n e ra l consum ption . T h is  i s ,  o f  c o u rs e , 
a v e ry  s u b je c t iv e  im p re s s io n , f o r  one cannot judge a q u e s tio n  
l i k e  t h is  w ith o u t h a v in g  been th e r e  in  th e  p e r io d  in  q u e s t io n .
I t  was c e r t a in ly  more d e t a i le d  th a n  th e  m a te r ia l  a v a i la b le  in  
bookshops d u r in g  th e  m id d le  1 9 5 0 s , about w h ich  I  can speak from  
p e rs o n a l o b s e rv a t io n . Many o f  th e  propaganda handbooks o f  th e  
e a r ly  1950s resem ble  m i l i t a r y  b a s ic  t r a in in g  m anuals , and th e  
c o n t r a d ic t io n  betw een t h is  ty p e  o f  l i t e r a t u r e  and m a c r o - p o l i t ic a l  
propaganda, such as on th e  K orean W ar, was a g la r in g  one. I t  
was a l l  too  easy f o r  th e  o ld  r u r a l  c a d re s , whom Kao Kang
164d e s c rib e d  as u n w i l l in g  to  b o th e r  w ith  a d m in is t r a t iv e  d e t a i l ,
to  o v e rlo o k  th e  fo rm e r and i t  was a l l  too  easy f o r  w o rker cad res
o f  a low  le v e l  o f  l i t e r a c y  n o t to  u n d e rs tan d  th e  l a t t e r .  We saw
in  c h a p te r  fo u r  th a t  in  th e  v e ry  e a r ly  p e r io d  p o l i t i c a l
consciousness d id  n o t alw ays go to g e th e r  w ith  a h ig h  l e v e l  o f
l i t e r a c y ,  a t  le a s t  in  th e  im m ediate  p o s t l i b e r a t i o n  s i t u a t io n ,
and th e  P a r ty  s e c r e ta ry  o f  th e  Wu San F a c to ry  n o ted  t h a t  th e
k e e p in g  o f  p ro p a g a n d is ts 1 d ia r ie s  was a u s e fu l  way in  r a is in g
165t h e i r  l i t e r a c y  l e v e l .  F u rth e rm o re , one o f  th e  m ajo r  
argum ents in  fa v o u r  o f  r a d io  propaganda was t h a t  many w o rkers  
were i l l i t e r a t e .
The P a r ty  b ranch  was to  a c h ie v e  some k in d  o f  a p p ro p r ia te  
m ix betw een th e  two ty p e s  o f  propaganda and to  d e v is e  a way o f  
m a in ta in in g  r e v o lu t io n a r y  fe rv o u r  and a c o n c e n tra t io n  on d e t a i l .
In the early 1950s, it would seem that the Party believed that 
enthusiasm could co-exist with administrative detail. We have 
seen however that a concentration on detail led frequently to 
"hard-working bureaucratism", where whatever enthusiasm a Party 
cadre might have was not much use if there were no time for him 
to communicate it to the masses. The prescribed attitude was one 
not of enthusiasm per se but of "activism", which was infectious 
and, having looked at the detailed cost accounting manuals of the 
period, my mind boggles at the thought of an activist cost- 
accountant. During the Great Leap Forward, this problem could 
only be dealt with by an insistance that Party cadres did not 
encumber themselves with administrative detail, and both the
/ \ r r~ ) A r o
Great Leap Forward ' and the Cultural Revolution were most 
iconoclastic in their treatment of detailed regulations.
Not only was there a potential contradiction between 
activism and attention to detail, but also between medium and 
message. For example, the Party was to propagate the attack on 
functional leadership, and yet in so doing it exercised itself a 
kind of functional leadership. If the Party ceased to exercise 
functional leadership, it would no longer exercise any 
leadership at all and would become only the adjunct of 
management, with scarcely any more power than personnel 
management in a traditional western factory.
Formal and Informal Structure
In chapter four, we saw that a lack of necessary resources 
resulted frequently in patterns of organisational superimposition 
where the network of control (in the sense of k'ung-chih) was
not congruent with the formal organisational structure. In 1953
an all out attempt was made to achieve congruence and to replace
patterns of functional supervision by a staff-line system. In
this chapter we have seen that the Party organisation was
similarly superimposed upon the formal organisation and likewise
exercised functional supervision over the shop floor. Unlike the
shih-kung and tiao-tu systems, however, the system of Party
organisation was a permanent feature that could never be replaced
so long as the particular resource-lack that it was required to
control (inadequate political consciousness) was present, and so
long as informal networks of power and communication overlay the
formal organisational structure. In Marxist terms, its function
could only be replaced when administration was truly by 
16°things. y In the meantime, the role of the Party organisation 
in relation to that part of human behaviour in the organisation 
that was not prescribed by, nor in accord with, formal 
regulations.
From Frederick Taylor through to Stalin, there have been 
organisational theorists who chose either to neglect informal 
organisational networks or to attempt to force them into 
prescribed formal patterns. Under such systems, personnel
, /i
management is concerned with creating organisational men. An 
alternative approach seeks to focus loyalty not upon the 
organisation, but upon levels both higher and lower than the 
organisation. At the lower level, it seeks not to force people 
into subdivisions of the formal organisation, but to infuse 
existing levels of group solidarity with committment to the 
same values as the formal organisation. At higher levels, it
seeks n o t to  ex ten d  th e  fo cu s  o f  lo y a l t y  th ro u g h  a h ie r a r c h y  o f  
fo rm a l o r g a n is a t io n , b u t to  focus  i t  on a p a r t i c u la r  symbol 
c lu s t e r  w h ich  is  th e  source o f  le g i t im a c y ,  o f  n o t o n ly  th e  
d i f f e r e n t  le v e ls  o f  fo rm a l o r g a n is a t io n , b u t a ls o  o f  in fo rm a l  
g ro u p in g s .
The above " p ro te s ta n t"  model i s ,  I  t h in k ,  r e le v a n t  to  a 
s tu d y  o f  C hinese o r g a n is a t io n . A t th e  r is k  o f  g ro s s ly  o v e r­
s im p l i f y in g  th e  p ro b le m , I  would c h a r a c te r is e  th e  d i f fe r e n c e  
betw een th e  v ie w  o f  o r g a n is a t io n  in h e r i t e d  by th e  Communist 
P a r ty  from  i t s  r u r a l  e x p e rie n c e  and th e  S o v ie t  v ie w  as fo l lo w s .  
The fo rm er saw th e  in d iv id u a l 's  p r im a ry  lo y a l t y  to  th e  s m a ll 
group and to  a c lu s t e r  o f  symbols a t  th e  n a t io n a l  l e v e l ,  whereas  
th e  l a t t e r  saw th e  in d iv id u a l 's  p r im a ry  lo y a l t y  to  a le v e l  
h ig h e r  th a n  th e  s m a ll group -  to  th e  o rg a n is a t io n  and an 
e x te n s io n  o f  th a t  lo y a l t y  th ro u g h  a com plex h ie r a r c h y ,  a t  th e  
apex o f  w hich stood  th e  same symbol c lu s t e r .  In  th e  S o v ie t  
v ie w , com m ittm ent to  any group s m a lle r  th a n  th e  o rg a n is a t io n  o r
i t s  s u b d iv is io n s  was seen as p o t e n t i a l l y  d is r u p t iv e  and t h is
170r e s u lte d  in  a to m is a t io n . In  th e  C hinese r u r a l  v ie w , th e  k ey  
to  u n i t y  la y  n o t in  sm ashing in fo r m a l s t r u c tu r e s ,  b u t in  
p o l i t i c i s i n g  them , and th e  k ey  a c to r  in  t h a t  p ro cess  was th e  
P a r ty  o r g a n i s a t i o n . ^
In  ou r s tu d y  so f a r  we have seen th e  c u r io u s  phenomenon o f  
t r a d i t i o n a l  work gangs c o n t in u in g  a f t e r  l i b e r a t i o n ,  a f t e r  
chang ing  t h e i r  names to  " te am s ", and a p rocess o f  d e m o c ra tic  
re fo rm  w hich sought to  c r e a te  new form s o f  " r a t io n a l"  
o r g a n is a t io n  b u t ,  w hich in  f a c t  c o n c e n tra te d  s im p ly  on r o o t in g  
o u t gang -bosses. We have seen a s i t u a t io n  where groups were
allowed to form "spontaneously” (under labour union leadership) 
to effect emergency repairs. The use of the word "spontaneous" 
could well be a meaningless propaganda device, but it might also 
mean that there were some pre-existing patterns upon which groups 
could be formed, and all that really concerned Party and 
management was how such groups might be led. Such a practice 
was very different from the Soviet prescription of the 
production territorial system, where the nature of production 
determined the structure of organisation and the network of 
command. It is my subjective impression that, until 1953* it 
was not absolutely clear whether existing structures should be 
politicised as a prelude for organisational change or whether 
organisation changes should be pushed through to provide a focus 
for new committments. As long as the former was considered a 
realistic alternative, the independent role of the Party 
organisation was extremely important. After 1953* however, 
when the production territorial system and one-man management 
was pushed most vigorously, the prescribed role of the Party 
could be no more than an adjunct to a process which sought to 
bring as much of the informal organisation as possible under the 
control of the formal organisation, rather than the former 
process which sought primarily to correct individual behaviour 
and focus loyalty on the new national symbol cluster. It was 
Mao’s view (in 1962) that adherence to the Soviet model (until 
1958 ) was unpleasant but necessary. In a situation where 
the gang boss system persisted and where traditional practices 
such as the employment of relatives were continued, perhaps 
some drastic policy was necessary. The reaction, however, was 
to be the Great Leap Forward and more particularly the Cultural
Revolution, which saw a reaffirmation of the protestant 
principle, not only of organisation but also of committment.
Conclusion
I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter a decline 
in the independent role of the Party within Chinese enterprises 
from liberation until 1953. Such a decline was not however a 
very steady one, for in the Three Anti Movement that decline, 
together with the erosion of horizontal linkages, was 
temporarily reversed.
In examining the role of the Party as an agent of liaison 
and control, we have seen that an increase in the number of 
control structures diluted its effectiveness as a check on the 
arbitrary actions of management, and the doctrine of one-man 
management made such actions more possible. In such a situation 
democracy, however,defined, could not but be weakened. As a 
result of the growth of patterns of one-man management, the 
major persisting role of the Party was that of propaganda. 
Ironically, in the period of the greatest Party independence, 
Party members were frequently too busy learning technology to 
exercise this role effectively and it was only after the power 
of the Party organisation had been restricted that the 
propaganda role was effectively exercised. By that time 
propaganda was to reinforce the directives of management.
We have seen that the rapid expansion of the Party resulted 
in a somewhat different membership composition by the beginning 
of the First Five Year Plan. The change in membership 
composition must surely have been an important factor in the
change in organisational perspective from one which stressed 
the combination of collective leadership and individual 
responsibility to one which in practice was more of single 
leadership and multiple control.
In terms of rationality, I have attempted to suggest that 
the relationship between organisational change and politicisa­
tion might have raised questions of priority in the hierarchy of 
immediate ends against which organisational rationality might 
be measured. This question is left open, since no conclusion is 
really possible without detailed comparison of organisational 
priorities, both in the rural and urban spheres, throughout the 
whole period from 1937 onwards.
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CHAPTER NINE THE LABOUR UNION BRANCH
In this chapter, we shall consider the role of the labour 
union organisation within state run industrial enterprises. 
Developments within the labour unions parallelled developments 
within the Party organisation. Consequently, some unions came 
under criticism in the period immediately following liberation 
for taking over more functions than those laid down by the 
Sixth Labour Conference of 19^8. In the immediate post 
liberation period, however, very few union branches were actually 
in operation and, when union organisations were established over 
most of the country, they were held to be guilty of 
Mbureaucratism”, as they became bogged down in administrative 
detail. With the Party rectification movement of "1950, an 
attempt was made to redefine the functions of the unions both at 
a national level and within the enterprises and, as has been 
noted by Paul Harper, this led to a situation where unions came 
under attack for "economism" in 1 9 5^- The union rectification 
of that year merged into the Three Anti Movement, after which 
the unions reverted once again to their role of "tools of 
management", and this was to be the subject of renewed 
criticism in "1 9 5 7-
In discussing the labour unions, I shall try not to 
duplicate the work of Paul Harper except in those areas where I 
disagree with him: nor will I talk about the very important
welfare functions undertaken by the unions during this period, 
since they relate only marginally to the problem of 
bureaucratism and democracy that are the major themes of this 
essay.
Union Membership
The Chinese Communist Party’s conception of a labour union
was that of an industrial union (ch'an-yeh kung-hui) rather than
2
a craft union (chih-yeh kung-hui). An enterprise union branch 
aimed at a total membership of all white and blue collar workers 
irrespective of job or trade, and excluded only those whom class 
status and counter-revolutionary activities disqualified. Such 
a composition is reflected in the term "staff and workers union" 
(chih-kung-hui) , which many unions were initially called, 
though later the simple term "labour union" (kung-hui) came into 
wider usage. It was felt that the craft unions that existed in 
the days before liberation divided the work force and led to 
alienation between white and blue collar workers.' The 
literature cites, with some justification but even more 
exaggeration, the fragmented work force in some British industri­
al units as an example of the pernicious nature of craft 
unions. Nevertheless, when the All China Federation of Labour 
(ACFL) (Chung Hua Ch'tLan-kuo Tsung-kung-hui) (known in English 
after 1953 as the All China Federation of Trade Unions) was 
brought back to life in 194-8 at the Sixth Labour Conference, it
7
was mainly representatives of craft unions that attended. By 
1950 ten national labour unions hierarchies were under
Q
construction, linked at lower levels by general labour unions 
(tsung-kung-hui).
Q
Membership of a labour union was voluntary' and, by 1952,
1090% of all industrial workers had been enrolled. The main 
criterion for joining was "membership of the working class", 
which took no account of class origin (at least formally), and
a member of the working class was defined as anyone who derived
his principal source of livelihood from hiring out his labour
11
(mental or manual). In the early years, this broad definition 
of "working class" led to a certain amount of confusion, as 
workers failed to understand the logic behind a senior manager 
being a member of the same union organisation as a part-time
auxilliary worker purely on the grounds that they worked in the
12same enterprise, or why a peasant who let his land m  order
15to work in a factory should be a union member. "
The looseness of criteria for membership contributed to 
two phenomena which were considered to be highly detrimental to 
union development. Firstly, as we have seen, "feudal elements" 
such as gang bosses and runaway landlords were able to use their 
former influence and connections to be elected to union office, 
and secondly, as we shall see, union leadership was often 
monopolised by people who held concurrent management posts.
Formation of Union Branches
It is my impression that the line of demarcation between
Party and union organisation in both the liberated and "white"
areas in the period prior to liberation was not very clear.
In the opinion of the reporter Chao Ch'ao-kou, who visited
Yenan in June and July 1944, the Party committee was the nucleus
14of the union organisation m  the factories he visited, and an 
examination of the quite detailed material on the workers 
movement in Shanghai has led me to the tentative conclusion 
that the "red unions" in the white areas constituted a kind of 
outer party with no clear cut organisational or functional
d i s t i n c t io n  betw een th e  fo rm a l P a r ty  o r g a n is a t io n  and th e  fo rm a l 
u n io n  o rg a n is a t io n .^ 1"
I n  th e  s i t u a t io n  im m e d ia te ly  fo l lo w in g  l i b e r a t i o n  where 
P a r ty  branches were a b le  sometimes to  usurp  m a n a g e ria l 
a u t h o r i t y ,  one m ig h t e xp ec t t h a t  th e  u n io n s  w hich were  
i n e x t r ic a b ly  t i e d  to  th e  P a r ty  o r g a n is a t io n  would sh are  in  t h is  
p ro c e s s . Such a s i t u a t io n  is  suggested by Kao Kang in  th e  
fo l lo w in g  quote
’’There  have been p e o p le  who have caused th e  la b o u r  
u n io n s  to  ta k e  o v e r some a sp ec ts  o f  th e  a d m in is t r a t iv e  
work o f  FGMs. Everyone knows t h a t  t h is  is  w rong. The 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  and work o f  th e  la b o u r  u n io n s  a re  to  
u n ite  and o rg a n is e  th e  b ro ad  masses o f  th e  w o rk e rs , to  
ed u cate  them so t h a t  th e  whole body o f  th e  w o rke r masses 
m ig h t u n d e rs ta n d  t h e i r  r o le  as ’’m a s te r” , to  enhance t h e i r  
consciousness o f  la b o u r  d i s c i p l i n e ,  to  f o s t e r  t h e i r  
a c t iv is m  and concern  f o r  p ro d u c t io n , to  exchange 
e x p e rie n c e s  w ith  one a n o th e r , to  le a r n  p ro d u c tio n  
management and fu r th e rm o re  to  work, f o r  th e  p r o te c t io n  o f  
th e  w o rk in g  c la s s .  I f  la b o u r  u n io n s  a re  tu rn e d  in to  
o rd in a ry  a d m in is t r a t iv e  o rg a n s , th e y  w i l l  c o n s e q u e n tly  
s tan d  as r i v a l s  to  f a c to r y  management. P a r a l l e l  
a d m in is t r a t iv e  organs w i l l  s tand  s id e  by s id e  and i t  is  
q u ite  m a n ife s t th a t  t h is  w i l l  impede th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  
system s o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ”^
I t  is  im p o s s ib le  to  say to  what e x te n t  th e  above phenomenon 
was a r e s u l t  o f  c o n fu s io n  betw een P a r ty  and u n io n  o r g a n is a t io n s ,  
and to  what e x te n t  i t  r e s u lte d  from  th e  f a c t  t h a t  u n io n  o f f ic e r s  
sometimes h e ld  c o n c u rre n t management p o s ts . W h ich ever was th e  
c a s e , I  know o f  no in s ta n c e  where th e  FGM was c o n c u r r e n t ly  
la b o u r  u n io n  ch a irm an . I  h a v e , fu r th e rm o re , seen no account o f  
e x a c t ly  how la b o u r  u n io n  branches came to  usurp  th e  fu n c t io n s  
o f management and can o n ly  suggest th a t  t h is  phenomenon was, 
l i k e  th e  s im i la r  phenomenon o f  P a r ty  u s u rp a tio n  o f  m a n a g e ria l 
p o s i t io n ,  a r e s u l t  o f  th e  im p o rtan ce  o f  h o r iz o n ta l  l in k a g e s
between lo c a l  governm ent, P a r ty  and u n io n  s t r u c tu r e s .  In  
T ie n t s in ,  where th e  prob lem  o f  l e f t  excesses was most s e r io u s  
p r io r  to  L iu  S h a o - c h 'i 's  v i s i t ,  la b o u r  u n io n  work was th e  d i r e c t  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  each group o f  f i v e  cad res  who c o n s t itu te d  a 
s t r e e t  governm ent, and who tended  to  re g a rd  th e  la b o u r  u n io n s  in  
much th e  same way as P oor P easan t A s s o c ia t io n s  in  th e  r u r a l  
sphere.^
P o l ic y  d u r in g  th e  im m ediate  p o s t - l ib e r a t io n  p e r io d  demanded
t h a t  la b o u r  u n io n  o rg a n is a t io n s  be c re a te d  from  th e  b a s ic
i Pi 1 O( e n t e r p r is e )  l e v e l ,  b o th  upwards and downwards. J Thus,
i n i t i a l l y ,  m u n ic ip a l l e v e l  and sub m u n ic ip a l l e v e l  u n io n
o rg a n is a t io n s  a c q u ire d  an im p o rtan ce  f a r  g r e a te r  th a n  th e
n a t io n a l  l e v e l  o r g a n is a t io n  and e n te r p r is e  le v e l  u n io n  b ranches
were e s ta b lis h e d  b e fo re  th o se  a t  shop l e v e l ,  where o th e r  form s
20o f  ’’c e l l  o r g a n is a t io n "  served  as tem p o ra ry  u n io n  s t r u c tu r e s .
Where P a r ty  b ranches had s u rv iv e d  th e  C i v i l  W ar, th e s e  b ranches
  . 21to o k  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  m  fo rm in g  a u n io n  a p p a ra tu s , and where
th e re  was no P a r ty  b ranch  upon l i b e r a t i o n ,  u n io n  fo rm a tio n  was
e i t h e r  postponed u n t i l  such a b ranch  was c re a te d  o r  was
e s ta b lis h e d  when cad res  were sen t down from  m u n ic ip a l o r  lo w e r
22le v e ls  o f  u n io n  o r g a n is a t io n .
L iu  C h *an g -s h en g , th e  D ir e c to r  o f  th e  E a s t C h ina  and
Shanghai o f f ic e s  o f  th e  ACFL, d e s c rib e d  th e  id e a l  s te p s  to  be
23ta k e n  m  fo rm in g  a u n io n  b ran ch  as fo l lo w s .  ^ F i r s t ,  a forum  o f  
a c t iv is t s  was summoned by th e  P a r ty  com m ittee o r  by c ad res  s e n t 
down by h ig h e r  l e v e ls ,  and t h is  forum  e le c te d  backbone e lem en ts  
(k u -k a n  f e n - t z u )  who o rg a n is e d  a c o n fe re n c e  o f  a l l  w o rk e rs .
The c o n fe re n c e  d iscu s sed  th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  a u n io n
preparatory committee and "extensive ideological and political
mobilisation took place". Activists were deputed to go down
into every shop and department to solicit suggestions about the
establishment of a union organisation, after which a conference
(or, in the cases of large enterprises, a delegate meeting) was
convened to propose a list of candidates for membership of the
preparatory committee. Finally, a formal conference of all
workers was held to vote on the list and to establish union
organs to carry out day to day work. At municipal level, model
union branches were selected and these formed the basis for the
24-formation of future enterprise union branches. Within the 
city of Shanghai in July 194-9* unions existed at four levels - 
municipal general labour union, industrial unions (for each 
industry, enterprise union branches and union delegates at 
workshop level.Eventually these shop delegates formed shop 
committees and union teams were elected, thus making a three 
level union organisation within the enterprise.
Enterprise union organisations were to fulfil five 
functions. Firstly, they were to serve a "transmission belt"
function between Party and workers (kung-ch'an-tang yfl kung-jen
26lien-hsi ch'i-lai ti p fi-tai) (sometimes yin-tai or niu-tai).
Secondly, they were to act as the legal representatives of the
workers on joint committees, such as the factory management
committee, and in drawing up collective contracts on their
behalf. Thirdly, they were to serve as a liaison organisation
27between the workers and other mass organisations. f Fourthly,
they were to share with the Party the task of educating the
28workers and conducting propaganda. Finally, they were to work 
with the relevant welfare and wage departments of management to
ensure that the stipulations concerning wages and welfare laid 
down in the collective contracts were adhered to.^ All five of 
these functions were important during the New Democratic Period , 
though, later, the last two functions were the only ones to he 
really significant. The first (Leninist) function, that of a 
"transmission belt”, depended to a very large extent upon the 
particular functions the Party committee was serving in the 
enterprise at any given time. We have seen that Party 
secretaries and Party committees had the power to suspend union 
officers and call for re-election of union committees and, 
despite instances where at a national level the Union 
organisation was in a position to strive for independence from 
the Party, the union organisation at enterprise level was 
probably always subordinate to the Party organisation. 
Consequently, when Party branches within industry became 
"bureaucratic” and subordinate to management after the initial 
radical period following liberation, union committees were 
likewise affected.
"Tools of Management"
Paul Harper argues that the "traditional tendency of 
Chinese labour organisations to serve as tools of management had 
come to the fore in 1950". He notes that the various strikes 
of late 1949, together with the economic crisis of March-June 
1950, caused the Party to step in with a firm hand, "stressing 
compromise and ignoring class struggle". The increasingly 
conservative tendency in the policy and activities of the labour 
unions in the first half of 1950 was dictated by a need to 
restore production as soon as possible; this stress on 
compromise and a tendency towards conservatism was, Harper
feels, particularly noticeable in the private sector, but also
31common in the public sector.
In using the term "traditional tendency", Harper confuses 
the nature of the "red" and "yellow" labour unions of pre- 
liberation days. Although the unions that were not led by the
Communist Party during the pre-liberation days were not
32completely tools of government, they were subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Kuomintang Social Department (She-hui-pu), 
which was attacked by even the non-Communist "left" as an 
organisation concerned with training secret agents.^ According 
to the Kuomintang government labour union law, membership of 
labour unions was compulsory and the unions were subject to
control by local government, who had the power to dissolve
34-them. Such unions were basically control organisations (at
least in practice) that were said to be infiltrated by agents of
the Military Secret Service (Chfln-t "ung-chft).^  In their latter
years they only mobilised the workers in connection with rooting
out Communists (for example, they formed work protection units
(hu-kung-tui).^  "Red" labour unions, on the other hand, were
always mobilisation organs. The literature is full of examples
of red unions initiating strikes, even at a time when there was
37formally peace between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang.
Harper cannot possibly be comparing the pre and post liberation
"red labour unions" in talking of a traditional tendency to
become tools of management. It is unlikely that he is talking 
%
about the "red labour unions" of the liberated areas, about 
which there is hardly any evidence, and what there is from the 
immediate post liberation period reveals an attitude markedly to 
the left of the Party c e n t r e . I f  he is in fact comparing the
non-Communist unions of the ”white areas” with the new post 
liberation unions, I would suggest that such a comparison is 
inappropriate, since they were different kinds of organisation.
Secondly, I would disagree with Harper that the spring of
1950 was particularly significant in establishing a conservative
line. Such a line can be traced right back to December 194-7*
through Liu’s Tientsin Talks of the spring of 194-9; throughout
this period the Party was constantly stepping in with a firm 
40hand, and it was not until 1951 that the policy of mass
mobilisation radically changed this situation in the urban
sector. Thirdly, the strikes that occurred in late 194-9 seem to
41have been largely in the private sector and to have been a
continuation of the ”left excesses” that hate from long before
Liu’s Tientsin talks. Indeed, in the state sector in the spring
of 1950, the atmosphere was, if anything, a little less
conservative, in that it was felt appropriate at that time to
carry out some measure of democratic reform in North China,
during which time middle management of the Yang Ch'dan variety
42came under attack.
The tendency for labour unions to side with management was 
not so much due to any continuation of tradition as to the fact 
that union cadres often held concurrent management posts, that 
they were subject to repeated transfer, leaving their branches 
in the hands of inexperienced cadres, that they were probably 
too busy with the sheer paper work involved in establishing a 
union apparatus to give constructive criticism to management, 
and finally that, lil^ e the Party, they were too busy studying 
technology to be anything but compliant.
In an article on labour union organisation in Kirin 
province in March 1950, it was noted that in some enterprise 
union committees, the majority of members held concurrent
LL7,
management posts.  ^ In the Shih ChiL Tzu Copper Mine, for
example, out of a labour union committee of six people, only two
had no concurrent management post. In a match factory in the
same province, a committee of seven contained only two members
with no concurrent post. One labour union chairman held eight
concurrent posts. In other places, workshop supervisors and one
deputy Party secretary held union posts. There was a tendency
to promote workers who had proven their ability in labour union
work to managerial positions. In the Shih C M  Tzu Mine, for
example, nineteen labour union cadres were promoted to
managerial posts from the emulation drive of May 19^9 to March
1950 (an average loss of two cadres per month), which deprived
44the union of any degree of continuity and any effective power.
The problem of transfer of cadres was made worse by the 
rapid expansion of industrial units as production was restored. 
During this process of expansion every effort was made to train 
large numbers of managerial personnel, for there was an 
unwillingness to rely for long upon retained personnel who,
according to Kao Kang, were ’’only able to master relatively
45 . •backward techniques”. y In any case, there were insufficient
retained technicians. Every means possible was used to bring
forward new talent and the union became "a school for
46 . •management”. We saw in chapter one that the participation of
workers in management began to be interpreted more and more as
training workers to become managers. By December 1950, 441
workers had been promoted to the rank of PGM in the North East,
484 to section chief and 2,247 to technician.^ By April 1952,
in the East China Region 7* 962 people had heen promoted to the
rank of production management cadre, of whom 2,040 were to the
48level of FGM or deputy FGM. At that time in the coal industry 
over the whole country 1,585 white and blue collar workers had 
been promoted to the rank of FGM Mine general manager or 
division chief (ch'u-chang)
In a situation where the unions provided a vehicle for 
promotion to management, a rapid turnover of union cadres was 
inevitable. The more able cadres would be creamed off into 
management or into the Party (if their talents were more 
political than managerial), leaving the less able and 
inexperienced in union jobs. It is not surprising therefore
that in 1951 such cadres complained that they were only treated
50as "fourth class". In a climate where Party and union cadres 
were enjoined to learn all about production and study technology, 
there is little wonder that the more inexperienced union cadres 
would tend not to oppose those who did know about such things.
It was probably because of a desire not to hand union work over 
to completely inexperienced personnel that union cadres 
sometimes retained their posts after promotion to management, as 
in the Kirin examples, and this could only add to their 
inclination to serve the interests of management.
The problem of subordination to management was not simply 
caused by rapid promotion and the holding of concurrent posts. 
Union cadres were frequently moved around even when they held no 
concurrent management post. This led to a situation, condemned 
by Li Li-san in June 1950, where large numbers of cadres existed
in enterprise union organisations who had been sent in from the 
51outside. Such cadres were no familiar with their new place of 
work, and were not the best people to represent the interests of 
the workers in discussions with management, much less act as a 
check to the arbitrary actions of FGMs.
Rapid transfer, and the holding of concurrent posts led to 
an alienation between union and workers which, as we have seen 
in the case of the Party, was described as "bureaucratism".. 
Perhaps the most important contributory factor in such 
bureaucratism, however, was the sheer weight of paper work that 
union cadres were required to undertake. The following figures 
for the expansion of union membership can give one some idea of 
the paper work that must have been involved.
1943 1,448,228
190-9 2,375,958
1950 4,904,408
1951 6,130,977
mid 1952 7,297,85752
end of 1952 10,000,000 (approx)"
Investigation had to be carried out as to the class status of
54.
each applicant for union membership and labour insurance-^  and
there was seldom time to do this adequately. Indeed, one of the
explicit aims of Democratic Reform was to persuade workers to
55correct their initial applications.^
The labour union law of June 1950 stipulated that the ratio
of union cadres free from production work to total employees
56within industrial enterprises should be as follows:- 
1 cadre for 200-500 white and blue collar workers
2 cadres for 501-1000 white and blue collar workers
3 cadres for 1001-2500 1 " " n
4 cadres for 2501-4000 " " " "
In addition to the process of registration, union cadres were 
required to attend training classes and cadre schools, to 
organise training classes and literacy classes for union 
members, to supervise the initiation of various welfare projects 
etc. It may well be that in this initial period the volume of 
work assigned to an inexperienced labour union cadre meant that 
he had time only to concentrate on the paper work assigned to 
him (for on this he would be immediately judged) and left his 
mass work unattended to. It would be very difficult indeed for 
a cadre in a large enterprise to keep his pulse on the opinions 
of up to 1000 workers.
Policy during this early period after liberation was to 
keep the number of full time union cadres to a minimum, and this 
was reflected in the labour union law. Many instances are cited 
of factories who employed too many union cadres, and official 
policy only permitted a large number of non-productive cadres 
during the period of initial registration.^ After that period 
the problem remained of what to do with the cadres appointed to 
conduct that registration. They could be transferred, which 
added to the problem of "outside cadres" that I have mentioned 
above; they could be deprived of their union post (a most 
unlikely policy in the period following liberation), or they 
could remain where they were. In the Lung Feng Coal Mine in the 
North East, for example, they remained where they were. 63 full 
time cadres were employed for a labour force of 18,000, which 
gives a ratiohof 1:280. This ratiofiwas said to be a 
contributory factor in alienating the union cadres from the
CO
masses* Presumably Just; as too few union cadres meant that 
the burden of paper work was excessive, which resulted in 
bureaucratism, too many tended to produce a union elite which 
likewise was alienated from the masses*
The problem here was how to determine the optimum number of 
union cadres* The prescribed formula was to adhere to the 
stipulations of the labour union law, which kept full-time 
cadres to a minimum, and employ a large number of union 
activists who engaged in union work in their spare time* In 
this respect a model union organisation was the Plaster Works of 
the Par East Electronics Bureau in Talien, which had only two 
full time cadres (the branch chairman and secretary) for more 
than 1,100 workers, but a large number of activists who divided 
their union work into ten specialist committees. 7
Activists, however, required a certain degree of 
administrative skill to sit on the specialised committees 
(wages, welfare,. etc*) and although there might have been 
sufficient material in Talien, such skill was at such a premium 
elsewhere that such activists would probably be offered 
management posts* It is the boast of some British trade unions 
that their shop stewards have as much managerial skill as line 
management. This situation is only possible when either skilled 
labour is in plentiful supply or where union work offers as much 
satisfaction as management work. Clearly, in a situation where 
almost all considerations were becoming subordinate to questions 
of production, a skilled activist would prefer to lead 
production himself rather than fulfil an auxiliary role in the
production process, A skilled activist would only be content 
with a union post if the tasks and goals of the union were quite 
different from management. If they were not, union cadres 
would remain "fourth class".
Union Rectification and "Economism"
By 1950 the union branches were considered to be guilty of
"bureaucratism", which I have tried to argue was yet another
result of the contradiction between policy and resources.
Consequently, the Party rectification movement launched at the
Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee in June 1950 was
60applied also to the labour unions, and the process of union
rectification proceeded under the leadership of the Party
61committee at the same level.
In criticising "bureaucratism" the rectification movement 
sparked off a debate within the labour unions on the precise 
difference in function between Party, management and unions 
within the enterprise. Launching the discussion at the end of 
July 1950, Teng Tzu-hui, Vice Chairman of the Central South 
Finance and Economics Committee, castigated labour unions for 
alienation from the masses, which he felt was due directly to 
the fact that they had confused their functions with management. 
In that the workposts (kang-wei) and work tasks were different, 
there was surely some difference in "concrete standpoint" (li-* 
ch*ang), even though their base standpoint was the same • It was 
the (job of unions to see that the interests of the workers were 
not sacrificed to the goals of increasing production, though 
demands for increased benefits were to be based on greater 
productivity. Teng felt that the fact that so many union
branches lined up with management meant that secret agents could 
hide behind left slogans and incite the workers to oppose both 
management and unions. There was a tendency for union cadres to 
talk high-sounding phrases about the glorious future and long 
term benefits whilst ignoring the immediate demands of the 
workers. Some cadres had persuaded workers to take a cut in 
wages for the sake of long term benefits and this only increased 
alienation. In Teng's view, savings could be generated by other 
means, such as economising on raw materials and fuel. Though the 
thrust of Teng's argument was to oppose the stress on long term 
benefits at the expense of short term ones, he did point out the 
dangers of the opposite policy, which was to become the main 
concern in the second half of 1951»
In the debate which followed, constant reference was made 
to Teng's speech. What was particularly significant was his 
suggestion that there was a possibility that some differences in 
standpoint (li-chf ang) could exist. In the terminology of the 
Chinese Communist Party, "standpoint" was a particularly 
important term. Although people's work tasks and attitudes 
(tai-tu) might differ, their standpoint was a reflection of 
their class position, and any; acknowledgment that there was a 
difference in standpoint between workers and management called 
into the question the broad definition of the term "working 
class", which comprised all those who hired out their labour 
for money. Teng Tzu-hui was extremely cautious in speaking of a
difference between "basic standpoint" (which was identical) and
f ■ ,
"concrete standpoint" (which reflected differences in work
position), though some of the participants in the subsequent
debate were much less cautious. Teng's report was said to be
instrumental in reforming union cadres in the private sector 
whose "arses were sitting on the wrong side" (p*i-ku tso-ts^-le 
ti-fang) ^  but in the public sector the issues were much more 
complex. With the fifteenth issue of the ACFL ,1 oumal, Chung-kuo 
Eung^jen, in April 1951* the whole issue of standpoint was thrown 
open for discussion. Chung-kuo Kung-,ien launched a correspon­
dence column entitled "Forum of the Question of the Labour 
Movement" (kung-ydn wen-t1 i t 1 ao-lun-hui), which was to discuss
CJL
specifically the relationship of unions to management. The 
first letter under this column was by a certain Li Nan-hsing, who 
declared that after Teng*s report debate started in his union 
branch.^ The majority of members agreed with Teng that the 
standpoint of unions and management was basically the same, 
though their different functions within the enterprise caused 
some concrete differences to appear. Some felt that management, 
as the representatives of the state, served the interests of the 
four officially approved classes in the New Democratic Period, 
whereas the unions were concerned with the interests only of the 
working class. Others felt that since standpoints were basically 
the same, management should devote more attention to the welfare 
of the workers and their short term interests.
Li*s letter was highly theoretical and its function was to
\ .
provoke a nation wide debate in which concrete examples of
differences in standpoint and identity in standpoint could be
compared. In the index to the next issue of Chung-kuo Kung-j en
(May 24th 1951)* however, under the heading of "Forum on the
Question of the Labour Movement" was just the cryptic remark
66"temporarily suspended". This was the last issue of Chung-kuo
Kung-jen to be published in 1951 and the magazine did not appear
again until the height of the Three Anti Movement (January 1952) 
under a new title, Kung-len, and with a new format. A new 
editorial committee of Chung-kuo Kung-jen had been established in 
December 1950 with Li Li-san as head,^7 and doubtless the 
disappearance of Chung-kuo Kung-.jen was connected with the 
charges of "economism" made against Li Li-san in late, 1,951 •
Until its suspension in May 1951* Chung-kuo Kung-nen reflected a 
policy which stressed the short term interests of the workers, 
and this inevitably had an effect upon the activities of union 
branches.
The labour union crisis of 1951 coincided with the 
"supplementary lesson in democratic reform", and we have already 
seen the inability of union branches to fulfil a leading role in 
that movement.^ Greater specificity in collective contracts 
was designed as a method to link welfare with increased 
productivity and to prevent wage and welfare demands getting out 
of hand^(in much the same way as current British productivity 
deals), but it would appear that this peaceful method of 
dealing with the problem of "economism” was not very 
successful.
In a survey of labour union work in the North East in July 
1951* Tung Pei Jih-pao observed that few union branches had 
made any serious effort to link welfare demands with increased 
productivity and there was rarely genuine co-operation between 
Party, management and labour unions.^ Over half of all union 
branches were considered to be fairly skillful in organising 
production competitions and mobilising workers to fulfil plans, 
but were unable to co-ordinate welfare demands and
productivity. Labour union branches were described as defective 
in organisation, unsystematic in work, as undemocratic and 
having poor relationships with Party and management. A number 
of cadres were just passive and were concerned solely with 
articulating the demands of workers and complaining about the 
difficulties in their realisation. Finally, as we have seen, 
there still remained at this time a number of "feudal elements" 
who had taken over union posts, though in the North East their 
numbers were small and were found mainly in the private sector. 
The following quote from the above article stands in direct 
contrast to the criticism that unions were excessively 
subordinate to management, made some twelve months before
"Lacking a full grasp of the basic principle that the 
improvement of workers livelihood and welfare should be 
based on increased production, basic level unions easily 
waver, become isolated or counterpose production and 
welfare. Deviations occur easily with the result that they 
either alienate themselves from the masses or just follow
the masses to stand against management The unions have
not done very well in organising the masses to unite with 
management in improving managerial work."r^
By mid 1951 a number of cadres had switched from supporting
to opposing management. The crisis of 1951 was not, as Harper
73suggests, mainly confined to the ACFL centre,  ^as the above 
article makes clear, though there were several factors which 
made the problem of "economism" less serious at the lower
levels than it might have been. Firstly, as we have seen,
. 74-vertical links within the ACFL structure were quite weak/ 
which meant that the "economist" line of the ACFL could not be 
transmitted down the union hierarchies very effectively, 
especially after the suspension of Chung-kuo Kung-jen (the line 
of the ACFL newspaper, Kung-jen Jih-pao. did not seem so 
markedly "economist"). Secondly, the problem of rapid transfer
of cadres was still important, as is shown by the following 
figures for length of experience in labour union work of cadres 
in 330 basic level union organisations in Shenyang:-*^
6 months experience 102 cadres
Over 1 year 81 cadres
1-J years 53 cadres
Over 2 years 4 cadres*
The fact that only four cadres remained in union work within the 
enterprises since mid 1949 suggests one of two things. Either 
former union cadres had been promoted to higher level union 
posts which, according to the literature of the time, cut them 
off from contact with the lower levels,^ or they had been 
promoted to Party and management posts, which was not likely to 
lead to unions taking a very constant stand against Party and 
management.
It is completely impossible to determine to what extent the
rectification movement of labour unions that took place in the
second half of 1931 was due to "economism”, "bureaucratism”, or
the persistence of ”feudal elements". The movement was extremely
thorough. In Shanghai, for example, during the months of August
and September 1951* 330 branches out of a possible 1,199
branches with over 100 members completely re-elected their
77branch union committee.rr The problem of bureaucratism cannot 
be documented adequately because it was not until early 1933 
that the full dimensions of the crisis were published.^ Key 
documents such as Li Fu-ch'un's report to the Party fraction 
(Tang-tsu) in the ACFL in December 1951» entitled "Divergent 
Opinions on the Question of Labour Union Work", which attacked 
the ACFL leadership for advocating labour union operational
autonomy, have not "been published.^ The official (1953) comment 
on the proceedings of late 1951 was that the majority of cadres
had not followed the erroneous "economist" line in the labour
80unions, but it should be remembered that the official comment 
was published after the Three Anti Movement when many labour 
union cadres were found to be "impuren •
At the height of the Three Anti Movement on 7th January 
1952, the ACFL convened a conference of labour union working 
personnel aimed at mobilising union cadres to participate in 
leading the Three Anti Movement. The conference concerned itself 
mainly with the persistance of bourgeois and petty bourgeois 
ideology at higher levels in the union organisation and Li Li-san 
himself commented on the fact that higher level union officers 
rarely talked to labour union cadres at enterprise level. Li 
noted that the lack of working class thought among union cadres
was due to bad leadership and called upon every labour union
8*1cadre to make a self examination.
As we have seen, one manifestation of the result of the
8p
"yamen mentality” at higher levels of union organisation was
that lower level union cadres considered themselves to be
"fourth class" ,an d one of the aims of the Three Anti Movement
was to correct this over-concern for status on the part of union
84-cadres and to "give union cadres a bath". Cadres were warned
that unless this concern for status was ended, the nature of the
85unions would undergo a fundamental change. ' This, however, was
86
an old problem which was noted by Liu Shao-ch'i in 19^9* was 
noted again in 1957 by Li Hsiu-jen, Deputy Director of the ACFTO
General Office,®'?'was probably due to the fact that the union 
was a training ground for Party members and a "school for 
management".
In many ways the labour union crisis of 1951 was similar to
QQ
the Soviet Union crisis of 1920-21, and there were 
similarities between Tomsky and Li Li-san. Both the Chinese 
"economists" and the Soviet "workers opposition" saw the role of 
the unions in some way independent from the Party and in both 
cases the battle was fought out at higher levels within the 
Party. The differences are, however, more striking. In the 
Soviet case, the workers opposition often entered into dispute 
with peasant organisations, which was not the case in China.
The Soviet crisis took place in a country exhausted by years of 
civil war when mortale was low, whereas in China the civil war 
was long over and morale was soaring. In the Soviet Union the 
Workers Opposition advocated the transfer of control over 
industry to the unions (for which crime in China Liu Shao-ch1 i 
was subsequently charged ).T her e is no evidence, however, 
that such a programme was put forward in China in 1951* nor were 
there any demands in China for a purge of intellectuals within 
the Party in 1951* In the Soviet Union the whole debate was 
aired publically in the press, whereas in China the principal 
journal carrying accounts of the debate was suspended. In the 
Soviet Union the crisis took place before the stress on Party 
discipline following the Kronstadt mutiny, and the stress on 
Party discipline was partly a result of that crisis. In China 
the stress on tight Party discipline not only preceded the 
crisis, but the anti-bureaucratic theme of the 1950 
rectification campaign actually contributed to the tendency for
the unions to seek autonomy. In China the crisis took place in 
an atmosphere of growing centralism of economic administration 
(even though the Three Anti Movement strengthened horizontal 
linkages for a time). In the Soviet Union the crisis originated 
from an opposition to economic centralisation, hut took place 
just before the NEP.
The Role of the Union Branch after the Three Anti Movement - 
The Wu San Model
The Three Anti Movement was Party led and, as we have seen, 
took as one of its targets "bureaucratism" and "economism" in 
labour union branches. The Five Anti Movement, on the other 
hand, which is not discussed here per se because it constituted 
an extension of the Three Anti Movement into the private sector, 
was able to assign a very important role to the unions in the 
struggle with unreformed capitalist elements.
In the public sector, we saw that after mid 1952 there was 
an increasing tendency to relate everything to matters of 
production. Indeed, the union branch at the Wu San Factory was 
praised precisely because in all its activities it "took 
production as its central point of reference".^ In such a 
situation any discussion of differences in standpoint between 
management and labour union was precluded. The main function of 
the union was to ensure adherence to the terms of the collective 
contract and team compacts, to make provisions for patriotic 
cultural (literacy) and technical education, to foster 
rationalisation proposals and check up on their implementation, 
to organise labour competitions, to aid the Party in propaganda 
work, to help management in welfare and safety work, to organise
the ratification of bonus payments, and to conduct research into 
technical problems.^
Of all these functions, the educative/propaganda function 
was perhaps the most important, and in performing this the union 
seemed not to serve the function of "transmission belt" between 
Party and workers but between management and workers. At the Wu 
San Factory for example, the union branch was required to study 
each document or directive sent down by higher levels of 
economic administration ^ as well as documents from higher level 
union and Party structures. Joint discussions were held between 
management and the heads of each labour -union team regarding the 
political and economic significance of such documents and how to 
implement them within the shops and teams. The union was then 
entrusted with the task of communicating the conclusions to the 
workers (and if need be to visit their homes).^
In accordance with the policy of relating everything to the 
production principle, efforts were made to create parallel union 
structures, not only for line organisation but for staff bodies 
also. For example, the enterprise wage section would be 
parallelled by a union wage committee. (See figure 14).
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In the early period when functional patterns of control were 
more common, not only was there overlap between management
personnel in staff organs and union personnel in parallel union
*
committees, hut such committees might issue instructions
directly to the shop floor without informing any union structure
attached to the line.^ For example, the Cultural Committee at
the Wu San Factory directed culture and education work at team
Q6level, often without informing the labour union chairman. 7 As 
the staff-line systems of command were strengthened after the 
Three Anti Movement, the Mone man” principle was applied to 
union work also. Henceforward specialist union committees could 
only issue advice to the factory union committee, who exercised 
direct leadership over the shops and teams.^ In the case of 
routine work, such as directing regular training classes, each 
specialist committee was required to draft a plan for the appro­
val of factory committee and shop committees specifying the 
scope of functional direction.^ Thus the adoption of staff- 
line systems of management was reinforced by the organisation of 
the labour union with the consequent attenuation of channels of 
command and the growth in the number of plans and restrictions 
imposed upon union committees.
The whole process of union work in industrial enterprises 
became highly formalised. The model Wu San Factory worked out a 
very complex meeting schedule, specifying not only when general 
meetings were to be held but the scope of the agenda for 
standing committee meetings for each of its thrice weekly 
meetings. Detailed provisions were laid down for the 
convocation of ”head knocking sessions” at factory and shop 
level. Provision was made for the inspection of the diaries of
shop committee chairmen and heads of union teams which contained 
production records and a summary of the problems confronting 
particular union members, and a detailed curriculum for evening 
study was established.^
In the mass of committees that were exemplified in the model 
Wu San Factory, the role of the factory management committee had 
shrunk considerably. I have seen very few accounts of the 
existence of such committees after the conclusion of the Three 
and Five Anti Movements. Indeed, the account dealing with the 
Wu San Factory is the last account I have seen that mentions the 
existence of a factory management committee. By that time the 
committee seemed solely concerned with matters of production and 
planning. Its great virtue was held to be its role in co­
ordinating the work of Party, management, union and Youth 
League, which was exactly the same function as the weekly 
factory level head knocking session of FGM, Party Secretary and 
labour union c h a i r m a n . I n  the various articles praising the 
achievements of the Wu San Factory, scant reference is made to 
the actual activities of the factory management committee and 
far more attention is given to the factory level head knocking 
sessions, the membership of which might be enlarged to include 
members of relevant staff sections and appropriate union 
specialist union committees. I can only conclude therefore that 
all that was left of the factory management committee were these 
”head knocking sessions”, enlarged to include a few union 
delegates who had no official position.
After mid 1952, managerial initiative was stressed in all 
matters that required consultation. Gadres were urged to give
weight to the opinions of the labour union but "not to lean
101excessively on it". When drawing up the collective contract
at the Wu San Factory, for example, there was no longer any joint
discussion of the collective contract, but both sides prepared a
draft and after discussion and amendment the union draft was to
102 *supplement the draft of management. There can be no doubt 
which draft carried the greater weight*
Conclusion
Enterprise union branches were affected by the same process 
that eroded the power of the Party branches during the New 
Democratic Period. In the immediate post liberation situation, 
■unions were able to take on functions beyond those prescribed for 
them, in much the same way as some Party branches usurped 
managerial functions. In the period which followed, unions 
became tied down with bureaucratic detail, and this situation was 
made worse by the rapid transfer and promotion of the most 
skilled union cadres. The re-examination of the role of unions 
during the rectification movement of 1950-1 led to the 
phenomenon of "economism", which placed unions at odds with not 
only management but also the Party organisation. During the 
Three Anti Movement, therefore, the economist tendency of labour 
unions came under sharp attack from the Party, which itself lost 
power at the basic levels after that movement. On the face of 
it this would seem to be a repetition of the Soviet process 
described by the historian E.H. Carr, where the Soviet Party
105
swallowed up the unions and was itself devoured by the state.  ^
In fact, it was not that simple. We have seen in the preceding 
chapter that the Party was not really swallowed up but was
merely eclipsed, and was quite capable of assuming a leading role
once again in 1958. Similarly, the same cycle of union
orientation during the period prior and during the Three Anti
104Movement was repeated in 1957-8. At that time unions were
accused of being tools of management and, reacting to this, they
became once again guilty of "economism". This was rooted out in
the prelude to another mass movement of massive dimensions (the
Great Leap Forward). One is tempted to look at the Cultural
Revolution in much the same light, except that there the Party
and unions tended to unite at the basic level, with the result
that the dismantling of the Party apparatus was accompanied by a
105dismantling of the union apparatus. ^ To date, the
restructuring of the Party has not resulted in the restructuring
of the labour unions. They appear to be non-existent, and their
welfare functions exercised by subdivisions of a latter day
106equivalent of the factory management committee.
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This followed a directive of the Shanghai General Labour 
Union "On the Re-election of Basic Level labour Union Or­
ganisations". Labour union teams were reorganised according 
to production criteria. This process was linked with Demo­
cratic Reform since some of the old labour union officials 
were found to be counter-revolutionary elements.
T ’ao Chih-ch’tlan:"Shang-hai Ko Kung-hui Chi-ts’eng Tsu-chih 
Ch’ung-fen Fa-yang Min-chu P’u-pien Chin-hsing Kai-hsttan" 
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KJJP 3rd November 1 951 •
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ts’eng Tsu-chih Kai-hsttan Kung-tso Tien-ti (Thing-yenTlbcal 
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Liu Shao-ch’i: "Report on Labour Union Work...." 1 9*+9(loc.cit) 
At Tientsin Liu weot to great pains to assure union cadres 
that they were not regarded as third or fourth class but 
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undertake union work.
Li Hsiu-jen: "8,000 li Hurried Tour of Inspection" report 
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KJJP 9th 'ray 1957 in JPRS 665 (summary) pp 33-36.
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The role of the unions in the Five Anti Movement is dis­
cussed in Gardner (loc.cit).
Wu Gan Factory (op.cit) p 1.
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(ibid) and p 86-93.
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Since the final suspension of KJJP on 31st March 1 967, news 
about labour ’anions in China has been very sparse. I am in­
formed by recent visitors to China that no union organisation 
exists at enterprise level and the welfare functions of the 
unions have been taken over by delegates of the factory 
revolutionary committees (personal information given me by 
members of visiting groups organised by the Society for Anglo 
Chinese Understanding).
Personal information from 3ACU visitors.
CONCLUSION
The Contradiction Between Policy and Resources
The one theme that runs through this essay is the 
contradiction between policy and resources. Such a contradiction 
was apparent in 194-2 when Mao called for the introduction of
A
khozraschgt and progressive piecework systems in a situation
2where the economy was only partially a monetary one. In our 
period of study, it has been apparent that the Soviet model of 
organisation could not be implemented in its entirety so long as 
there were not enough competent foremen to make staff-line 
systems of command a realistic possibility, so long as there were 
not enough competent personnel to attach to various points on the 
line and so long as the movement to root out gang bosses was only 
partially implemented. The Soviet model of incentive could not 
be implemented so long as there were insufficient criteria for 
evaluating the political qualities of line management and so long 
as piecework systems of remuneration could not be backed up by an 
educational programme that made the establishment of higher norms 
a desirable goal for the workers. The Soviet model of planning 
could not be implemented fully when there were considerable 
supply problems and when there were wide cost disparities between 
sections of the same industry.
At the root of this contradiction between policy and 
resources was the problem of education. The functions of factory 
management committees could not be fulfilled effectively so long 
as the level of political education of management was so low that 
they held the workers in contempt and so long as the level of 
technical and political education of the workers was so low that
they did not earn the confidence of management. Democratic 
Reform could not be successful so long as there remained a 
confusion between gang bosses and skilled workers. The 
establishment of staff-line systems of command could not be 
undertaken effectively so long as it was necessary to maintain 
lines of functional supervision to compensate for the low level 
of education of junior line management. The establishment of 
complex technical norms and systems of piecework payment could 
not proceed if workers did not under stand them adequately. The 
participation of workers in planning was frustrated by a lack of 
knowledge of the technical factors in that process, as was the 
incorporation of planned targets into collective and other 
contracts. The propaganda function of the Party and unions 
could only be as effective as was permitted by the literacy 
level of lower level propagandists, and union cadres would 
remain "fourth class" so long as the more educated and 
politically conscious of their number were creamed off into 
other organisations.
Selection and Creation in the Education Process
In this early period China was faced with a limited amount 
of skilled and conscious personnel, but this situation was 
gradually improved by a rapid training programme and by 1953 
various movements could be launched to implement the prescribed 
policies more closely. The emphasis in this period seems in 
practice to have been on the selection of competent personnel, 
in marked contrast to the emphasis during the Great Leap Forward 
and Cultural Revolution, where one may interpret the ideological 
approach to education as being concerned with the creation of 
personnel by first changing the environment in which education
was carried on. The contradiction between a selective and 
creative approach was most marked in our period of study in the 
role of the factory management committees and the labour unions. 
The literature seems to imply that one of the prime functions of 
the management committees and of the labour unions was to create 
workers who were competent in managerial skills and yet in 
practice they were frequently used to select the most competent 
to become managers.
Which Soviet Model?
The problem of implementing Soviet patterns of organisation 
and incentive was not just one of a contradiction between policy 
and resources, but also of clarity in specifying the model. Some 
of the institutions adopted during this early period belonged not 
to the Soviet model of the late 1940s, but to the Soviet Union of 
a much earlier period. However much the Chinese literature of 
the time condemned the "parliamentary system" of management, the. 
formal structure of management committees bore a striking 
resemblance to those forms of management organisation long 
discarded in the Soviet Union. The literature of the early 1950s 
went to great pains to point out that the "responsibility system" 
was not in contradiction to the "democratisation of management"; 
nor indeed need it have been, so long as responsibility was 
defined as specificity of function and the fulfillment of 
specific work tasks. Nevertheless, as we have seen, right from 
the New Record Movement of 194-9» there was a tendency to regard 
the "responsibility system" and "one man management" as one and 
the same thing and, in the provisions of 1953* I see no essential 
difference between the system of "sole responsibility by the FGM" 
and "one man management". In such a situation, the factory
management committees could not but be relatively ineffective
Conflict Resolution and Conflict Development
In this essay, considerable attention has been paid to the 
loci of tension within industrial enterprises. Much of this 
tension has been subsumed under the rubric "bureaucratism". We 
have seen that tension might exist between FGM and management 
committee, between "feudal" and non-feudal line management, 
between union and management, union and Party and even between 
model workers shorn of their prestige and ordinary workers. It 
was the function of the Party organisation to root out "feudal 
remnants" and tb lessen tension between all the various 
personnel and organisational structures within the enterprise. 
This was to be effected, however, in an atmosphere that was not 
always directed towards conflict resolution. In fact, during 
the Democratic Reform Movement and the Three Anti Movement, the 
stress was on creative conflict development. We have seen the 
dilemmas faced by a leadership that was instructed to unite with 
skilled workers and technicians and yet struggle against gang 
bosses who were themselves considered by many to be "skilled 
workers". It is the hallmark of Mao Tse-tung*s approach to 
unity that unity is fostered in struggle. The many are united 
to struggle against the few and the product of that struggle is 
a new and higher stage of unity. Such an approach is only 
possible once the "enemy" at any given stage is clearly defined. 
In a situation where Soviet patterns of organisation were 
superimposed upon existing forms of organisation, the targets 
may have been obscured.
The Three Anti Movement, which occupies the mid point in
our period of study, is of particular importance in that it
sought to define most clearly the targets that the earlier mild
period had obscured and, in doing so, represented a partial
reversal in the process of Sovietisation. The strengthening of
horizontal links and the growth in power of the Party
organisation within the enterprise was, however, a temporary
phenomenon and the removal of corrupt elements probably
facilitated the imposition of Soviet organisational forms after
that movement. There can be no doubt that the Three Anti
Movement was seen as a step in the direction of implementing the
Soviet model, though what is interesting is that the mechanisms
used and procedures adopted were more in keeping with the spirit .
of 194-2, which led to the policy of "unified leadership and
divided operations", and was a far cry from the stipulations of
4the Soviet model.
Models of Rationality
In chapter three, I suggested that the hierarchy of ends 
and values against which rationality could be measured was laid 
down by the Soviet model, and that such a hierarchy of ends and 
values contained elements that were not only contradictory in a 
Chinese context (such as between staff-line systems and basic- 
level control), but which were also inherently contradictory 
(such as the provision of a complex set of a success indicators 
in a system where managerial performance was overwhelmingly 
determined by gross output). What has been of particular 
relevance to our discussion is not just contradictory nature 
of elements of the Soviet model in a Chinese context, not just 
its inherent contradictions, but its contradiction with values
which stemmed from a completely different organisational milieu 
and which continued to exercise an important influence in the
New Democratic Period. We have seen, for example, the
persistance of "egalitarianism" and the functional intervention 
of the Party organisation, which stemmed from the rural-military 
tradition of the Chinese Communist Party and which gained 
currency again during the Great Leap Forward.
It would he only a partial explanation of the events of
1958 that concentrated solely on the Yenan heritage. In the 
last two or three years some social scientists have attempted to 
examine the values of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution in a more universalistic context.^ It would be 
extremely rash at this point to posit an alternative model of 
rationality, because at no point was such a model put forward 
with so much specificity as the Soviet model in the early 1950s 
and even in Yenan days, elements of Soviet organisational forms 
and Soviet views on incentive^ were mixed with traditional 
values and views determined by the exigencies of the situation. 
However rash it might be, one is obliged to specify the 
dimensions of this problem which has already split the ranks of 
social scientists working on China, for the events of 194*9-55 
can best be seen in the light of those of 1958-59 and. 1966 
onwards.
In chapter three I suggested that the goal hierarchy of 
these later two periods were different from that of 194-9-53- It 
was not, however, a simple matter of substituting human goals 
for output goals, for much of the literature of the Great Leap 
Forward focussed on the primacy of output goals. The issue, as
I see it, is basically one of distribution. It is not only a 
question of economic development not being worth very much if it 
leads to gross inequalities between various sectors of society, 
but, as Gurley has pointed out, the radical view considered that 
rapid economic development itself was not likely to occur unless 
everyone rises together in a situation of under-development.^
In other words, the contradiction is not only between human and 
economic goals but also between two views of the determinants of 
rapid economic growth. If this interpretation is correct, the 
developmental logic of the two radical periods in the history of 
the Chinese Peoples Republic is an egalitarian one in complete 
opposition to the incentive policy in the period under review. 
The Chinese radical view starts out from the opposite standpoint 
to psycho-economists such as Jaques, who believe that equitable 
patterns of distribution become differentially more steep as 
wealth increases. As I interpret the radical Chinese view, 
equity should in the final analysis be determined by moral 
incentive, and in the short run material incentives should be of 
collective dimension. Equity is ideologically determinedi and 
the content of that ideology has increasingly become one which 
gives primacy to human development in terms of what Berlin would
Q
call the "positive conception of freedom”. This view of the 
determinants of economic growth starts off from a conception of 
human potential and human motivation very different from the 
Soviet Union. It is utopian in the sense that it is unrealised 
and in Karl Mannheim*s sense that it challenges traditional 
"ideology".^ To say that it is unrealisable, however, would 
reveal no more than the axioms of he who said it, for such 
axioms are not amenable to empirical test.
If one may establish that two views of motivation are in
conflict, to what extent can on construct two models of
"rational" organisation? In the history of the past twenty two
years one may discern many patterns of organisation, but I have
tried to suggest that it is possible to construct two ideal types
or models against which to chart organisational change. The
first of these is organisation characterised by the principal of
"one man management", and the second I have called the
"ideologically integrated functional model". In chapter four I
attempted to suggest that organisation characterised by the
principle of "one man management" was to all intents and purposes
merely an ideal type. Similarly, I know of no example of the
ideologically integrated functional model that ever existed.
Nevertheless, we have seen that the Tsitsihar model of ^965
offered an example of an organisation where middle level
management had been removed and where functional leadership was
exercised by technical personnel at factory level. During the
Great Leap Forward the Party was frequently able to by-pass line
channels of command and direct action on the shop floor in a
situation where a great degree of trust was vested in the 
ioteams. As far as I know, no one has yet demonstrated to what 
extent the dislocation caused by the Great Leap Forward was due 
to organisational change and to what extent it was. due to 
ineffective ideological integration of conflicting stimuli. To 
suggest the latter possibility again leaves one open to the 
charge of utopianism, which in the above sense I accept.
One will not be in a position to evaluate to what extent 
functional patterns of command are developing in Chinese 
factories until we have more Information on the organisational
changes that have been taking place in recent years. On the face 
of it, however, there seem to be some remarkable parallels with 
the situation of 1950-51•
Management Committees and Revolutionary Committees
One is immediately struck by the similarity between the
factory revolutionary committees that have developed in recent
years and the prescribed forms of management committee that were
laid down in the regulations of 194-9* Firstly, these new
revolutionary committees ideally determine overall policy,
whereas management determines day to day operations. Secondly,
there is frequently a military component (although in some cases
11a militia-man serves this function). In the early 1950s, we
saw that the military component was taken over" by the new Party
organisation and worker representatives began to be controlled
by the unions. At the time of writing, Party organisations in
industrial enterprises are in the process of formation and there
are no basic level unions. We are in no position to say whether
12the pattern of the early 1950s will be repeated or whether, as 
I suspect, a new conception of collective leadership will 
develop. For in 197^ there is no Soviet model, and the 
determination of organisational rationality calls for a far 
greater degree of creativity than it did in 194-9*
Representative and Participatory Definitions of Democracy
I have attempted to argue in this essay that during the 
movement to democratise management and the democratic reform 
movement, there was a steady move from a representative to a 
participatory conception of democracy. In both cases, however, 
the goal of "democracy" was an intermediate one and cannot be
assigned the primary position in any hierarchy of goals against 
which to judge rationality. In the mid 1950s, Mao remarked that
democracy was not an end in itself but a mechanism with which to
1*5resolve "internal contradictions". ^ Democracy, therefore, must 
be interpreted in terms of other goals, and the effectiveness of 
a representative or participatory definition of democracy 
depends on exactly what those other goals are. During the New 
Democratic Period, I can only conclude that the primary goal in 
the industrial sector was to get production moving again, and 
this goal was pursued even if it meant for a time exploitative 
forms of control were maintained. Later other wider goals 
became salient, but it is extremely difficult to say with any
degree of certainty exactly which position in a goal hierarchy
each of these goals occupied. During the Great Leap, for 
example, the primary goals were the making of a communist man, 
the closure of the urban-rural gap, the closure of the elite- 
mass gap, and simple industrial and agricultural production. In 
different situations these goals could reinforce each other or 
stand in mutual contradiction, and the criterion of democracy 
was only relevant in so far as it contributed to the realisation 
of the greater number of these goals. The radical attack upon 
the Soviet model and the revisionism of the 1960s was a protest 
against an excessive stress on the last of these four goals at 
the expense of the others, for the radical Chinese approach saw 
its primary goals arranged in a somewhat flatter pyramid than 
the Soviet model of the early 1950s.
The Soviet Model as an Abberation
To substantiate a contention that the Soviet model was an 
abberation one would be obliged to show that liberated areas
forms of organisation and work motivation re-emerged after 1957*
In showing that the pao-kung form of organisation and the policy
of centralised leadership and divided operations re-asserted
themselves in 1958, Schurmann has made a contribution to this 
14end. This essay is not so ambitious. I have tried to show 
that many of the prescribed Soviet forms of organisation and 
incentive could not be introduced befofe 1955 and that many of 
the organisational forms of the early 1950s were to appear later 
(the management committees, the military element in management 
and functional systems of organisation in the 1960s, and the 
pao-kung and lateral intervention during the Great Leap Forward)
One must, however, not make too much of the similarity 
between the New Democratic Period and the last few years, for 
China has now a much larger number of skilled workers and 
technicians than in the early 1950s, a much higher literacy rate 
a wealth of experience both of the Soviet Union and her own 
es^eriments and, after f. long debates on "slave mentality", the 
determination to work out the answers to problems of organisa­
tion and motivation by relying upon her own efforts.
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Some Examples of Wage Point Formulation
NE Adm Cttee Wage pt 
Ceptember 7th 1 9b8 
(FEN)
Hsin Chuang Coal 
Mine (N China) 
December 19b8 
(HSI)
Peking Municipal 
Wage pt. 9th Oct 
1951 (FEN)
RICE
v 1 . 6 3 chin 2 chin 0.b8 shih chin
WHEAT 1 chin 0 . 3 2  shih chin
COa L 5.5 chin 1-£- chin 2 shih chin
OIL 0 . 0 3 5  chin 5 ch’ien 0 . 0 5  shih chin
3 a LT 0.0b5 chin 5 ch! ien 0.02 shih chin
COTTON
CLOTH 0.20 sq ft. 1 sq.metre 0.2 feet
Ranges
Highest
Lowe s t
FGM
White collar workers 
Skilled workers 
Ordinary Workers in 
light work 
Sundry workers
apprentices 
Ordinary Workers 
Trainee Technicians 
Technic ians 
Management
300 points 
180 points 
1U5 points 
120 points
90 points
35 points 
60 points 
50 points 
75 points 
130 points
1 05 points
30 points
Note on Weights and Measures
The term 'chin' referred to here is probably what is now referred 
to as an old chin (chin-chin) = 0,597 Kg.
1 chTien was the tenth part of 1 Hang (ounce), according to the
old standard 1 chin = 1o liang, though later this was changed to 
1 shih chin = 1 0  liang,
1 shih chin = 0.5 Kg.
It is not clear what linear measurement the term foot refers to. 
according to the old standard 1 foot (ch'ih) = O . 3 2 metres whereas
the new standard stipulated that 1 shih foot = 0.333 metres.
Because of uncertainty as to which standards are referred to, I 
have not converted the weights and measures.
Sources.
1 . Tung pei Chan-shih .Kung-ying CtMi-yeh Kung-hsin Piao-chun
(War-time V/age & Salary Standards for Public ally-run Enter - 
prises in the North East) 7th September 19^8 in Chung-yang 
Ts'ai-ching Cheng-ts 'e Fa-ling Hul-pien (Compendium of 
Financial & Economic Policies Laws and Decrees No 1 (Part 2) 
PP 710-713.
2. hsin Chuang Mei-K'uang Esi-mi K'ao-Kung : Xung-tzu P'ing-ting 
Chiao-ch1ien Ho-li (The Hsin Chuang Coal Mine Conducts a 
Meticulous Examination of Work and' Wage assessment is more 
Rational than Hitherto) JMJP 25th December 19*+8 p 2.
3• Pei-ching-shih Tsai-cheng Ching-chi Wei-yflan-hui Xung-pu
Kung-tzu (fen) Chi-suan Pan-fra (Peking ?*unic ipality, Finance 
and Economics Committee Publishes Method of Calculating Wage 
Points) JMJP 11th October 1951 P 2.
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COLLECTIVE CONTRACT OF THE GLASS FACTORY UNDER THE LUSHUN-TALIEN 
FAR EAST ELECTRONICS BUREAU (Lu Ta Yflan-tung Tien-yeh Po-li 
ICung-ch’ang Chi-t1 i Ho-tHmg) SUGARY.
The Contract was concluded between management (kung-ch!ang tang- 
chd) and labour union (ch ih-kung-hui) and signed by FGM and Labour 
union Chairman in July 19^9- It was ratified by special meeting 
of white and blue collar workers to be in force from July 1st 19^9 
until December 31st 1950; texts were in both Chinese and Russian.
I. Aims & Objects.
To guarantee plan fulfillment, to raise the level of technical 
knowledge, to improve the organisation of production, to consoli­
date labour discipline, to implement a system for practising 
economy.
II Management undertakes
1 , to adopt all measures necessary for the fulfillment and overful­
fillment of stipulated production norms, to organise technical 
direction, to adopt measures for the supply of fuel and materials, 
and to ensure the timely installation and repair of technical 
equipment.
2. to transmit production plans to the shops, teams and individual 
workers at the latest 5 days before the commencement of each 
monthly or quarterly period and to assign workers to fixed work 
pos it ions.
3. to provide favourable conditions and material help to those who 
put forward rationalisation proposals or suggest inventions, to 
propagate such proposals that are adopted and to award bonuses 
according to the regulations of the Electronics Bureau.
h. to guarantee the material conditions for the cultural and educational 
work of all employees and to designate a building as a temporary 
club before the end of this (Chinese) year.
III The Labour Union Undertakes i -
1 . to employ every effort to improve the effectiveness of the emu­
lation movement, to check up on adherence to technical standards 
and to propagate achievements.
422.
2. to carry out daily education work with the aim of consolidating 
production and labour discipline and to inspire the workers to 
fulfill their daily production tasks and raise the labour pro­
ductivity rate.
3. to organise voluntary labour to help decorate the club once 
designated.
Management and Union Undertake :-
in launching a "creativity movement", to give all help to white 
and blue collar workers to publish work achievements, sum up the 
emulation movement quarterly and to honour model workers by 
setting up a roll of honour awarding badges publishing photo­
graphs, biographies etc. (In addition to such moral incentive 
the FGM’s office will make appropriate bonus payments from the 
bonus fund).
IV Wages. Production Bonuses & Allowances.
1. Basic wages will be paid according to the attached chart. Al­
though the factory was classified as Grade 1, Grade 2 rates are 
shown since the contract was published as a model to be emulated 
by factories classified as both grade 1 (heavy industry) and 
grade 2 (light industry). The basic piece rate is calculated at 
the time rate + 10£ (see chapter three). The hazard rate was 
paid to people working in high temperatures and where health 
might be damaged (a list of the various jobs covered by this rate 
is included in the contract). Apprentices were to be paid (acc­
ording to Soviet practice) according to grades 1 and 2 of the 7 
grade scale rate.
2. The scale for white collar workers was exactly the same as the 
fifteen grade scale prescribed for Lushun and Talien (see chapter 
three, figure three) although, inexplicably, grade 3 of a grade
2 enterprise appears to be^3^0 lower than the official scale 
(probably a misprint). Contrary to the practice noted in Chapter 
Five, both technicians and line management were to be paid acc­
ording to the fifteen grade scale.
3. Management and union undertook to draw up a concrete plan for the 
implementation of piecework systems; by the end of 19*+9> 7 0% of
all workers were to be in receipt of payment by piecework or acc­
ording to the progressive bonus system for overfulfilling norms.
A bonus system for white collar workers was also introduced. After 
6 months norms and piecework standards were to be revised.
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*+. If a worker failed to fulfil his work norms due to accumulated 
mistakes, he would receive payment according to the amount of 
work completed but his pay was not less than two thirds of the 
basic wage.
5. In the case of norm revision due to rationalisation proposals, 
the norm of the worker who put forward the proposals was not to 
be altered prematurely.
6. Overtime pay was not to be less than time and a half and over­
time was only to be practised when there was mutual agreement 
between management and union. Workers under 18 and pregnant 
women were forbidden to participate in overtime. Workers under 
the age of 18 were required to work only a seven hour day but 
the wages due to them were to be those of an eight hour day.
If there were a work stoppage which was not due to a worker’s 
mistakes and if management were unable to transfer a worker to 
another job, he would receive payment at half the time rate. If
he were transferred to another job he was to receive the full
time rate.
If, due to a worker’s errors, his production was completely sub­
standard and constituted waste, he was to receive no payment; 
if his product were only partially sub-standard, payment would 
be reduced proportionally and if sub-standard products appeared 
which were not due to his errors, he x^ould be paid according to 
the time rate rather than the piece rate.
Management guaranteed to obtain grain at a low price and make
monthly allocations to workers and their dependants. Management
guaranteed further to provide the necessary industrial (rationed) 
goods and daily necessities.
When workets were absent from work due to electoral and other 
duties, management was to continue to pay their average wage.
When on outside duty in connection with their work, workers 
would be paid according to their basic wage plus outside duty 
pay and travel allowances; (daily outside duty pay was to equal 
3% of the monthly basic wage and hotel expenses were not to 
exceed bO% of the daily outside pay).
Losses incurred in the performance of work duties were to be 
recovered by management except in the case of carelessness. 
Management might deduct up to 30% of a workers wage for losses 
due to carelessness except in the case of a court order when it 
was limited to $0%,
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In  th e  case o f redundancy, management was r e q u ir e d  to  pay s e v e r ­
ance pay e q u iv a le n t  t o  12 days b a s ic  wage p lus  g ra n ts  f o r  r e s t  
days owing.
In  the  case o f  tem p orary  in c a p a c i ty  w orkers would r e t a i n  t h e i r  
o r i g i n a l  s ta tu s  and wage. In  the  case o f  s ickness  t h i s  period  
was l i m i t e d  to  th re e  months and in  the  case o f  c h i l d b i r t h  2 i
m onths.
I f  a w o rker  l e f t  the  f a c t o r y  w i th o u t  good reason  b e fo re  an 
agreed t im e  he was to  compensate th e  f a c t o r y  by re p a y in g  a t  
c u r r e n t  m arket p r ic e s  the  v a lu e  o f  s p e c ia l  work c lo th e s  g iv e n  
t o  h im , g r a in  a l l o c a t i o n  made d u r in g  th e  month he l e f t  and i n ­
d u s t r i a l  ( r a t io n e d )  goods a l lo c a t e d  to  him d u r in g  the  c u r r e n t  
q u a r t e r .  In  such case management was empowered to  g iv e  th e  s a id  
w o rker two weeks n o t ic e  to  move out o f  h is  d o rm ito ry .
When a new w o rker was ta k e n  on, management was r e q u ir e d  to  s t i p ­
u la te d  tw e lv e  to  fo u r te e n  days as a t r i a l  p e r io d  d u r in g  w h ich  
t im e  h is  grade and d u t ie s  would be d e te rm in e d .
In  th e  case o f  w h ite  and b lu e  c o l l a r  w orkers  whose p lace  o f  
re s id e n c e  was over 5 km. from  the f a c t o r y ,  management would p ro ­
v id e  expenses to  h e lp  them move n e a r e r .  Management u n d e rto o k  to  
i n s t a l  a d o rm ito ry  t o  ho ld  2 0 0 -3 0 0  peop le  b e fo re  November 1 9*+9 
(the  t e x t  says 1 9*+0 -  c l e a r l y  a m i s p r i n t ) .  T e c h n ic a l  p e rs o n n e l  
and s k i l l e d  w orkers were g iv e n  p r i o r i t y  in  accom odation . (Such 
a b u i ld in g  was found on 3 0 th  J u ly ) .
V. Working Hours
N o rm a lly  th e s e  would n o t exceed e ig h t  hours d a i l y  (seven hours 
in  the  case o f workers between the age of V-+ and 17 and those  
w o rk in g  u n d e rg ro u n d ) .  N ig h t  s h i f t  w orkers  were paid f o r  n ine  
hours, on an e ig h t  hour s h i f t ,  each hour b e in g  c a lc u la t e d  a t  one 
and one s e ve n th  th e  day r a t e .  Foremen, and s h i f t  s u p e rv is o rs  
o n ly  re c e iv e d  payment f o r  e ig h t  hours and p iecew ork norms would  
be c a lc u la t e d  on an 8 hour b a s is .
Rest and lu nch  breaks were not in c lu d e d  in  w ork ing  h o u rs .
V I  R est P e r io d s .
N o rm a lly  th e r e  was one r e s t  day per week l a s t in g  39 hours (from  
5 p.m. on th e  prev ious  day u n t i l  8 a .m . on th e  succeed ing d a y ) .  
One day h o l id a y  was awarded a t  New Y e a r ,  2 days a t  S p r in g  F e s t i ­
v a l ,  2 days a t  the  b e g in n in g  o f May and one day to  c e le b r a te  
v i c t o r y  over Japan (3 rd  S ep tem ber). I f  such h o lid a y s  cou ld  not  
be aw arded, workers would be pa id  a t  t im e  and a h a l f .
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Those who had worked for an uninterrupted period of eleven 
months received 12 days holiday per year with pay according 
to the time rate. Workers in hazardous occupations could he 
awarded 1-8 days with pay according to the hazard rate. Those 
who had worked for an uninterrupted period of 2 years in the 
same enterprise were granted three days extra holiday per year 
though the number of accumulated holiday days was not to ex­
ceed 2*+ days in any one year. Management had the right to 
award from 6 to 12 days supplementary holiday for white and 
blue collar workers whose holidays were not fixed (a list of 
such people was to be determined by agreement by management 
and union). Workers under 17 years received 2h days per year.
7 TI labour Protection
Management was to provide certain equipment to protect the 
workers health (a list of such equipment was given), conduct 
regular inspections, improve the clinic etc. In addition, 
management was to provide an adequately heated and ventilated 
place for shift workers to spend the night which had to be 
completed by September 19^ +9-
7 III Conciliation and arbitration
A conciliation committee (t'iao-chieh wei-ylian-hui) was set 
up consisting of an equal number of delegates from the factory 
general office and the labour imion with a system of rotating 
chairmen with a casting vote if necessary. The conciliation 
committee was required to discuss all labour disputes and its 
decisions were equally binding on management and labour union. 
In matters of great gravity, however, matters might be sub­
mitted to a higher body (the Electronics Bureau) which could 
convene an arbitration conference (chung-ts'ai hui-i)attended 
by representatives from the Bureau and the Lushun Talien Gen­
eral Labour Union and representatives of each of the relevant 
departments of the factory. Such conferences could revise 
decisions taken by the conciliation committee.
El Social Insurance
Management required to set up a social insurance fund which 
might not be used for any purpose other than social insurance. 
The fund would be c&lculated at of that part of the total 
wages bill expressed in monetary terms. Management was ex­
pressly forbidden to make any deductions from wages in return 
for money received from this fund.
The social insurance fund was to be used as help towards
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medical expenses, as grants to those temporarily incapacitated 
or caring for sick relatives and as supplementary grants for 
wet nurses, funerals etc.
There followed concrete details of what constituted the period 
of pregnancy and what awards should be made in the case of 
death on duty. Payments for incapacitated workers varied ac­
cording to length of service (kung-ling) ranging from 25% of 
basic wage (for less than sixth month’s service) to 100# for 
over two years service.
X Culture and Education
Management was required to set up a culture and education fund 
and money from this fund was paid monthly to the labour union 
for the provision of education. The fund was calculated at \% 
of that part of the monthly wage bill which was expressed in 
monetary terms and deductions from workers wages in respect of 
educational expenses was forbidden. The fund was to be used 
for education in literacy and politics, for conducting propa­
ganda and cultural activities, the purchase of books and ex­
penses incurred in commemoration meetings.
Source :
Chun a Iiua Ch’uan-kuo Tsung-kung-hui Pien-chi Chu-pan-shih
Chi-ti lio-t ’una 3hou-tse (Collective Contract Handbook) pp 193-217
Peking Kung-jen Ch’u-pan-she August 1950.
APPENDIX t h r e e
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patriotic compact op tip: hang cr»uw~ lao team at the wuch’ang
CHEN HUAN SPINNING MILL (Wu-ch’ang Chen Hu an Sha-ch’ang Wang
May 1951* Ch’ttn-lao Hsiao-tsu Ai-kuo Kung-yfteh)
1. Respond to the calls of the Party, management, labour union 
and Youth League. Actively participate in all factory acti­
vities .
2. Mobilise the masses to append their names to the resolution of 
the executive council (of the China Peace Committee) and carry 
out propaganda among the workers and their relatives concerning 
the United States rearming Japan.
3. Resolutely support the government’s suppression of counter 
revolutionaries. Trace the origins of any (false) rumours that 
one may have heard.
*+. Set up a newspaper reading group to read newspapers for twenty
minutes daily.
5. Appoint a worker picket before 1st June.
6. Appoint a Party propagandist before 1st June.
7. Undertake to attend classes run by the Party and Youth League.
8. Undertake that the entire team shall attend night school, will 
not come late or leave early and will maintain study discipline.
9. Guarantee the completion of the production plan, regularly 
inspect its completion and raise the level of the targets.
10. Every Saturday inspect the progress in implementing the com­
pact .
PATRIOTIC COMPACT OF THE CHU T3AO TI TEAM OF THE UUHAN FIRST 
SPINNING MILL (Wu-han Ti-i Sha-ch’ang Chu Tsao-ti 
April 1951* Hsiao-tsu ^i-kuo Kung-ytteh)
1. Study current affairs. Read newspapers from five to ten 
minutes daily. Raise the level of one’s own understanding 
and publicise the news amongst others.
2. Support and help the government in its suppression of counter 
revolutionaries. Protect the mill and search out secret agents.
3. Do not believe rumours one may hear. Explain (the true facts) 
to others and seek out the source of such rumours.
b. By means of effective action, improve production and fulfill 
work tasks in order to give thanks to Chairman Mao, the 
Communist Party and the Peoples government for their correct 
leadership. Support the Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army and 
oppose the American arming of Japan.
5. Improve unity and mutual help. Don’t complain, and achieve 
ideological unity within the whole team. Establish relations 
with other groups.
6. Study technology, do research into technology together with 
other workers and management cadres who understand technology; 
study how to make minor repairs in machines. Raise the level 
of production.
7. Study ’culture’ (i.e. improve literacy), undertake not to miss 
classes at night school so that one may become a person who 
understands, writes and is able to use (machinery). Help 
those who cannot attend night school.
8. Every two weeks investigate the implementation of the patriotic 
compact.
Source :
Tsen-vang Ting-li ho Chih-hsing Ai-kuo Kung-yfleh (How to 
Draw uo and Implement Patriotic Compacts) Harkow Chung Nan 
Jen-min Ch’u-pan-she September 1951 PP 50-51.
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BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MORE IMPORTANT NAMES APPEARING
IE THE NOTES
I have listed here only the more important posts held during 
the New Democratic Period or the period in which their 
articles were written.
AN TZU-WEN
2. CHANG HSI
Deputy Director CCP.CC Organisation Bureau. 
Minister of Personnel.
Ranking Party Secretary in Honan Party Com­
mittee. Chairman Honan Finance and Economics 
Committee. Member of State Planning Commission 
(1952 -
3. CHANG LI-K’O Chairman Shenyang General Labour Union.
CHANG P1ING-HUa Member CSMAC (1950) and its Finance and Econo­
mics Cttee. Chairman Wuhan Peoples Government 
(Sept. 1950 - ) demoted early 1952 and later 
reinstated.
5. CHANG SKIH-LIN
6. CIMEN PO-TA
7. CHI MING-TA
8. CHOU SHU K ’ANG
9. CHU H3TJEH-FAN
10. IiSU TI-IIS IN
11
Team Leader of the 1202 drilling crew at the 
Tach’ing Oil Field (1966)
Deputy Director Party Propaganda Bureau.
Director Anshan Iron and Steel Company; Smelt­
ing Works Construction Corporation.
Head of Wages Department NE General Labour 
Union.
Adm. Cttee. member of Chinese Labour Assn(1 '9^ +5^  
Delegate of Assn to 6th Labour Conference. Held 
a number of posts 19^+9-65 including Minister of 
Posts and Telecommunications. Vice Chairman ACFTU
KSUEH
12. JAO SHU-SHIH
Vice Chairman E. China Military Region Finance 
and Economics Cttee (and later ECMAC Feb 1950) 
June 1952 Vice Chairman of All China Federation 
of Industry and Commerce.
MU-CH1IAQ Secretary General GAC Finance and Economics 
cttee (1 9^9-52). Head of State Statistical 
Bureau. Member State Planning Commission.
Chairman E. China MAC (late# E. China Adm. 
cttee) 1st Secretary CCP.CC E. China Bureau 
(1952-) Head of CCP Organisation Bureau. Dis­
appeared Feb. 195*+* Censured. March 1955*
13. KAO FANG-CIU I 
1V. ICAO KANG
1 5* KU CHO-HSIN
16. LAI JO-YU
17. LI FU-CIlfUN
FGM Shenyang Wu San Factory.
Chairman NEPG, Secy CCP.CC NE Bureau. (1952-) 
Chairman State Planning Commission. Disappeared 
Feb 195^• Suicide 195*+* Censured March 1955*
Head of Finance Dpt. NEPG (1952) Vice Chairman 
NEPG Planning Cttee (195*+-) Vice Chairman State 
Planning Commission.
(Dec 1951-) Member Central Austerity Examination 
Cttee. ACFL Secretary General and from 1953 
ACFTU Chairman.
(19*+9-) Vice Chairman NEPG. (October 19*+9) mem­
ber Central Finance and Economics Cttee and 
later Vice Chairman. Minister of Heavy Industry 
(1950-52). Vice Chairman Central Austerity 
Committee (1951)* Member and later Chairman of 
State Planning Commission (after dismissal of Kao 
Kang)
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18.
19.
20.
21 .
22,
23.
2b.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
LI H3IU-JEN of ACFTU General Office
LI HSUEH-FENG
LI LI-3AN
Deputy Director
(1 957).
Held a number of important posts in C3MAC 
(1 950-5iO  • Later Head CCP Industrial and 
Communications Work Dpt.
_________  Better known for his career in the late
1920s. (19^8) 1st Vice Chairman ACFL (de­
fact Head). Until union crisis of 1951-2. 
His errors exposed in 1953. Replaced by 
Lai Jo-yti at 7th Labour Conference.
LIU CH’ANG-SHENG Executive Cttee. member Shanghai Party Cttee
(19^+9-52) and 3rd Secretary (1 952-3) Member 
of Central Govt. Finance and Economics Cttee 
(1951-^) Head of ECMAC Labour Dpt and Dir­
ector Shanghai Office of ACFL.
LIU SHAO-CH’ I
LIU TZU-CHIU
LU TUNG
MA HENG-CHANG
PENG CHEN 
SUN YEH-FANG
T ’ AO CHU
TENG T ’ O
TENG TZU-H UI
WANG H0-3H0U
YEH HSIU CH’ ING
By 1 9^5 Second only to Mao Tse-tung in the 
Party. For full list of posts see Klein and 
Clark (op.cit).
Director of a number of bodies directly 
under ACFL Centre and member of the ACFTU 
Executive Cttee, Praesidium and Secretariat.
Deputy Director NEPG Industrial Dpt. (19529 
Vice Minister of Heavy Industry.
Teamleader in the 5th Machinery works in 
Shenyang. The most famous of all the model 
team leaders in the period.
Best known as Mayor of Peking (1951-66).
Economic Theorist. (19^9) Member ECMAC Fi­
nance and Economics Cttee. (195*+-7) Deputy 
Director State Statistical Bureau. (19o1) 
Director Institute of Economics. Attacked 
as a ’’Chinese Liberraan” in 1966.
(in 1960s) 1st Secretary of Central South 
Bureau CCP.CC and Vice Premier.
(1950) Deputy Managing Director JMJP. (1952) 
Editor in Chief JMJP. (1951) Head of Propa­
ganda Cttee of Peking Party Cttee. Later to 
become notorious in Cultural Revolution.
Member Central Finance and Economics Cttee 
and (after 1952) Vice Chairman, Ranking Vice 
Chairman of C3MAC.
Director NEPG Industrial Dpt. and member of 
NE Finance and Economics Cttee. Succeeded 
Li Fu-ch’un as Minister of Heavy Industry.
FGM Canton Heavy Duty Machine Works, (in 
1960s) Director of Industrial Bureau of 
Economics cttee of Central South Bureau of 
the Party.
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